Your message dated Thu, 11 May 2023 12:21:47 +0000 with message-id <[email protected]> and subject line Bug#1035932: fixed in python-os-brick 6.2.2-1 has caused the Debian Bug report #1035932, regarding CVE-2023-2088 / OSSA-2023-003: Unauthorized volume access through deleted volume attachments to be marked as done.
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--- Begin Message ---Source: python-os-brick Version: 6.2.0-1 Severity: grave ============================================================================ OSSA-2023-003: Unauthorized volume access through deleted volume attachments ============================================================================ :Date: May 10, 2023 :CVE: CVE-2023-2088 Affects ~~~~~~~ - Cinder: <20.2.1, >=21.0.0 <21.2.1, ==22.0.0 - Glance_store: <3.0.1, >=4.0.0 <4.1.1, >=4.2.0 <4.3.1 - Nova: <25.1.2, >=26.0.0 <26.1.2, ==27.0.0 - Os-brick: <5.2.3, >=6.0.0 <6.1.1, >=6.2.0 <6.2.2 Description ~~~~~~~~~~~ An unauthorized access to a volume could occur when an iSCSI or FC connection from a host is severed due to a volume being unmapped on the storage system and the device is later reused for another volume on the same host. **Scope:** Only deployments with iSCSI or FC volumes are affected. However, the fix for this issue includes a configuration change in Nova and Cinder that may impact you on your next upgrade regardless of what backend storage technology you use. See the *Configuration change* section below, and item 4(B) in the *Patches and Associated Deployment Changes* for details. This data leak can be triggered by two different situations. **Accidental case:** If there is a problem with network connectivity during a normal detach operation, OpenStack may fail to clean the situation up properly. Instead of force-detaching the compute node device, Nova ignores the error, assuming the instance has already been deleted. Due to this incomplete operation OpenStack may end up selecting the wrong multipath device when connecting another volume to an instance. **Intentional case:** A regular user can create an instance with a volume, and then delete the volume attachment directly in Cinder, which neglects to notify Nova. The compute node SCSI plumbing (over iSCSI/FC) will continue trying to connect to the original host/port/LUN, not knowing the attachment has been deleted. If a subsequent volume attachment re-uses the host/port/LUN for a different instance and volume, the original instance will gain access to it once the SCSI plumbing reconnects. Configuration Change -------------------- To prevent the intentional case, the Block Storage API provided by Cinder must only accept attachment delete requests from Nova for instance-attached volumes. A complicating factor is that Nova deletes an attachment by making a call to the Block Storage API on behalf of the user (that is, by passing the user's token), which makes the request indistinguishable from the user making this request directly. The solution is to have Nova include a service token along with the user's token so that Cinder can determine that the detach request is coming from Nova. The ability for Nova to pass a service token has been supported since Ocata, but has not been required until now. Thus, deployments that are not currently sending service user credentials from Nova will need to apply the relevant code changes and also make configuration changes to solve the problem. Patches and Associated Deployment Changes ----------------------------------------- Given the above analysis, a thorough fix must include the following elements: 1. The os-brick library must implement the ``force`` option for fibre channel, which which has only been available for iSCSI until now (covered by the linked patches). 2. Nova must call os-brick with the ``force`` option when disconnecting volumes from deleted instances (covered by the linked patches). 3. In deployments where Glance uses the cinder glance_store driver, glance must call os-brick with the ``force`` option when disconnecting volumes (covered by the linked patches). 