Here are a few ideas that have been kicking around in my head for a
while. #1 and #3 should be fairly noncontroversial; #2 probably will
tick some people off ;-)
Proposal 1: Adopt the "alternate vote" voting procedure
Background:
To say that our project's voting rules are confusing is an
understatement. Concordet's method, while of interest to political
scientists and economists for its property of tending to produce
"Pareto optimal" outcomes (outcomes in which no party "loses"), in
practice means that nobody understands what in the hell is going on.
I don't even understand it half the time, and I'm a political
scientist whose interests include electoral systems.
I do know that people think our voting method works like the alternate
vote (sometimes called Single Transferrable Vote, although STV is in
fact a different process used in multiseat constituencies). The
alternate vote is simply a mechanical device that functions the same
as a majority+1 system, with the advantage that people only have to
vote once. Voters rank order their preferences, and the first-place
votes are tallied. If no candidate/option receives a majority of
first-place votes, the votes for the candidate with the least
first-place votes are cast for the candidate listed second on those
ballots, and other votes for that candidate on other ballots are
discarded.
For example, with 3 candidates and 6 voters (- = blank):
A B C A C
1 2 3 1 2
3 2 1 -> B has least 1st place votes -> 2 1 -> A has a majority of
2 3 1 so last ballot is shifted 2 1 first place votes
1 - 2 1 2
2 1 3 --redistributed-----------------> 1 2
1 2 3 1 2
Ties are possible on the final iteration, in which case they must be
resolved. I propose that we retain the casting vote power of the DPL
to resolve such disputes, except in the case of an election for DPL.
(Another possibility might be something like how the college football
and basketballs work in the U.S., where on a N-candidate ballot, the
first-place candidate gets N points, second-place gets N-1, etc.
In the example above, A = 3*3+2*2+1*1 = 14, B = 3*1+2*2+1 = 8,
C = 3*2+2*1+1*2 = 9
[B has 1 first-place ballots for 3 pts each, 2 2nd place ballots @ 2 pts
each, and 1 3rd place ballot at 1 pt each.]
However, I don't think this is as intuitive as AV, and you could get
weird results (B=C if the fourth ballot had been voted fully). On the
other hand, it probably rewards consistent relative approval better
than AV.)
Proposed Amendment:
I propose that section A.6 of the Constitution be stricken in its
entirety and replaced by the following:
A.6 Alternate Vote Counting
1. This is used to determine the winner amongst a list of options.
Each ballot paper gives a ranking of the voter's preferred
options. (The ranking need not be complete.)
2. The "appropriate majority" is usually a simple majority, unless
otherwise specified by this Constitution.
3. The number of first preferences for each option is counted, and if
any option receives the appropriate majority of the first preference
votes, it is the winner. However, see section 8.
4. If no option receives a majority of the first preference votes, the
option with the lowest number of first preferences is eliminated and
its votes redistributed according to the second preferences. In the
event that a number of options are tied for the lowest number of first
place preferences, all of those ballots will be redistributed before
another count is taken.
5. This elimination procedure is repeated, moving down ballot papers
to 2nd, 3rd, 4th, etc. preferences as required, until one option gets
more than half of the `first' preferences.
6. In the case of ties, the elector with a casting vote will decide.
The casting vote does not count as a normal vote; however that elector
will usually also get a normal vote.
7. If no option receives the appropriate majority, the default option
will be adopted.
8. After completing the vote distribution procedure, if the number of
first place votes for the winning option is less than the quorum, the
default option will be adopted.
I also propose that any references to "Concorde Vote Counting" in the
Constitution be stricken (such as that at 6.1.7, A.3.5) and
replaced by references to "Alternate Vote Counting."
Finally, I propose that section 5.2.7 be amended as follows:
7. The decision will be made using Alternate Vote Counting, with the
sole exception that a tied vote will be treated as if the default
option is selected. The quorum is the same as for a General
Resolution (s.4.2) and the default option is None Of The Above.
Proposal 2: Non-technical documents which alter the course of the project
Proposed Amendment:
Add the following new power to section 4.1:
#. Materially amend or alter the existing goals, guidelines, and
practices of the project, by a 2:1 majority. Any non-technical
document (see 4.1.5) will be voted on by this procedure if either the
Project Leader or K developers send a signed message to the Project
Secretary (copied to an appropriate mailing list) indicating their
view that the proposal would, in fact, materially alter the existing
goals, guidelines or practices of the project.
Rationale:
I think it's fairly self-explanatory. Love it or hate it, we need
fairly strong agreement among developers to legitimately shift our goals.
Proposal 3: Adoption by consensus
Proposed Amendment:
Add the following new power to section 4.2:
#. Adoption by consensus: Notwithstanding the procedure stated in this
section, any power vested in the developers in section 4.1.5 or 4.1.6
may be exercised by consensus if, during the discussion period in
section 4.2.4, fewer than K developers request a vote (by sending a
signed message to the Project Secretary and copied to the appropriate
mailing list) on the issue. However, no resolution which must be
adopted by a supermajority may be approved through this procedure.
Rationale:
I'm sick and tired of voting on stuff we all agree on. ;-)
Chris
--
Chris Lawrence
Titles/affiliations at http://www.lordsutch.com/chris/info.html
Office: 662-915-5949 Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED] / [EMAIL PROTECTED]
