At 03\04\22 13:10 -0500 Tuesday, Branden Robinson wrote: > Re Robonson wins [4...].ems<file://v:\mail_archive\attach\Re Robonson wins > [4...].ems <0880.0002>> >*** PGP Signature Status: unknown >*** Signer: Unknown, Key ID x2B46A27C >*** Signed: 03\04\23 6:10:30 AM >*** Verified: 03\04\23 2:37:21 PM >*** BEGIN PGP VERIFIED MESSAGE *** > >On Mon, Apr 21, 2003 at 01:44:38PM +0200, Matthias Urlichs wrote: >> In other words, if you held a vote which would ask whether to annul >> the vote and replace Martin with Brandon, the majority would be >> against that proposal.
-------------------------- At 03\04\21 13:44 +0200 Monday, Matthias Urlichs wrote: >Summary of my point: > >This election has demonstrated quite nicely that those Debian developers >who voted prefer Martin to any other single candidate. In other words, if >you held a vote which would ask whether to annul the vote and replace >Martin with Brandon, the majority would be against that proposal. I do not >understand how you can, given that fact, declare that Condorcet voting is >fundamentally flawed. -------------------------- A problem is that at the end of competent arguing no competent in the topic of selecting the correct winner could believe that the Condorcet winner is the desirable or right winner. Mr Urlichs can't seem to name the quantifier logic style axiom the guarantees that it is improper for for one person to have too much power. Mr Urlichs was trying to say that this Debian-vote should keep the whole [wrong] voting polytope and not un-nicely discard it and with a sad show of unreasonableness, no one is allowed to check that polytope at any other spot than that single point. So far that sounds very unsatisfactory by the offered ideal of nearly total ignorance might still allow rejection of the Debian voting polytopes since it did actually get the wrong winner there. I can complete 2-50 pages of algebra and derive the fair solution using universally acceptable fair axioms, etc. No sign of disagreement so far against the idea that votes should not be negated. Condorcet allways negates votes on the surfaces and the election point of the last election was close to a surface bounding the paradox regions and it very likely a surface that was non-monotonic. Happily Mr Urlichs reminds that pairwise beliefs are our favourites. A nice social analogy is that malevolent hooligans who applied excesive force and trickery in resolving disputes at each election, could be in a cage for all their ability to produce wrong solutions. A mathematical definition of equal suffrage would say something like this: "no one else's ballot has too much apparent power (especially as preferences are added), and this ballot paper does not harm that interests that it declares when in amongst the collection of ballot papers." That principle has a sharp definition: it is forever inconsistent with the Condorcet idea. An obvious possibility is to put in a fair method that has the last election be a fair 3 candidate 1/3 quota election that is monotonic. Let's consider this: what if we got this explanation: there was 2 or more elections and the last was perfectly monotonic and it had 3 candidates and had 2 stages: * every candidate with less than 1/3 of the vote is rejected with Alt Vote style eliminating; * the winner is the winner of the remaining 1-2 candidate election. Presumably they won't feel like writing well on that. Suppose they were perfectly blocked from making adjustments and then were asked to adjust the algorithm to make it more like Condorcet. I guess 100% of readers understand though Debian's Condorcet likers can sustain unprincipled threads seeming to discuss the methods by which unfairness can be advanced and reshaped, their boat of their whole purpose would overturn if let no option but to tweak-up a fair method into a bad one, instead of their wrong dumb current plan of tweaking-up a bad method into a good one. The future victims of the tweakers are reading this. This is now two mailing lists. Of course they slipped away. Check every single message of the Debian Condorcet liker and see if there is any plain or implied recognition that Condorcet is perfectly incompatible with fairness. A fair algorithm might not get the winners that the group desires, but it is about the only way to go under an aim of avoiding sucking in the world's most unconving bad-advice-giving Condorcet-likers or theorists. Now that a few of them are subscribed: the big plan would be to keep the rows and rows of very large machines that are true mathematical off the top of their dirty green air balloon of lies about what is good. All Martin has to do is tell them that some actual mathematical quality claims on what makes Condorcet better must be provided or else the big huge side even of tweaking up the method is blocked and shut. Then the Condorcet likers (who can do without justice themselves and pure reasoning too) would vote against the current leader who might then want an incumbent protecting methods. One of the very options in that direction is a perfectly monotonic method that has a very big 1/3 quota. I was not able to follow it all but a plan to put a small quota in was all part an parcel of the aging culture here of trying have a good chance of being unfair to the previous winner. Since Condorcet