On Fri, Dec 01, 2000 at 06:54:32AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote: > However, with the 3:1 supermajority which affects A, you get: > 10 : 0 B:C > 3 1/3: 0 A:B > 3 1/3: 0 A:C > B wins. This isn't correct: A wins by being preferred to all other options (A > B, 3.3 to 0 and A > C, 3.3 to 0). The strengths of the victories don't come into play unless you have a cycle. Cheers, aj -- Anthony Towns <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> <http://azure.humbug.org.au/~aj/> I don't speak for anyone save myself. GPG signed mail preferred. ``Thanks to all avid pokers out there'' -- linux.conf.au, 17-20 January 2001
- Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [C... Thomas Bushnell, BSG
- Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTI... Buddha Buck
- Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTI... Buddha Buck
- Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTI... Raul Miller
- Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTI... Buddha Buck
- Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTI... Raul Miller
- Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTI... Branden Robinson
- Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [C... Anthony Towns
- Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTI... Anthony Towns
- Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTI... Raul Miller
- Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTI... Anthony Towns
- Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTI... Raul Miller
- Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTI... Anthony Towns
- Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTI... Raul Miller
- Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTI... Buddha Buck
- Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTI... Anthony Towns
- Re: Condorcet Voting and Supermajorities (Re: [CONSTI... Raul Miller