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This is a regression of
http://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=531522

The checks for FAKEROOT introduced to fix this bug upstream are
preceeded by a new check that calls stat re-producing the original bug.

Re-ordering the checks to ensure that FAKEROOT is detected first
appears to resolve this issue - please see the attached patch.


- -- 
James Page
Ubuntu Core Developer
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Description: If running under Debian fakeroot then its important
 that this hook is disabled; a new stat check was introduced in
 1.5.x which preceeds the FAKEROOT check resulting in a SEGFAULT.
Author: James Page <james.p...@ubuntu.com>
Origin: https://svn.open-mpi.org/trac/ompi/changeset/21489

Index: openmpi-1.5.4/opal/mca/memory/linux/hooks.c
===================================================================
--- openmpi-1.5.4.orig/opal/mca/memory/linux/hooks.c    2012-02-15 12:59:39.986314651 +0000
+++ openmpi-1.5.4/opal/mca/memory/linux/hooks.c 2012-02-15 13:14:57.744722517 +0000
@@ -738,15 +738,6 @@
     check_result_t r1, r2, lp, lpp;
     bool want_rcache = false, found_driver = false;
 
-    /* First, check if ummunotify is present on the system. If it is,
-       then we don't need to do the following ptmalloc2 hacks.
-       open/mmap on the device may fail during init, but if /dev/ummunotify
-       exists, we assume that the user/administrator *wants* to use
-       ummunotify. */
-    if (stat("/dev/ummunotify", &st) == 0) {
-        return;
-    }
-
     /* Yes, checking for an MPI MCA parameter here is an abstraction
        violation.  Cope.  Yes, even checking for *any* MCA parameter
        here (without going through the MCA param API) is an
@@ -769,6 +760,15 @@
         return;
     }
 
+    /* Next, check if ummunotify is present on the system. If it is,
+       then we don't need to do the following ptmalloc2 hacks.
+       open/mmap on the device may fail during init, but if /dev/ummunotify
+       exists, we assume that the user/administrator *wants* to use
+       ummunotify. */
+    if (stat("/dev/ummunotify", &st) == 0) {
+        return;
+    }
+
     /* Look for sentinel files (directories) to see if various network
        drivers are loaded (yes, I know, further abstraction
        violations...).

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