is identical to the Alternative Vote when there are 3 candidates, then this could be considered: some patched Condorcet method reduces the number of candidates to three. Currently I solved the 3 candidate voting problem on this page http://www.ijs.co.nz/quota-13.htm Fairness is very agreeable particularly for persons who do not like other making wrong adverse decisions about them. Wrong adverse decisions is just the sort of thing that Condorcet would like to give. The Condorcet likers might want to pull away and "switch off". Check carefully and see if they are on a winning streak in not knowing if I am writing about the principle of keeping the power of a paper in the range 0...1. Debian has no competence in preferential voting. Last month it could not get the winners right. This month its awfully incompetent theorists are thinking of dropping out of the Debian-votes list and creating a new internal mailing list inside here. Those who did not make it out to the new mailing but who got delayed here might want to pack up their stuff and troop out to the segregated threads of those want to vanish into a secret chamber, alter the Debian voting system. A possibility is that Debian is not the only Linux distro that has to keep renumbering its debian-vote mailing lists each time the compent theorists moves into communicate with the Debian Condorcet-liker. The Condorcet enthusiasts (or apathetists) shipped themselves from Rome to Greece. They never offered a principle that is a core idea of the winning faction: the javelin that could prevent ballot papers racing ahead in the march to the capital -- the rule to constrain the power of others. The power to vanish into a secret chamber and thereby affect the next winner. In the following I pose some questions by way of proposing some solution. One obvious solution is to shut down the tweaking. Their seems to be a morally weak aim of increasing Mr M's chances at the next election. I guess Mr Robinson prefer my view of a much stronger defence for the current, i.e. having the first step in the 3 candidate Alternative Vote use a 1/3 quota instead of eliminating just the candidate with the smallest (not that that 1/3 does not extrapolate pleasingly to use of 1/k). That would: (a) confront the lying that is Condorcet and (b) reduce change in the winners. My previous proposal could alter that to whichever candidate is quickest at delivering results during last-minute debates. That could possibly lead to faster evolution at the Debian system (and given what Condorcet likers think of, Debian could move slowly if it somehow there is a transferrence of character). Later I might say how year of best effort improvements could result in improvements in monotonicity if there was not clear understanding on what monotonicity was. I observed a tiny <1% improvement when altering an STV algorithm. The absence of success in improving the system can be much bigger problem than the use of wrong tests, lack of knowledge on what to do. and complete absence of any checking. If Mr V's pro-Debian webpage guides then there chould also be false claims that sacrifices are need, checking is occuring and statements on improvements that mismatch with what happened. If Mr Urlichs lays down his thinking then I suppose the new idea of running a Monte-Carlo program at 1 point per year would be added. But I found that it takes about 3000 samples with 3 candidates and if publishable results are needed then Monte Carlo and a 1GHz PC and 1 month is not good enough for 4 candidate elections. However Debian produces OS/390 software. What would be nice is for IBM to supply a nonlinear optimizer that actually runs well in the presence of perfectly Boolean barriers. I searched and found nothing. I may have to write one. If Mr Voss was actually intending to check the Debian system then Debian might have a just cause for using that currently-not-found nonlinear optimizer too. High generals principals drop into Debian Let the worst Debian has reduce the candidates to 3 and then use the best method known to man in the last stage. Case 1: If the last stage is the Condorcet method that got patched up to make it as monotonic as possible subject to the constraint that the Condorcet winner wins, then surely that method is PERFECTLY IDENTICAL TO THE "IRV" METHOD. ("IRV" is an acronym of the Rob Richie think tank and they renamed the Alternative Vote that is a standard English term). The best 3 Condorcet variant for the papers (AB),(B),(C) is the Alternative Vote, almost. It sort of requires an added aim (i.e. keeping B losing when B has less votes than A). The Condorcet winner and the Alternative Vote winner were the same in the last election. So long as there is not a strong 4th candidate then Debian is actually using the IRV but internally calling it the Condorcet method. It sounds like some sort of internal self-deceptions. The advocacy of the Alternative Vote centres around having 1-2 polytope sequences and then pronouncing that only the Alternative Vote is best. It sounds like the same method Debian uses internally. Why not send a communication off to the CVD and explain to them the dilemma: * given that the disliked monotonicity principle is a way to convert Condorcet into the IRV method, does the CVD advise paying some respect