Package: rsyslog Version: 8.4.2-1 Severity: important Tags: security -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256
We are using rsyslog to send logs from machine A to machine B through a TLS-authenticated TCP connection. Sometimes, the network between the two machines becomes unreliable. If the TCP connections breaks without proper indication, the server side does not seem to clean some context or state. This results in the connection not being re-established after the network comes back, which breaks logging on the client because the log buffers run over and Syslog is designed to block in that case. I could imagine this is security-relevant. *If* an admin sees need to use TLS on Syslog, then they obviously have an untrusted network between machines, so deliberately breaking the TLS connection and thus causing a Denial of Service on the server becomes an attack vector. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1 iQJOBAEBCAA4BQJWQGVJMRpodHRwczovL3d3dy5kb21pbmlrLWdlb3JnZS5kZS9n cGctcG9saWN5LnR4dC5hc2MACgkQt5o8FqDE8pZQmxAAs07EusSEu0ZGw07m1g9d wcMkiPKmE3rpzjPTFQkTGwP26l7x+1qKcOgPRQ5gaFWxHHUmVDpgCdU+RN5b2Yih A8KAaoccKzwONhCecHFMLLbmjZFh6ZqI0OI1i4DUnfLb/zKWmcNMjh8LWBGdDC3T rApopmBIGeOcnhvdHMIiSlkRl1av560eyEwrUW5A6p4OqS6CeWX8Kl5olMPtTnhO 0RsNqXCnQluQOO0oQA5G7WcNl9DHVj4VvUte8nbm+tN+3D1fTrGywQ65gIi9nPWQ AHQ6lM2FPFLVv4QBejI9VT262u2BelrFMB5JGWZr2YsW7Jzzspq+s4Wn1PQqEJm2 i9t0A/4pTGBeJWs1wrVqVMGhNfWOZQczrtyYoE658flXv4fR2HalW2aoy9SWTtxs i3//zQmMaEgKzmG8EI8PW8T/pVuBjuXOKCsV+CJkpLimIlwHt1+VClqUBtV0UVYp zQsC+qeeHwWfLjpBhQ8lIfJQqsblR14hwESaXrcPV7wnsFjQx6ViIhQLn+b/ktOg O9ihZ79n4xMPZjAhpDBvO8WYZT7nZnvjUbTXr86bf9eU7IJF7jcrlq80JnCfARR5 +DFSwgYY2cfGuPyuP4pYYc5HdKNPFiuF7SmodIwTndKBfbMSeLrJF+tlWNa7qT+Y U+ZCTX3RsqS9Q6dgXcn3Nao= =dy+L -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----