4. Cinder must distinguish between safe and unsafe attachment delete requests and reject the unsafe ones. This part of the fix has two components: a. The Block Storage API will return a 409 (Conflict) for a request to delete an attachment if there is an instance currently using the attachment, **unless** the request is being made by a service (for example, Nova) on behalf of a user (covered by the linked patches). b. In order to recognize that a request is being made by a service on behalf of a user, Nova must be configured to send a service token along with the user token. If this configuration change is not made, the cinder change will reject **any** request to delete an attachment associated with a volume that is attached to an instance. Nova must be configured to send a service token to Cinder, and Cinder must be configured to accept service tokens. This is described in the following document and **IS NOT AUTOMATICALLY APPLIED BY THE LINKED PATCHES:** (Using service tokens to prevent long-running job failures) https://docs.openstack.org/cinder/latest/configuration/block-storage/service-token.html The Nova patch mentioned in step 2 includes a similar document more focused on Nova: doc/source/admin/configuration/service-user-token.rst 5. The cinder glance_store driver does not attach volumes to instances; instead, it attaches volumes directly to the Glance node. Thus, the Cinder change in step 4 will recognize an attachment-delete request coming from Glance as safe and allow it. (Of course, we expect that you will have applied the patches in steps 1 and 3 to your Glance nodes.) Errata ~~~~~~ An additional nova patch is required to fix a minor regression in periodic tasks and some nova-manage actions (errata 1). Also a patch to tempest is needed to account for behavior changes with fixes in place (errata 2). Patches ~~~~~~~ - https://review.opendev.org/882836 (2023.1/antelope cinder) - https://review.opendev.org/882851 (2023.1/antelope glance_store) - https://review.opendev.org/882858 (2023.1/antelope nova) - https://review.opendev.org/882859 (2023.1/antelope nova errata 1) - https://review.opendev.org/882843 (2023.1/antelope os-brick) - https://review.opendev.org/882835 (2023.2/bobcat cinder) - https://review.opendev.org/882834 (2023.2/bobcat glance_store) - https://review.opendev.org/882847 (2023.2/bobcat nova) - https://review.opendev.org/882852 (2023.2/bobcat nova errata 1) - https://review.opendev.org/882840 (2023.2/bobcat os-brick) - https://review.opendev.org/882876 (2023.2/bobcat tempest errata 2) - https://review.opendev.org/882869 (Wallaby nova) - https://review.opendev.org/882870 (Wallaby nova errata 1) - https://review.opendev.org/882839 (Xena cinder) - https://review.opendev.org/882855 (Xena glance_store) - https://review.opendev.org/882867 (Xena nova) - https://review.opendev.org/882868 (Xena nova errata 1) - https://review.opendev.org/882848 (Xena os-brick) - https://review.opendev.org/882838 (Yoga cinder) - https://review.opendev.org/882854 (Yoga glance_store) - https://review.opendev.org/882863 (Yoga nova) - https://review.opendev.org/882864 (Yoga nova errata 1) - https://review.opendev.org/882846 (Yoga os-brick) - https://review.opendev.org/882837 (Zed cinder) - https://review.opendev.org/882853 (Zed glance_store) - https://review.opendev.org/882860 (Zed nova) - https://review.opendev.org/882861 (Zed nova errata 1) - https://review.opendev.org/882844 (Zed os-brick) Credits ~~~~~~~ - Jan Wasilewski from Atman (CVE-2023-2088) - Gorka Eguileor from Red Hat (CVE-2023-2088) References ~~~~~~~~~~ - https://launchpad.net/bugs/2004555 - http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2023-2088 Notes ~~~~~ - Limited Protection Against Accidents... If you are only concerned with protecting against the accidental case described earlier in this document, steps 1-3 above should be sufficient. Note, however, that only applying steps 1-3 leaves your cloud wide open to the intentional exploitation of this vulnerability. Therefore, we recommend that the full fix be applied to all deployments. - Using Configuration as a Short-Term Mitigation... An alternative approach to mitigation can be found in OSSN-0092 https://wiki.openstack.org/wiki/OSSN/OSSN-0092 - The stable/xena and stable/wallaby branches are under extended maintenance and will receive no new point releases, but patches for them are provided as a courtesy where available. OSSA History ~~~~~~~~~~~~ - 2023-05-10 - Errata 2 - 2023-05-10 - Errata 1 - 2023-05-10 - Original Version -- Jeremy Stanley OpenStack Vulnerability Management Team
