Hi Guillem, 
>I assume you have something installed that downloads source packages
> (and perhaps builds them) as part of the upgrade?
Gnome Software and I left sources.list pretty much as it came from the
net install CD. 
So I'm getting this because some packages no longer have a maintainer,
that sucks, hope you guys get some more maintainers for those projects.
Either way, thanks for the clear explanation of why it's happening and
where the warnings are coming from. 
If it's not really a bug I guess it's okay to close it and sorry for
wasting your time. 
Have a great day! 
 
-- 
 <tmcconnell...@gmail.com>


On Wed, 2022-07-27 at 12:25 +0200, Guillem Jover wrote:
> Control: reassign -1 dpkg-dev 1.21.9
> Control: tag -1 moreinfo
> 
> Hi!
> 
> On Tue, 2022-07-26 at 14:24:41 -0500, Tim McConnell wrote:
> > Package: dpkg
> > Version: 1.21.9
> > Severity: normal
> > X-Debbugs-Cc: tmcconnell...@gmail.com
> 
> > What led up to the situation? Normal upgrading of system
> > 
> > What exactly did you do (or not do) that was effective (or
> > ineffective)? Unsure
> > these messages started appearing.
> > 
> > What was the outcome of this action? I now receive multiple lines
> > of: gpgv:
> > Signature made Fri 24 Oct 2014 06:23:17 PM CDT
> > gpgv:                using RSA key F664D256B4691A7D
> > gpgv: Can't check signature: No public key
> > dpkg-source: warning: cannot verify signature
> > /var/cache/apt/sources/libtrio_1.16+dfsg1-3.dsc
> > gpgv: Signature made Tue 03 May 2022 09:04:38 PM CDT
> > gpgv:                using RSA key A1489FE2AB99A21A
> > gpgv: Note: signatures using the SHA1 algorithm are rejected
> > gpgv: Can't check signature: Bad public key
> > dpkg-source: warning: cannot verify signature
> > /var/cache/apt/sources/r-cran-
> > quantreg_5.93-1.dsc
> > gpgv: Signature made Wed 20 Jul 2022 05:25:03 AM CDT
> > gpgv:                using RSA key A1489FE2AB99A21A
> > gpgv: Note: signatures using the SHA1 algorithm are rejected
> > gpgv: Can't check signature: Bad public key
> > dpkg-source: warning: cannot verify signature
> > /var/cache/apt/sources/r-cran-
> > quantreg_5.94-1.dsc
> > apt-listdifferences: removing old src:r-cran-quantreg 5.93-1
> > gpgv: Signature made Fri 27 May 2022 04:42:52 AM CDT
> > gpgv:                using RSA key
> > 5F2A9FB82FA6C1E1077007072D191C8843B13F4D
> > gpgv: Note: signatures using the SHA1 algorithm are rejected
> > gpgv: Can't check signature: Bad public key
> > dpkg-source: warning: cannot verify signature
> > /var/cache/apt/sources/kconfig_5.94.0-3.dsc
> > gpgv: Signature made Sat 23 Jul 2022 05:20:34 AM CDT
> > gpgv:                using RSA key
> > 5F2A9FB82FA6C1E1077007072D191C8843B13F4D
> > gpgv: Note: signatures using the SHA1 algorithm are rejected
> > gpgv: Can't check signature: Bad public key
> > dpkg-source: warning: cannot verify signature
> > /var/cache/apt/sources/kconfig_5.94.0-4.dsc
> > 
> > When running this command `apt-get dist-upgrade -y -m`
> 
> I assume you have something installed that downloads source packages
> (and perhaps builds them) as part of the upgrade? Otherwise that
> seems
> uncommon. In any case…
> 
> > What outcome did you expect instead? To be sure I'm getting
> > packages from an
> > uncompromised repo.
> 
> … assuming you are getting the source packages from a Debian
> repository, those should have the repository mataindices signed by
> the
> archive keys, which get rotated and updated when necessary, in
> contrast
> to the source package signatures which are created by the person
> uploading
> the source package (and never updated anymore). As such those latter
> signatures (when later verified after the archive did the initial
> verification on upload) can very easily come from now revoked or
> expired
> keys or from keys for people that are no longer members of the
> project
> and are thus not present in the keyrings, the signatures can be
> expired
> themselves, they might come from keys or signatures which are now
> considered weak, which is what happens to be the case here. These
> signatures use SHA1 as a hashing algorithm which is no longer
> considered
> secure and get rejected.
> 
> For the above reasons apt passes --no-check to dpkg-source, and
> dpkg-source does not default to erroring out (unless passing to it
> --require-valid-signature), as can be seen from the warnings (not
> errors) shown above. So I see no dpkg bug here, perhaps whatever is
> calling dpkg-source should also be passing --no-check (if it can
> guarantee the source came from a verified repo). Otherwise I'll be
> closing this in a bit.
> 
> Thanks,
> Guillem

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