On Tue, Dec 13, 2016 at 02:03:50PM +0100, Sébastien Delafond wrote:
> On Dec/13, Uwe Kleine-König wrote:
> > Do you consider CVE-2016-6255 and CVE-2016-8863 bad enough to make a
> > security update for it? If so, I suggest the following debdiff.
> 
> Yes, the first one is bad, so let's fix both via a DSA.

I had the impression that the 2nd might be bad, too. There is no public
exploit available, but AFAIK writing to unallocated memory is dangerous?

> Could you please provide a debdiff with 1:1.6.19+git20141001-1+deb8u1 as
> a version, instead of 1.1 ?

Yeah, I wondered if the version is right and trusted dch --security to
do the right thing. Find below a debdiff using +deb8u1

Best regards
Uwe

dpkg-source: warning: extracting unsigned source package 
(/home/uwe/tm/libupnp_1.6.19+git20141001-1+deb8u1.dsc)
diff -Nru libupnp-1.6.19+git20141001/debian/changelog 
libupnp-1.6.19+git20141001/debian/changelog
--- libupnp-1.6.19+git20141001/debian/changelog 2014-10-23 22:48:01.000000000 
+0200
+++ libupnp-1.6.19+git20141001/debian/changelog 2016-12-13 11:46:31.000000000 
+0100
@@ -1,3 +1,11 @@
+libupnp (1:1.6.19+git20141001-1+deb8u1) jessie-security; urgency=high
+
+  * Non-maintainer upload by the Security Team.
+  * backport fixes for CVE-2016-6255 and CVE-2016-8863
+    (Closes: #831857, #842093)
+
+ -- Uwe Kleine-König <uklei...@debian.org>  Tue, 13 Dec 2016 11:46:31 +0100
+
 libupnp (1:1.6.19+git20141001-1) unstable; urgency=low
 
