Hello, I have prepared a security update for Bullseye which fixes CVE-2022-37026. Sergei could you review the update please? I am attaching the debdiff.
Regards, Markus
diff -Nru erlang-23.2.6+dfsg/debian/changelog erlang-23.2.6+dfsg/debian/changelog --- erlang-23.2.6+dfsg/debian/changelog 2021-02-25 10:34:59.000000000 +0100 +++ erlang-23.2.6+dfsg/debian/changelog 2022-11-30 12:53:30.000000000 +0100 @@ -1,3 +1,16 @@ +erlang (1:23.2.6+dfsg-1+deb11u1) bullseye-security; urgency=high + + * Non-maintainer upload. + * Fix CVE-2022-37026: + A Client Authentication Bypass vulnerability has been discovered in the + concurrent, real-time, distributed functional language Erlang. Impacted + are those who are running an ssl/tls/dtls server using the ssl application + either directly or indirectly via other applications. Note that the + vulnerability only affects servers that request client certification, that + is sets the option {verify, verify_peer}. (Closes: #1024632) + + -- Markus Koschany <a...@debian.org> Wed, 30 Nov 2022 12:53:30 +0100 + erlang (1:23.2.6+dfsg-1) unstable; urgency=medium * New upstream release. diff -Nru erlang-23.2.6+dfsg/debian/patches/CVE-2022-37026.patch erlang-23.2.6+dfsg/debian/patches/CVE-2022-37026.patch --- erlang-23.2.6+dfsg/debian/patches/CVE-2022-37026.patch 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100 +++ erlang-23.2.6+dfsg/debian/patches/CVE-2022-37026.patch 2022-11-30 12:53:30.000000000 +0100 @@ -0,0 +1,589 @@ +From: Markus Koschany <a...@debian.org> +Date: Wed, 30 Nov 2022 11:46:49 +0100 +Subject: CVE-2022-37026 + +Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/1024632 +Origin: https://github.com/erlang/otp/commit/cd5024867e7b7d3a6e94194af9e01e1fb77e36c9 +Origin: https://github.com/erlang/otp/commit/6a1baa36e4e6c1b682e8b48e0c141602e0b8e6e5 +--- + lib/ssl/src/dtls_connection.erl | 25 +++++- + lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.hrl | 6 +- + lib/ssl/src/ssl_gen_statem.erl | 3 - + lib/ssl/src/tls_connection.erl | 21 ++++- + lib/ssl/src/tls_dtls_connection.erl | 155 ++++++++++++++++++++++-------------- + lib/ssl/src/tls_gen_connection.erl | 23 +++++- + lib/ssl/src/tls_handshake_1_3.erl | 8 +- + lib/ssl/test/ssl_npn_SUITE.erl | 8 +- + 8 files changed, 171 insertions(+), 78 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/dtls_connection.erl b/lib/ssl/src/dtls_connection.erl +index fb389dc..9f6a8a0 100644 +--- a/lib/ssl/src/dtls_connection.erl ++++ b/lib/ssl/src/dtls_connection.erl +@@ -46,7 +46,8 @@ + %% ClientKeyExchange \ + %% CertificateVerify* Flight 5 + %% [ChangeCipherSpec] / +-%% Finished --------> / ++%% NextProtocol* / ++%% Finished --------> / + %% + %% [ChangeCipherSpec] \ Flight 6 + %% <-------- Finished / +@@ -64,7 +65,8 @@ + %% <-------- Finished / part 2 + %% + %% [ChangeCipherSpec] \ Abbrev Flight 3 +-%% Finished --------> / ++%% NextProtocol* / ++%% Finished --------> / + %% + %% + %% Message Flights for Abbbriviated Handshake +@@ -140,6 +142,7 @@ + user_hello/3, + wait_ocsp_stapling/3, + certify/3, ++ wait_cert_verify/3, + cipher/3, + abbreviated/3, + connection/3]). +@@ -462,6 +465,24 @@ certify(state_timeout, Event, State) -> + certify(Type, Event, State) -> + gen_handshake(?FUNCTION_NAME, Type, Event, State). + ++ ++%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- ++-spec wait_cert_verify(gen_statem:event_type(), term(), #state{}) -> ++ gen_statem:state_function_result(). ++%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- ++wait_cert_verify(enter, _Event, State0) -> ++ {State, Actions} = handle_flight_timer(State0), ++ {keep_state, State, Actions}; ++wait_cert_verify(info, Event, State) -> ++ gen_info(Event, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State); ++wait_cert_verify(state_timeout, Event, State) -> ++ handle_state_timeout(Event, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State); ++wait_cert_verify(Type, Event, #state{connection_env = #connection_env{negotiated_version = Version}} = State) -> ++ try tls_dtls_connection:gen_handshake(?FUNCTION_NAME, Type, Event, State) ++ catch throw:#alert{} = Alert -> ++ ssl_gen_statem:handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State) ++ end. ++ + %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- + -spec cipher(gen_statem:event_type(), term(), #state{}) -> + gen_statem:state_function_result(). +diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.hrl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.hrl +index 371599b..9425fc7 100644 +--- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.hrl ++++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_connection.hrl +@@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ + %% need to worry about packet loss in TLS. In DTLS we + %% need to track DTLS handshake seqnr + flight_buffer = [] :: list() | map(), +- client_certificate_requested = false :: boolean(), ++ client_certificate_status = not_requested :: not_requested | requested | empty | needs_verifying | verified, + protocol_specific = #{} :: map(), + session :: #session{} | secret_printout(), + key_share, +@@ -146,8 +146,8 @@ + %% session_cache_cb - not implemented + %% crl_db - not implemented + %% client_hello_version - Bleichenbacher mitigation in TLS 1.2 +-%% client_certificate_requested - Built into TLS 1.3 state machine +-%% key_algorithm - not used ++%% client_certificate_status - only uses non_requested| requested ++%% key_algorithm - only uses not_requested and requested + %% diffie_hellman_params - used in TLS 1.2 ECDH key exchange + %% diffie_hellman_keys - used in TLS 1.2 ECDH key exchange + %% psk_identity - not used +diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_gen_statem.erl b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_gen_statem.erl +index aa2a554..be4ba1c 100644 +--- a/lib/ssl/src/ssl_gen_statem.erl ++++ b/lib/ssl/src/ssl_gen_statem.erl +@@ -656,9 +656,6 @@ handle_common_event(internal, {protocol_record, TLSorDTLSRecord}, StateName, + Connection:handle_protocol_record(TLSorDTLSRecord, StateName, State); + handle_common_event(timeout, hibernate, _, _) -> + {keep_state_and_data, [hibernate]}; +-handle_common_event(internal, #change_cipher_spec{type = <<1>>}, StateName, +- #state{connection_env = #connection_env{negotiated_version = Version}} = State) -> +- handle_own_alert(?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?HANDSHAKE_FAILURE), Version, StateName, State); + handle_common_event({timeout, handshake}, close, _StateName, #state{start_or_recv_from = StartFrom} = State) -> + {stop_and_reply, + {shutdown, user_timeout}, +diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/tls_connection.erl b/lib/ssl/src/tls_connection.erl +index e96e0e2..7d865b4 100644 +--- a/lib/ssl/src/tls_connection.erl ++++ b/lib/ssl/src/tls_connection.erl +@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ + %% ClientKeyExchange \ + %% CertificateVerify* Flight 3 part 1 + %% [ChangeCipherSpec] / ++%% NextProtocol* + %% Finished --------> / Flight 3 part 2 + %% [ChangeCipherSpec] + %% <-------- Finished Flight 4 +@@ -48,6 +49,7 @@ + %% [ChangeCipherSpec] + %% <-------- Finished Abbrev Flight 2 part 2 + %% [ChangeCipherSpec] ++%% NextProtocol* + %% Finished --------> Abbrev Flight 3 + %% Application Data <-------> Application Data + %% +@@ -70,13 +72,14 @@ + %% | + %% New session | Resumed session + %% WAIT_OCSP_STAPELING CERTIFY <----------------------------------> ABBRIVIATED +-%% ++%% WAIT_CERT_VERIFY + %% <- Possibly Receive -- | | +-%% OCSP Stapel ------> | Flight 3 part 1 | ++%% OCSP Stapel/CertVerify -> | Flight 3 part 1 | + %% | | + %% V | Abbrev Flight 2 part 2 to Abbrev Flight 3 + %% CIPHER | + %% | | ++%% | | + %% | Fligth 3 part 2 to Flight 4 | + %% | | + %% V V +@@ -121,6 +124,7 @@ + user_hello/3, + wait_ocsp_stapling/3, + certify/3, ++ wait_cert_verify/3, + cipher/3, + abbreviated/3, + connection/3]). +@@ -303,6 +307,19 @@ certify(info, Event, State) -> + certify(Type, Event, State) -> + tls_dtls_connection:gen_handshake(?FUNCTION_NAME, Type, Event, State). + ++ ++%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- ++-spec wait_cert_verify(gen_statem:event_type(), term(), #state{}) -> ++ gen_statem:state_function_result(). ++%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- ++wait_cert_verify(info, Event, State) -> ++ gen_info(Event, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State); ++wait_cert_verify(Type, Event, #state{connection_env = #connection_env{negotiated_version = Version}} = State) -> ++ try tls_dtls_connection:gen_handshake(?FUNCTION_NAME, Type, Event, State) ++ catch throw:#alert{} = Alert -> ++ ssl_gen_statem:handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State) ++ end. ++ + %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- + -spec cipher(gen_statem:event_type(), term(), #state{}) -> + gen_statem:state_function_result(). +diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/tls_dtls_connection.erl b/lib/ssl/src/tls_dtls_connection.erl +index c27fead..fb6dac5 100644 +--- a/lib/ssl/src/tls_dtls_connection.erl ++++ b/lib/ssl/src/tls_dtls_connection.erl +@@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ + user_hello/3, + abbreviated/3, + certify/3, ++ wait_cert_verify/3, + wait_ocsp_stapling/3, + cipher/3, + connection/3, +@@ -319,7 +320,7 @@ certify(internal, #certificate{asn1_certificates = []}, + ssl_options = #{verify := verify_peer, + fail_if_no_peer_cert := false}} = + State0) -> +- Connection:next_event(?FUNCTION_NAME, no_record, State0#state{client_certificate_requested = false}); ++ Connection:next_event(?FUNCTION_NAME, no_record, State0#state{client_certificate_status = empty}); + certify(internal, #certificate{}, + #state{static_env = #static_env{role = server}, + connection_env = #connection_env{negotiated_version = Version}, +@@ -344,16 +345,21 @@ certify(internal, #certificate{asn1_certificates = [Peer|_]} = Cert, + ocsp_stapling_state = #{ocsp_expect := Status} = OcspState}, + connection_env = #connection_env{ + negotiated_version = Version}, +- ssl_options = Opts} = State) when Status =/= staple -> ++ ssl_options = Opts} = State0) when Status =/= staple -> + OcspInfo = ocsp_info(OcspState, Opts, Peer), + case ssl_handshake:certify(Cert, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, + Opts, CRLDbInfo, Role, Host, + ensure_tls(Version), OcspInfo) of + {PeerCert, PublicKeyInfo} -> +- handle_peer_cert(Role, PeerCert, PublicKeyInfo, +- State#state{client_certificate_requested = false}, Connection, []); ++ State = case Role of ++ server -> ++ State0#state{client_certificate_status = needs_verifying}; ++ client -> ++ State0 ++ end, ++ handle_peer_cert(Role, PeerCert, PublicKeyInfo, State, Connection, []); + #alert{} = Alert -> +- ssl_gen_statem:handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State) ++ ssl_gen_statem:handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State0) + end; + certify(internal, #server_key_exchange{exchange_keys = Keys}, + #state{static_env = #static_env{role = client, +@@ -421,7 +427,7 @@ certify(internal, #certificate_request{}, + %% The client does not have