On Sun, Aug 19, 2018 at 09:32:57AM +0100, Chris Lamb wrote:
> Hi,
> 
> > openssh: CVE-2018-15473: delay bailout for invalid authenticating
> > user until after the packet
> 
> I've started on a patch for wheezy (WIP attached).
> 
> Would the security team be interested in one for stretch? If so, I can
> return with a proposed debdiff.

Your WIP mostly looks good, except:

> --- openssh-6.7p1.orig/auth2-pubkey.c
> +++ openssh-6.7p1/auth2-pubkey.c
> @@ -76,15 +76,11 @@ userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt)
>       Buffer b;
>       Key *key = NULL;
>       char *pkalg, *userstyle;
> -     u_char *pkblob, *sig;
> +     u_char *pkblob, *sig = NULL;
>       u_int alen, blen, slen;
>       int have_sig, pktype;
>       int authenticated = 0;
>  
> -     if (!authctxt->valid) {
> -             debug2("userauth_pubkey: disabled because of invalid user");
> -             return 0;
> -     }
>       have_sig = packet_get_char();
>       if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH) {
>               debug2("userauth_pubkey: SSH_BUG_PKAUTH");
> @@ -131,6 +127,11 @@ userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt)
>               } else {
>                       buffer_put_string(&b, session_id2, session_id2_len);
>               }
> +             if (!authctxt->valid || authctxt->user == NULL) {
> +                     debug2("%s: disabled because of invalid user",
> +                         __func__);
> +                     goto done;
> +             }
>               /* reconstruct packet */
>               buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
>               xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
> @@ -162,11 +163,14 @@ userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt)
>                   buffer_len(&b))) == 1)
>                       authenticated = 1;
>               buffer_free(&b);
> -             free(sig);
>       } else {
>               debug("test whether pkalg/pkblob are acceptable");
>               packet_check_eom();
> -
> +             if (!authctxt->valid || authctxt->user == NULL) {
> +                     debug2("%s: disabled because of invalid user",
> +                         __func__);
> +                     goto done;
> +             }
>               /* XXX fake reply and always send PK_OK ? */
>               /*
>                * XXX this allows testing whether a user is allowed
> @@ -192,6 +196,7 @@ done:
>               key_free(key);
>       free(pkalg);
>       free(pkblob);
> +     free(sig);
>       return authenticated;
>  }
>  

This bit has the same memory leak problem that I noticed in Sébastien's
backport for stretch: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2898,
but the backported fix needs to be different because we're working with
a buffer on the stack rather than a pointer to the buffer on the heap.
My suggestion to Sébastien was to add "buffer_free(&b);" before the new
"goto done;" in (only) the have_sig branch; this is a bit clunky, but
seems like the easiest solution.

-- 
Colin Watson                                       [[email protected]]

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