severity 314465 important quit Version 0.9.8 will fix this bug. The defautl will be SHA1 and SHA-256 etc. will be included.
I downgrade the severity temporarily to important to allow Version 0.9.7 to enter testing before I upload the new upstream 0.9.8. Christoph Andreas Bogk schrieb: > Package: openssl > Version: 0.9.7e-3 > Severity: grave > Tags: security > Justification: user security hole > > > openssl.cnf defaults to usage of MD5 as digest algorithm for generation > of certificates and CAs. MD5 must be considered broken beyond hope, > we're not just talking about theoretical attacks, but attacks feasible > for everybody. X.509 keys with colliding checksums (and thus false > certificates) have been shown. See: > > http://www.cits.rub.de/MD5Collisions/ > > for another example. > > Unfortunately, there seem to be problems with RIPEMD160 in practice > (e.g. the Debian Thunderbird package doesn't understand RIPEMD160). So > the only reasonable choice at the moment is SHA-1, even though SHA-1 has > been theoretically weakend already, and RIPEMD160 would be preferable. > I suggest adding > > default_md: sha-1 > > in the req and ca sections of openssl.cnf, and talking the upstream > maintainers into supporting SHA-384 or SHA-512. > > -- System Information: > Debian Release: 3.1 > Architecture: i386 (i686) > Kernel: Linux 2.6.8-2-686 > Locale: LANG=en_GB.UTF-8, LC_CTYPE=en_GB.UTF-8 (charmap=UTF-8) > > Versions of packages openssl depends on: > ii libc6 2.3.2.ds1-22 GNU C Library: Shared libraries > an > ii libssl0.9.7 0.9.7e-3 SSL shared libraries > > -- no debconf information -- ============================================================================ Christoph Martin, Leiter der EDV der Verwaltung, Uni-Mainz, Germany Internet-Mail: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Telefon: +49-6131-3926337 Fax: +49-6131-3922856
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