a certificate and will send an empty reply, the server may fail + %% or accept the connection by its own preference. No signature algorihms needed as there is + %% no certificate to verify. +- Connection:next_event(?FUNCTION_NAME, no_record, State#state{client_certificate_requested = true}); ++ Connection:next_event(?FUNCTION_NAME, no_record, State#state{client_certificate_status = requested}); + certify(internal, #certificate_request{} = CertRequest, + #state{static_env = #static_env{role = client, + protocol_cb = Connection}, +@@ -435,7 +441,7 @@ certify(internal, #certificate_request{} = CertRequest, + ssl_gen_statem:handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State); + NegotiatedHashSign -> + Connection:next_event(?FUNCTION_NAME, no_record, +- State#state{client_certificate_requested = true, ++ State#state{client_certificate_status = requested, + handshake_env = HsEnv#handshake_env{cert_hashsign_algorithm = NegotiatedHashSign}}) + end; + %% PSK and RSA_PSK might bypass the Server-Key-Exchange +@@ -514,14 +520,6 @@ certify(internal, #server_hello_done{}, + #alert{} = Alert -> + ssl_gen_statem:handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State0) + end; +-certify(internal = Type, #client_key_exchange{} = Msg, +- #state{static_env = #static_env{role = server}, +- client_certificate_requested = true, +- connection_env = #connection_env{negotiated_version = Version}, +- ssl_options = #{fail_if_no_peer_cert := true}} = State) -> +- %% We expect a certificate here +- Alert = ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL,?UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, {unexpected_msg, {Type, Msg}}), +- ssl_gen_statem:handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State); + certify(internal, #client_key_exchange{exchange_keys = Keys}, + State = #state{handshake_env = #handshake_env{kex_algorithm = KeyAlg}, + static_env = #static_env{protocol_cb = Connection}, +@@ -539,37 +537,53 @@ certify(Type, Event, State) -> + ssl_gen_statem:handle_common_event(Type, Event, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State). + + %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +--spec cipher(gen_statem:event_type(), +- #hello_request{} | #certificate_verify{} | #finished{} | term(), ++-spec wait_cert_verify(gen_statem:event_type(), ++ #hello_request{} | #certificate_verify{} | term(), + #state{}) -> + gen_statem:state_function_result(). + %%-------------------------------------------------------------------- +-cipher({call, From}, Msg, State) -> +- handle_call(Msg, From, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State); +-cipher(info, Msg, State) -> +- handle_info(Msg, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State); +-cipher(internal, #certificate_verify{signature = Signature, +- hashsign_algorithm = CertHashSign}, +- #state{static_env = #static_env{role = server, +- protocol_cb = Connection}, +- handshake_env = #handshake_env{tls_handshake_history = Hist, +- kex_algorithm = KexAlg, +- public_key_info = PubKeyInfo} = HsEnv, +- connection_env = #connection_env{negotiated_version = Version}, +- session = #session{master_secret = MasterSecret} +- } = State) -> ++wait_cert_verify(internal, #certificate_verify{signature = Signature, ++ hashsign_algorithm = CertHashSign}, ++ #state{static_env = #static_env{role = server, ++ protocol_cb = Connection}, ++ client_certificate_status = needs_verifying, ++ handshake_env = #handshake_env{tls_handshake_history = Hist, ++ kex_algorithm = KexAlg, ++ public_key_info = PubKeyInfo}, ++ connection_env = #connection_env{negotiated_version = Version}, ++ session = #session{master_secret = MasterSecret} = Session0 ++ } = State) -> + + TLSVersion = ssl:tls_version(Version), +- %% Use negotiated value if TLS-1.2 otherwhise return default ++ %% Use negotiated value if TLS-1.2 otherwise return default + HashSign = negotiated_hashsign(CertHashSign, KexAlg, PubKeyInfo, TLSVersion), + case ssl_handshake:certificate_verify(Signature, PubKeyInfo, + TLSVersion, HashSign, MasterSecret, Hist) of + valid -> +- Connection:next_event(?FUNCTION_NAME, no_record, +- State#state{handshake_env = HsEnv#handshake_env{cert_hashsign_algorithm = HashSign}}); ++ Connection:next_event(cipher, no_record, ++ State#state{client_certificate_status = verified, ++ session = Session0#session{sign_alg = HashSign}}); + #alert{} = Alert -> +- ssl_gen_statem:handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State) ++ throw(Alert) + end; ++ ++wait_cert_verify(internal, #hello_request{}, _) -> ++ keep_state_and_data; ++wait_cert_verify(Type, Event, State) -> ++ ssl_gen_statem:handle_common_event(Type, Event, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State). ++ ++%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- ++-spec cipher(gen_statem:event_type(), ++ #hello_request{} | #finished{} | term(), ++ #state{}) -> ++ gen_statem:state_function_result(). ++%%-------------------------------------------------------------------- ++cipher({call, From}, Msg, State) -> ++ handle_call(Msg, From, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State); ++cipher(info, Msg, State) -> ++ handle_info(Msg, ?FUNCTION_NAME, State); ++ ++ + %% client must send a next protocol message if we are expecting it + cipher(internal, #finished{}, + #state{static_env = #static_env{role = server}, +@@ -609,6 +623,7 @@ cipher(internal, #next_protocol{selected_protocol = SelectedProtocol}, + Connection:next_event(?FUNCTION_NAME, no_record, + State#state{handshake_env = HsEnv#handshake_env{negotiated_protocol = SelectedProtocol, + expecting_next_protocol_negotiation = false}}); ++ + cipher(internal, #change_cipher_spec{type = <<1>>}, + #state{handshake_env = HsEnv, + static_env = #static_env{protocol_cb = Connection}, +@@ -881,12 +896,12 @@ handle_peer_cert_key(_, _, _, _, State) -> + certify_client(#state{static_env = #static_env{role = client, + cert_db = CertDbHandle, + cert_db_ref = CertDbRef}, +- client_certificate_requested = true, ++ client_certificate_status = requested, + session = #session{own_certificates = OwnCerts}} + = State, Connection) -> + Certificate = ssl_handshake:certificate(OwnCerts, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, client), + Connection:queue_handshake(Certificate, State); +-certify_client(#state{client_certificate_requested = false} = State, _) -> ++certify_client(#state{client_certificate_status = not_requested} = State, _) -> + State. + + verify_client_cert(#state{static_env = #static_env{role = client}, +@@ -894,7 +909,7 @@ verify_client_cert(#state{static_env = #static_env{role = client}, + cert_hashsign_algorithm = HashSign}, + connection_env = #connection_env{negotiated_version = Version, + private_key = PrivateKey}, +- client_certificate_requested = true, ++ client_certificate_status = requested, + session = #session{master_secret = MasterSecret, + own_certificates = OwnCerts}} = State, Connection) -> + +@@ -907,7 +922,7 @@ verify_client_cert(#state{static_env = #static_env{role = client}, + #alert{} = Alert -> + throw(Alert) + end; +-verify_client_cert(#state{client_certificate_requested = false} = State, _) -> ++verify_client_cert(#state{client_certificate_status = not_requested} = State, _) -> + State. + + client_certify_and_key_exchange(#state{connection_env = #connection_env{negotiated_version = Version}} = +@@ -917,7 +932,7 @@ client_certify_and_key_exchange(#state{connection_env = #connection_env{negotiat + {State2, Actions} = finalize_handshake(State1, certify, Connection), + State = State2#state{ + %% Reinitialize +- client_certificate_requested = false}, ++ client_certificate_status = not_requested}, + Connection:next_event(cipher, no_record, State, Actions) + catch + throw:#alert{} = Alert -> +@@ -936,8 +951,8 @@ server_certify_and_key_exchange(State0, Connection) -> + + certify_client_key_exchange(#encrypted_premaster_secret{premaster_secret= EncPMS}, + #state{connection_env = #connection_env{private_key = Key}, +- handshake_env = #handshake_env{client_hello_version = {Major, Minor} = Version}} +- = State, Connection) -> ++ handshake_env = #handshake_env{client_hello_version = {Major, Minor} = Version}, ++ client_certificate_status = CCStatus} = State, Connection) -> + FakeSecret = make_premaster_secret(Version, rsa), + %% Countermeasure for Bleichenbacher attack always provide some kind of premaster secret + %% and fail handshake later.RFC 5246 section 7.4.7.1. +@@ -955,56 +970,74 @@ certify_client_key_exchange(#encrypted_premaster_secret{premaster_secret= EncPMS + catch + #alert{description = ?DECRYPT_ERROR} -> + FakeSecret +- end, +- calculate_master_secret(PremasterSecret, State, Connection, certify, cipher); ++ end, ++ calculate_master_secret(PremasterSecret, State, Connection, certify, client_kex_next_state(CCStatus)); + certify_client_key_exchange(#client_diffie_hellman_public{dh_public = ClientPublicDhKey}, + #state{handshake_env = #handshake_env{diffie_hellman_params = #'DHParameter'{} = Params, +- kex_keys = {_, ServerDhPrivateKey}} ++ kex_keys = {_, ServerDhPrivateKey}}, ++ client_certificate_status = CCStatus + } = State, + Connection) -> + PremasterSecret = ssl_handshake:premaster_secret(ClientPublicDhKey, ServerDhPrivateKey, Params), +- calculate_master_secret(PremasterSecret, State, Connection, certify, cipher); ++ calculate_master_secret(PremasterSecret, State, Connection, certify, client_kex_next_state(CCStatus)); + + certify_client_key_exchange(#client_ec_diffie_hellman_public{dh_public = ClientPublicEcDhPoint}, +- #state{handshake_env = #handshake_env{kex_keys = ECDHKey}} = State, Connection) -> ++ #state{handshake_env = #handshake_env{kex_keys = ECDHKey}, ++ client_certificate_status = CCStatus ++ } = State, Connection) -> + PremasterSecret = ssl_handshake:premaster_secret(#'ECPoint'{point = ClientPublicEcDhPoint}, ECDHKey), +- calculate_master_secret(PremasterSecret, State, Connection, certify, cipher); ++ calculate_master_secret(PremasterSecret, State, Connection, certify, client_kex_next_state(CCStatus)); + certify_client_key_exchange(#client_psk_identity{} = ClientKey, + #state{ssl_options = +- #{user_lookup_fun := PSKLookup}} = State0, ++ #{user_lookup_fun := PSKLookup}, ++ client_certificate_status = CCStatus ++ } = State0, + Connection) -> + PremasterSecret = ssl_handshake:premaster_secret(ClientKey, PSKLookup), +- calculate_master_secret(PremasterSecret, State0, Connection, certify, cipher); ++ calculate_master_secret(PremasterSecret, State0, Connection, certify, client_kex_next_state(CCStatus)); + certify_client_key_exchange(#client_dhe_psk_identity{} = ClientKey, + #state{handshake_env = #handshake_env{diffie_hellman_params = #'DHParameter'{} = Params, + kex_keys = {_, ServerDhPrivateKey}}, + ssl_options = +- #{user_lookup_fun := PSKLookup}} = State0, ++ #{user_lookup_fun := PSKLookup}, ++ client_certificate_status = CCStatus ++ } = State0, + Connection) -> + PremasterSecret = + ssl_handshake:premaster_secret(ClientKey, ServerDhPrivateKey, Params, PSKLookup), +- calculate_master_secret(PremasterSecret, State0, Connection, certify, cipher); ++ calculate_master_secret(PremasterSecret, State0, Connection, certify, client_kex_next_state(CCStatus)); + certify_client_key_exchange(#client_ecdhe_psk_identity{} = ClientKey, + #state{handshake_env = #handshake_env{kex_keys = ServerEcDhPrivateKey}, + ssl_options = +- #{user_lookup_fun := PSKLookup}} = State, ++ #{user_lookup_fun := PSKLookup}, ++ client_certificate_status = CCStatus ++ } = State, + Connection) -> + PremasterSecret = + ssl_handshake:premaster_secret(ClientKey, ServerEcDhPrivateKey, PSKLookup), +- calculate_master_secret(PremasterSecret, State, Connection, certify, cipher); ++ calculate_master_secret(PremasterSecret, State, Connection, certify, client_kex_next_state(CCStatus)); + certify_client_key_exchange(#client_rsa_psk_identity{} = ClientKey, +- #state{connection_env = #connection_env{private_key = Key}, ++ #state{connection_env = #connection_env{private_key = PrivateKey}, + ssl_options = +- #{user_lookup_fun := PSKLookup}} = State0, ++ #{user_lookup_fun := PSKLookup}, ++ client_certificate_status = CCStatus} = State0, + Connection) -> +- PremasterSecret = ssl_handshake:premaster_secret(ClientKey, Key, PSKLookup), +- calculate_master_secret(PremasterSecret, State0, Connection, certify, cipher); ++ PremasterSecret = ssl_handshake:premaster_secret(ClientKey, PrivateKey, PSKLookup), ++ calculate_master_secret(PremasterSecret, State0, Connection, certify, client_kex_next_state(CCStatus)); + certify_client_key_exchange(#client_srp_public{} = ClientKey, + #state{handshake_env = #handshake_env{srp_params = Params, +- kex_keys = Key} ++ kex_keys = Key}, ++ client_certificate_status = CCStatus + } = State0, Connection) -> + PremasterSecret = ssl_handshake:premaster_secret(ClientKey, Key, Params), +- calculate_master_secret(PremasterSecret, State0, Connection, certify, cipher). ++ calculate_master_secret(PremasterSecret, State0, Connection, certify, client_kex_next_state(CCStatus)). ++ ++client_kex_next_state(needs_verifying) -> ++ wait_cert_verify; ++client_kex_next_state(empty) -> ++ cipher; ++client_kex_next_state(not_requested) -> ++ cipher. + + certify_server(#state{handshake_env = #handshake_env{kex_algorithm = KexAlg}} = + State, _) when KexAlg == dh_anon; +@@ -1337,7 +1370,7 @@ request_client_cert(#state{static_env = #static_env{cert_db = CertDbHandle, + Msg = ssl_handshake:certificate_request(CipherSuite, CertDbHandle, CertDbRef, + HashSigns, TLSVersion), + State = Connection:queue_handshake(Msg, State0), +- State#state{client_certificate_requested = true}; ++ State#state{client_certificate_status = requested}; + + request_client_cert(#state{ssl_options = #{verify := verify_none}} = + State, _) -> +diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/tls_gen_connection.erl b/lib/ssl/src/tls_gen_connection.erl +index 7c16bfa..fbc222d 100644 +--- a/lib/ssl/src/tls_gen_connection.erl ++++ b/lib/ssl/src/tls_gen_connection.erl +@@ -349,7 +349,28 @@ next_event(StateName, #alert{} = Alert, State, Actions) -> + {next_state, StateName, State, [{next_event, internal, Alert} | Actions]}. + + %%% TLS record protocol level application data messages +-handle_protocol_record(#ssl_tls{type = ?APPLICATION_DATA, fragment = Data}, StateName, ++handle_protocol_record(#ssl_tls{type = ?APPLICATION_DATA}, StateName, ++ #state{static_env = #static_env{role = server}, ++ connection_env = #connection_env{negotiated_version = Version}, ++ handshake_env = #handshake_env{renegotiation = {false, first}} ++ } = State) when StateName == initial_hello; ++ StateName == hello; ++ StateName == certify; ++ StateName == wait_cert_verify; ++ StateName == wait_ocsp_stapling; ++ StateName == abbreviated; ++ StateName == cipher ++ -> ++ %% Application data can not be sent