Control: tags 1009167 + patch Control: tags 1009167 + pending
Dear maintainer, I've prepared an NMU for xz-utils (versioned as 5.2.5-2.1) and uploaded it to DELAYED/2. Please feel free to tell me if I should delay it longer. Regards, Salvatore
diff -Nru xz-utils-5.2.5/debian/changelog xz-utils-5.2.5/debian/changelog --- xz-utils-5.2.5/debian/changelog 2021-03-08 23:01:54.000000000 +0100 +++ xz-utils-5.2.5/debian/changelog 2022-04-10 13:31:29.000000000 +0200 @@ -1,3 +1,11 @@ +xz-utils (5.2.5-2.1) unstable; urgency=medium + + * Non-maintainer upload. + * xzgrep: Fix escaping of malicious filenames (ZDI-CAN-16587) + (CVE-2022-1271) (Closes: #1009167) + + -- Salvatore Bonaccorso <car...@debian.org> Sun, 10 Apr 2022 13:31:29 +0200 + xz-utils (5.2.5-2) unstable; urgency=medium * Non-maintainer upload (Closes: #983067). diff -Nru xz-utils-5.2.5/debian/patches/0010-xzgrep-Fix-escaping-of-malicious-filenames-ZDI-CAN-1.patch xz-utils-5.2.5/debian/patches/0010-xzgrep-Fix-escaping-of-malicious-filenames-ZDI-CAN-1.patch --- xz-utils-5.2.5/debian/patches/0010-xzgrep-Fix-escaping-of-malicious-filenames-ZDI-CAN-1.patch 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100 +++ xz-utils-5.2.5/debian/patches/0010-xzgrep-Fix-escaping-of-malicious-filenames-ZDI-CAN-1.patch 2022-04-10 13:30:30.000000000 +0200 @@ -0,0 +1,96 @@ +From: Lasse Collin <lasse.col...@tukaani.org> +Date: Tue, 29 Mar 2022 19:19:12 +0300 +Subject: xzgrep: Fix escaping of malicious filenames (ZDI-CAN-16587). +Origin: https://git.tukaani.org/?p=xz.git;a=commit;h=69d1b3fc29677af8ade8dc15dba83f0589cb63d6 +Bug-Debian-Security: https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2022-1271 +Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/1009167 + +Malicious filenames can make xzgrep to write to arbitrary files +or (with a GNU sed extension) lead to arbitrary code execution. + +xzgrep from XZ Utils versions up to and including 5.2.5 are +affected. 5.3.1alpha and 5.3.2alpha are affected as well. +This patch works for all of them. + +This bug was inherited from gzip's zgrep. gzip 1.12 includes +a fix for zgrep. + +The issue with the old sed script is that with multiple newlines, +the N-command will read the second line of input, then the +s-commands will be skipped because it's not the end of the +file yet, then a new sed cycle starts and the pattern space +is printed and emptied. So only the last line or two get escaped. + +One way to fix this would be to read all lines into the pattern +space first. However, the included fix is even simpler: All lines +except the last line get a backslash appended at the end. To ensure +that shell command substitution doesn't eat a possible trailing +newline, a colon is appended to the filename before escaping. +The colon is later used to separate the filename from the grep +output so it is fine to add it here instead of a few lines later. + +The old code also wasn't POSIX compliant as it used \n in the +replacement section of the s-command. Using \<newline> is the +POSIX compatible method. + +LC_ALL=C was added to the two critical sed commands. POSIX sed +manual recommends it when using sed to manipulate pathnames +because in other locales invalid multibyte sequences might +cause issues with some sed implementations. In case of GNU sed, +these particular sed scripts wouldn't have such problems but some +other scripts could have, see: + + info '(sed)Locale Considerations' + +This vulnerability was discovered by: +cleemy desu wayo working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative + +Thanks to Jim Meyering and Paul Eggert discussing the different +ways to fix this and for coordinating the patch release schedule +with gzip. +--- + src/scripts/xzgrep.in | 20 ++++++++++++-------- + 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/scripts/xzgrep.in b/src/scripts/xzgrep.in +index b180936c808c..e5186baf84e9 100644 +--- a/src/scripts/xzgrep.in ++++ b/src/scripts/xzgrep.in +@@ -180,22 +180,26 @@ for i; do + { test $# -eq 1 || test $no_filename -eq 1; }; then + eval "$grep" + else ++ # Append a colon so that the last character will never be a newline ++ # which would otherwise get lost in shell command substitution. ++ i="$i:" ++ ++ # Escape & \ | and newlines only if such characters are present ++ # (speed optimization). + case $i in + (*' + '* | *'&'* | *'\'* | *'|'*) +- i=$(printf '%s\n' "$i" | +- sed ' +- $!N +- $s/[&\|]/\\&/g +- $s/\n/\\n/g +- ');; ++ i=$(printf '%s\n' "$i" | LC_ALL=C sed 's/[&\|]/\\&/g; $!s/$/\\/');; + esac +- sed_script="s|^|$i:|" ++ ++ # $i already ends with a colon so don't add it here. ++ sed_script="s|^|$i|" + + # Fail if grep or sed fails. + r=$( + exec 4>&1 +- (eval "$grep" 4>&-; echo $? >&4) 3>&- | sed "$sed_script" >&3 4>&- ++ (eval "$grep" 4>&-; echo $? >&4) 3>&- | ++ LC_ALL=C sed "$sed_script" >&3 4>&- + ) || r=2 + exit $r + fi >&3 5>&- +-- +2.35.1 + diff -Nru xz-utils-5.2.5/debian/patches/series xz-utils-5.2.5/debian/patches/series --- xz-utils-5.2.5/debian/patches/series 2021-03-04 20:54:41.000000000 +0100 +++ xz-utils-5.2.5/debian/patches/series 2022-04-10 13:30:50.000000000 +0200 @@ -7,3 +7,4 @@ 0007-xz-Avoid-unneeded-f-escapes-on-the-man-page.patch 0008-xz-Make-keep-accept-symlinks-hardlinks-and-setuid-se.patch 0009-Scripts-Fix-exit-status-of-xzgrep.patch +0010-xzgrep-Fix-escaping-of-malicious-filenames-ZDI-CAN-1.patch