   * Ack both NMUs, thankyou for your care of this package.
diff -Nru libupnp-1.6.19+git20141001/debian/patches/CVE-2016-6255.patch 
libupnp-1.6.19+git20141001/debian/patches/CVE-2016-6255.patch
--- libupnp-1.6.19+git20141001/debian/patches/CVE-2016-6255.patch       
1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
+++ libupnp-1.6.19+git20141001/debian/patches/CVE-2016-6255.patch       
2016-12-13 11:46:31.000000000 +0100
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+From c91a8a3903367e1163765b73eb4d43be7d7927fa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Matthew Garrett <mj...@srcf.ucam.org>
+Date: Tue, 23 Feb 2016 13:53:20 -0800
+Subject: [PATCH] Don't allow unhandled POSTs to write to the filesystem by
+ default
+
+If there's no registered handler for a POST request, the default behaviour
+is to write it to the filesystem. Several million deployed devices appear
+to have this behaviour, making it possible to (at least) store arbitrary
+data on them. Add a configure option that enables this behaviour, and change
+the default to just drop POSTs that aren't directly handled.
+
+Signed-off-by: Marcelo Roberto Jimenez <mrobe...@users.sourceforge.net>
+Bug: https://sourceforge.net/p/pupnp/bugs/132/
+Bug-CVE: https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2016-6255
+Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/831857
+---
+ configure.ac                         |    4 ++++
+ upnp/inc/upnpconfig.h.in             |    4 ++++
+ upnp/src/genlib/net/http/webserver.c |    4 ++++
+ 3 files changed, 12 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/configure.ac
++++ b/configure.ac
+@@ -495,6 +495,10 @@
+         AC_DEFINE(UPNP_ENABLE_BLOCKING_TCP_CONNECTIONS, 1, [see upnpconfig.h])
+ fi
+ 
++RT_BOOL_ARG_ENABLE([postwrite], [no], [write to the filesystem on otherwise 
unhandled POST requests])
++if test "x$enable_postwrite" = xyes ; then
++      AC_DEFINE(UPNP_ENABLE_POST_WRITE, 1, [see upnpconfig.h])
++fi
+ 
+ RT_BOOL_ARG_ENABLE([samples], [yes], [compilation of upnp/sample/ code])
+ 
+--- a/upnp/inc/upnpconfig.h.in
++++ b/upnp/inc/upnpconfig.h.in
+@@ -131,5 +131,9 @@
+  * header (i.e. configure --enable-unspecified_server) */
+ #undef UPNP_ENABLE_UNSPECIFIED_SERVER
+ 
++/** Defined to 1 if the library has been compiled to support filesystem 
writes on POST
++ * (i.e. configure --enable-postwrite) */
++#undef UPNP_ENABLE_POST_WRITE
++
+ #endif /* UPNP_CONFIG_H */
+ 
+--- a/upnp/src/genlib/net/http/webserver.c
++++ b/upnp/src/genlib/net/http/webserver.c
+@@ -1366,9 +1366,13 @@
+               if (Fp == NULL)
+                       return HTTP_INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR;
+       } else {
++#ifdef UPNP_ENABLE_POST_WRITE
+               Fp = fopen(filename, "wb");
+               if (Fp == NULL)
+                       return HTTP_UNAUTHORIZED;
++#else
++              return HTTP_NOT_FOUND;
++#endif
+       }
+       parser->position = POS_ENTITY;
+       do {
diff -Nru libupnp-1.6.19+git20141001/debian/patches/CVE-2016-8863.patch 
libupnp-1.6.19+git20141001/debian/patches/CVE-2016-8863.patch
--- libupnp-1.6.19+git20141001/debian/patches/CVE-2016-8863.patch       
1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
+++ libupnp-1.6.19+git20141001/debian/patches/CVE-2016-8863.patch       
2016-12-13 11:46:31.000000000 +0100
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+From 8d48f5cf63973c452cb4578a1fbe623ba95a8e65 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Uwe=20Kleine-K=C3=B6nig?= <uklei...@debian.org>
+Date: Thu, 8 Dec 2016 17:11:53 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix out-of-bound access in create_url_list() (CVE-2016-8863)
+
+If there is an invalid URL in URLS->buf after a valid one, uri_parse is
+called with out pointing after the allocated memory. As uri_parse writes
+to *out before returning an error the loop in create_url_list must be
+stopped early to prevent an out-of-bound access
+
+Bug: https://sourceforge.net/p/pupnp/bugs/133/
+Bug-CVE: https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2016-8863
+Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/842093
+Bug-Redhat: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1388771
+Applied-Upstream: 1.6.x, commit:a0f6e719bc03c4d2fe6a4a42ef6b8761446f520b
+
+---
+ upnp/src/gena/gena_device.c |   17 ++++++++++++-----
+ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/upnp/src/gena/gena_device.c
++++ b/upnp/src/gena/gena_device.c
+@@ -1113,7 +1113,7 @@
+       /*! [out] . */
+       URL_list *out)
+ {
+-    size_t URLcount = 0;
++    size_t URLcount = 0, URLcount2 = 0;
+     size_t i;
+     int return_code = 0;
+     uri_type temp;
+@@ -1155,16 +1155,23 @@
+         }
+         memcpy( out->URLs, URLS->buff, URLS->size );
+         out->URLs[URLS->size] = 0;
+-        URLcount = 0;
+         for( i = 0; i < URLS->size; i++ ) {
+             if( ( URLS->buff[i] == '<' ) && ( i + 1 < URLS->size ) ) {
+                 if( ( ( return_code =
+                         parse_uri( &out->URLs[i + 1], URLS->size - i + 1,
+-                                   &out->parsedURLs[URLcount] ) ) ==
++                                   &out->parsedURLs[URLcount2] ) ) ==
+                       HTTP_SUCCESS )
+-                    && ( out->parsedURLs[URLcount].hostport.text.size !=
++                    && ( out->parsedURLs[URLcount2].hostport.text.size !=
+                          0 ) ) {
+-                    URLcount++;
++                    URLcount2++;
++                  if (URLcount2 >= URLcount)
++                          /*
++                           * break early here in case there is a bogus URL 
that
++                           * was skipped above. This prevents to access
++                           * out->parsedURLs[URLcount] which is beyond the
++                           * allocation.
++                           */
++                          break;
+                 } else {
+                     if( return_code == UPNP_E_OUTOF_MEMORY ) {
+                         free( out->URLs );
diff -Nru libupnp-1.6.19+git20141001/debian/patches/series 
libupnp-1.6.19+git20141001/debian/patches/series
--- libupnp-1.6.19+git20141001/debian/patches/series    2014-10-04 
06:26:29.000000000 +0200
+++ libupnp-1.6.19+git20141001/debian/patches/series    2016-12-13 
11:46:31.000000000 +0100
@@ -5,3 +5,5 @@
 18-url-upnpstrings.patch
 19_fix_tests.patch
 21_fix-1.6.19+git.patch
+CVE-2016-6255.patch
+CVE-2016-8863.patch

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