before initial handshake pre TLS-1.3. ++ Alert = ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, application_data_before_initial_handshake), ++ ssl_gen_statem:handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, StateName, State); ++handle_protocol_record(#ssl_tls{type = ?APPLICATION_DATA}, start = StateName, ++ #state{static_env = #static_env{role = server}, ++ connection_env = #connection_env{negotiated_version = Version} ++ } = State) -> ++ Alert = ?ALERT_REC(?FATAL, ?DECODE_ERROR, invalid_tls_13_message), ++ ssl_gen_statem:handle_own_alert(Alert, Version, StateName, State); ++handle_protocol_record(#ssl_tls{type = ?APPLICATION_DATA, fragment = Data}, StateName, + #state{start_or_recv_from = From, + socket_options = #socket_options{active = false}} = State0) when From =/= undefined -> + case ssl_gen_statem:read_application_data(Data, State0) of +diff --git a/lib/ssl/src/tls_handshake_1_3.erl b/lib/ssl/src/tls_handshake_1_3.erl +index dbde7ad..434cb1a 100644 +--- a/lib/ssl/src/tls_handshake_1_3.erl ++++ b/lib/ssl/src/tls_handshake_1_3.erl +@@ -1122,7 +1122,7 @@ maybe_append_change_cipher_spec(#state{ + maybe_append_change_cipher_spec(State, Bin) -> + {State, Bin}. + +-maybe_queue_cert_cert_cv(#state{client_certificate_requested = false} = State) -> ++maybe_queue_cert_cert_cv(#state{client_certificate_status = not_requested} = State) -> + {ok, State}; + maybe_queue_cert_cert_cv(#state{connection_states = _ConnectionStates0, + session = #session{session_id = _SessionId, +@@ -1322,7 +1322,7 @@ create_change_cipher_spec(#state{ssl_options = #{log_level := LogLevel}}) -> + + process_certificate_request(#certificate_request_1_3{}, + #state{session = #session{own_certificates = undefined}} = State) -> +- {ok, {State#state{client_certificate_requested = true}, wait_cert}}; ++ {ok, {State#state{client_certificate_status = requested}, wait_cert}}; + + process_certificate_request(#certificate_request_1_3{ + extensions = Extensions}, +@@ -1338,10 +1338,10 @@ process_certificate_request(#certificate_request_1_3{ + %% Check if server supports signature algorithm of client certificate + case check_cert_sign_algo(SignAlgo, SignHash, ServerSignAlgs, ServerSignAlgsCert) of + ok -> +- {ok, {State#state{client_certificate_requested = true}, wait_cert}}; ++ {ok, {State#state{client_certificate_status = requested}, wait_cert}}; + {error, _} -> + %% Certificate not supported: send empty certificate in state 'wait_finished' +- {ok, {State#state{client_certificate_requested = true, ++ {ok, {State#state{client_certificate_status = requested, + session = Session#session{own_certificates = undefined}}, wait_cert}} + end. + +diff --git a/lib/ssl/test/ssl_npn_SUITE.erl b/lib/ssl/test/ssl_npn_SUITE.erl +index 81c75ec..914563b 100644 +--- a/lib/ssl/test/ssl_npn_SUITE.erl ++++ b/lib/ssl/test/ssl_npn_SUITE.erl +@@ -68,14 +68,18 @@ + all() -> + [{group, 'tlsv1.2'}, + {group, 'tlsv1.1'}, +- {group, 'tlsv1'} ++ {group, 'tlsv1'}, ++ {group, 'dtlsv1.2'}, ++ {group, 'dtlsv1'} + ]. + + groups() -> + [ + {'tlsv1.2', [], next_protocol_tests()}, + {'tlsv1.1', [], next_protocol_tests()}, +- {'tlsv1', [], next_protocol_tests()} ++ {'tlsv1', [], next_protocol_tests()}, ++ {'dtlsv1.2', [], next_protocol_tests()}, ++ {'dtlsv1', [], next_protocol_tests()} + ]. + + next_protocol_tests() -> diff -Nru erlang-23.2.6+dfsg/debian/patches/series erlang-23.2.6+dfsg/debian/patches/series --- erlang-23.2.6+dfsg/debian/patches/series 2021-02-25 10:34:59.000000000 +0100 +++ erlang-23.2.6+dfsg/debian/patches/series 2022-11-30 12:53:30.000000000 +0100 @@ -9,3 +9,4 @@ beamload.patch x32.patch atomsfontlock.patch +CVE-2022-37026.patch
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