Hi, Josselin Mouette <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: > Indeed, gksu should be made setgid something to protect against such > attacks.
Hmm, is this really worth it? Couldn't the malicious process next just do 1) cp /usr/bin/gksudo /tmp/bin/gksudo 2) ptrace POKETEXT all potential parents of gksudo to call /tmp/bin/gksudo instead What if gksudo showed a "personalized greeting text" that only the local user knows? This way user could detect if she/he is actually talking to the real setgid gksudo that can read the "secret" greeting from disk. (Of course normal people are way too lazy to set something like this.) best regards, Timo Lindfors -- To UNSUBSCRIBE, email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] with a subject of "unsubscribe". Trouble? Contact [EMAIL PROTECTED]
