Matt Zimmerman <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: > On Wed, Dec 03, 2003 at 06:43:18AM +0100, Goswin von Brederlow wrote: > > > Matt Zimmerman <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: > > > > > On Wed, Dec 03, 2003 at 03:07:17AM +0100, Goswin von Brederlow wrote: > > > > > > > But this kind of tampering _can_ be checked by apt before installing > > > > the deb simply by adding a signature verifyer into the > > > > DPkg::Pre-Install-Pkgs config option, the same mechanism > > > > apt-listchanges already uses to display only the new section of the > > > > changelog. > > > > > > Indeed, apt can do a lot better, and is very close to doing so. See > > > #203741. > > > > The assumption was that the archive was compromised but the Release.gpg > > file changed and resigned. > > Who was assuming this? At any rate, protecting the secret key is of course > the weakest link in any public key cryptosystem, and I don't see what that > has to do with apt.
Signed debs establish a trust chain from the buildd to the user and from the buildd-admin/maintainer to the user as well as copy the existing trust chain from ftp-master to the user into the deb itself. The Release.gpg only protects against a mirror being hacked. Checking it is important but not as powerfull as a signature in the deb. > > #203741 is about checking the > > Release.gpg chain of trust or is there more hidden in all the mails. > > Yes, that is what it is about. > > > Did the BTS reoder the mails, there don't seem to follow a locigal > > discussion. Haven't bothered to check the timestamps though. > > Messages from discussions in other fora (including private mail) were later > copied to the BTS. That explains it. MfG Goswin