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--- Begin Message ---Source: python-os-brick Source-Version: 6.2.2-1 Done: Thomas Goirand <[email protected]> We believe that the bug you reported is fixed in the latest version of python-os-brick, which is due to be installed in the Debian FTP archive. A summary of the changes between this version and the previous one is attached. Thank you for reporting the bug, which will now be closed. If you have further comments please address them to [email protected], and the maintainer will reopen the bug report if appropriate. Debian distribution maintenance software pp. Thomas Goirand <[email protected]> (supplier of updated python-os-brick package) (This message was generated automatically at their request; if you believe that there is a problem with it please contact the archive administrators by mailing [email protected]) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 Format: 1.8 Date: Thu, 11 May 2023 13:34:21 +0200 Source: python-os-brick Architecture: source Version: 6.2.2-1 Distribution: experimental Urgency: medium Maintainer: Debian OpenStack <[email protected]> Changed-By: Thomas Goirand <[email protected]> Closes: 1035932 Changes: python-os-brick (6.2.2-1) experimental; urgency=medium . * New upstream point release: - Fixes CVE-2023-2088: Unauthorized volume access through deleted volume attachments. (Closes: #1035932). Checksums-Sha1: 37cad0c18be3dc69c7f3e7228772c794d6b567a4 2912 python-os-brick_6.2.2-1.dsc 141c6bd51fbcf84ff3ba7e7c582c7761f9e28ee4 176276 python-os-brick_6.2.2.orig.tar.xz ec9000e382176fb0ef0adf30036014db3e0955a6 4704 python-os-brick_6.2.2-1.debian.tar.xz 6346770d2625b8714fbf985042ad7dd6c9c9f87b 12890 python-os-brick_6.2.2-1_amd64.buildinfo Checksums-Sha256: f4c1aca67f62647659dd5976976d3cb7b12ca857fe7908c51998fa1ec911a563 2912 python-os-brick_6.2.2-1.dsc 9891864e3e3f91035b0f95646ad30b53c693f2c4e8a080ea31924d70ea14389f 176276 python-os-brick_6.2.2.orig.tar.xz 86896323189d9a7ce964e78feee587a0f8572eeceba2a2bc08ca941c254e50a3 4704 python-os-brick_6.2.2-1.debian.tar.xz 4fbd70e686f0ae0b5a767a8642b21bfd22d43983e01582b2c18fd9cff1289726 12890 python-os-brick_6.2.2-1_amd64.buildinfo Files: bfbb2df7e11caaa16e9c63177373e4da 2912 python optional python-os-brick_6.2.2-1.dsc b856ab305026f5b4a1e506181d9c5fee 176276 python optional python-os-brick_6.2.2.orig.tar.xz a14f91e25d9032bf257ade41b39402cf 4704 python optional python-os-brick_6.2.2-1.debian.tar.xz 1dc451a2c00cda37958e528c9954b958 12890 python optional python-os-brick_6.2.2-1_amd64.buildinfo -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIzBAEBCAAdFiEEoLGp81CJVhMOekJc1BatFaxrQ/4FAmRc1L4ACgkQ1BatFaxr Q/5sYQ//Uvg+hn6Bbhxx2SW6En1WyfJx1mRX7wDhcsboGEytrM5ne7RNl+BQVv0V RezINwaWW4AkKIpGTfTe6ju05dxsTKuzR+0xmtX5K1cvfeUROiqFr9p9+lImkwNR LkycvTILR0tftMeww19TwvxcXrXVGH6nRPLl+8IdiFHkRc9Q39aUhVShin29eToe OP+6DRkH6lfoZWkkJ2tl93elCnLzrEZ7MZdS/Ak6G0HAvkYScJ4ikT/WCqLAw1l2 ttFvgJ395eTlHA8SkOfmeGMdCqDZnrLZnhyzwxuxRrRGvvyKzrXgbkt4ojexTxo5 r9Ym7HW7Uhdz9aODLKz4AO45A9qYTgpE2CHJR1VDMpMwIowREPMll2hLBdeZgGYK K4osZxut5EMjLGEaUYSBuemE7zAL2A5oCBPXshp+3Lv4dHEPiggAqqtIDDv2FbUp A3jtJ+wiusCbxnaTINWy/gQZDwC3gb1dp8rr0K4PwRiPUpIbTpWiWoE6Gc9sR+J1 ztt7RmQsrTrgJ/AK/1IBPRGYHop49LzUxUnWbx4Go3davdlgZfHiYNVqYcEkWwJi 9lTkqGLyLozbQjOqmfSu8y4w/tknXSCITB0BfRle3Sy1pJYJK6AIyC6D3NCG2al5 a+spMtG5HsObGOLNkSUOb9eUaDRFJwXX5oSldkBLs0dLW9tUBDg= =RbJ+ -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
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