Well, if sudo is well configured, it does not give complete root access,
It should be limited to mostly inoffensive command options and require
the password for the rest. As for the logs, you are right in the case
where they are kept local, but any reasonable size network will use a
separate node with a different password as a loghost. All the failed
attempt will be sent there and recorded before any successful promotion.
Those will be much harder to erase. But you are right I should have
mentioned it.
This make more sense, but still I am perplex. I was speaking about the
"Unbuntu" type of sudo account: you have to give your own password to
have root access, not a different one. If an offender had succeed to log
in, he has already the normal user account password. For the logs, if
the local system is able to send some log to another network, a user
having root access is also able too; how can the local system be
"authorized" to send remote log across the network and denying this to a
user having rootlocal access. Even if there is a password to send the
logs over the network, the system must store it somewhere in order to be
able to use it. A user having local root access is able to analyse
/dev/mem to discover it. It may present some difficulties but this seems
like "security by obscurity"; which is known to be bad. However, a more
secure variant would be to authorize the system to send log but not to
clear it; in this later case it could be more secure. Anyway just
prevent a root ssh does not increase security as it; it only does in
conjunction with several other steps.
Olive
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