On Wed, 3 Dec 2003 12:34, Don Armstrong <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Smartcards are not a magical panacea either.
True. > The problems associated > with them aren't too terribly different from those associated with > keys or other forms of physical security, notably, that they can be > stolen, or the output from them duplicated. Using a smart-card means that logging in does not merely require "something you know" but also "something you have". All the good security guides say that security should depend on "something you know and something you have", smart-cards plus a password meets this criteria. > Refer to the ongoing saga > between DirectTV and satelite pirates for a trivially applicable > example. That's a case of a smart-card used to decode distributed content (IE something like DECSS in principle). Encryption of one to many is a very different problem to individual encryption/authentication. The problem we are trying to solve is easier. Also in the DirectTV saga cracking the cards allegedly cost $25M. GPG smart-cards are entering the market. If GPG is crackable then we have lost regardless. If GPG is secure then GPG smart-cards will do as long as they are not stolen. Having revokation proceedures for stolen cards and DD's reliable enough to follow them should deal with this. > From my perspective, Smartcards do little to raise the bar. They > merely move the bar sideways. I think that they raise the bar a lot. They raise it from something that can be cracked by any script kiddie to something that requires a lot of money and expertise. That is a significant benefit. -- http://www.coker.com.au/selinux/ My NSA Security Enhanced Linux packages http://www.coker.com.au/bonnie++/ Bonnie++ hard drive benchmark http://www.coker.com.au/postal/ Postal SMTP/POP benchmark http://www.coker.com.au/~russell/ My home page