to the principle of being fair to the contestants and their supporters?. I suggest that persons join the "instantrunoff" mailing list. It is quite an awful list and it is on the topic of spreading the method. The whole backyard of the meowing cats of Debian's Condorcet likers could be photographed with the question: why not simply use this method: * the method is Condorcet and all the unknown regions are shifted according to the desire of monotonicity and never beyond the positions of the boundariess that the Alternative Vote would place. All polygons are polytopes. The Debian project might have been subjected to a stealthy attack from the fairvote.org people who oppose the fairness in all known forms. In California the CVD had members of one of its group advised by leader Steve Chessing, to join up with another group. Then the 2nd group's votes would be controlled. Maybe a top leader of the 2nd group sabotaged its interests which previously were unfriendly to IRV. To favour the infiltrators with a 2nd preference through unawareness could cause more to arrive. Wherever the CVD goes it offers unbelievably weak arguments presuming nothing is checked except what they say can be checked. Condorcet likers are cultivating a style that hass nothing but misfortune for Debian and that is having no answers and no presence in any debate. No more than any leader can I counter all those minute details on adjusting the Debian voting system. It seems to be over motives that are not true. I guess there is no use at all of a thought that would ensure that the winner is right. The pairwise comparing idea is an ancient idea that 21st century man can solve much better by splitting it out into its 3 principles: (1) truncation resistance (it is never upsetting to add another preference) (2) monotonicity. An attempt to help never ever harms (3) _subject_ to the 2 above being held, "proportionality" (i.e. for every preference, the weight of a paper naming a candidate is added to its total). That is about right. Can someone assist me and do this for me. Persons should have been told that the Debian project was being IRV-ized. There would be a spreading evil of IRVs unfairness without some central intelligence ?. They would like to banish me but they seem to be really quite fact averse. So they got themselves banished. Many times I have seem the very same behaviour at Rob Lanphier's own Election Methods List mailing list. If I write down a formula that finds the winner then all the faces are flat (not curved) and of each flat this can be made available: * the principle agreeable to rules providing rights that set the orientation of the flat; and * an argument with however many steps that shows why that flat is in that position. The 1/3 quota follows from 2 steps where 2 shadows are cast (If A wins then (B)->(C) has B stay losing so C wins in the wedge; then (AB)->(C) creates the 1/3 shadow.) There is something that smells quite suspect with the activity of Manoj Srivastava. I'd say that the very worst that the current leader can do is to permit Manoj Srivastava to get what he wants. Having so very many lightly untrue statements at the website of Mr Voss, and having Mr Voss speak of being party to the activities of Manoj Srivastava, implies to me that motives are shockingly bad (and to that I can add, unfixable too). These people can't argue in public -- well, at least if the topic is over their core area of expertise -- and it would be fascinating to read some of the private communications defending Condorcet at Debian. Some of the arguments defending the retention of Condorcet and its complete lack of principles would be arguments that are also very clearly anti-Debian. The presentation of voting methods in legal format is done with a purpose including that of concealing that the method is not monotonic. There is NOT any other prime aim (when 1 winner and 3 candidates) for Mr Manoj Srivastava to be subservient to except that of making the method more monotonic. I allege that Mr Manoj Srivastava activities in this mailing list have thoroughly brought the Debain project into a serious and unacceptable non-compliance with the social contract principle of never concealing bugs. Outside of Debian, the legalistic formulation of a polytope sequence is a much relied up method for hiding the fact that the 1 winner method is not monotonic. It can take perhaps 10 to 30 years to figure that out, but less than 8 seconds if the method is written as a polytope. The papers: (A) (AB) (AC) (B) (BA) (BC) (C) (CA) (CB) (A wins) = (b<c)(b<a)(...<...) or (c<a)(c<b)(...<...) That is the Alternative Vote method's A-wins region. It can't be monotonic since: (a) that is simplified, and (b) "(b<c)" does not have an A term on the RHS. Transferring votes from (A) to (C) make A win. I ask people to note carefully the "..." ellipsis in my (A wins) equation. Debian has been captured by some purpose that has nothing to do with getting the winners satisfied. I can suspect a figurative gravely bad STINK arising from the planning of Mr Manoj Srivastava. What I look forward to seeing is a prompt shutdown of Mr Srivastava's activities until this is normalised. AS far as we can tell, the facts are these: * there will NO checking that the method is getting better. That is contrary to the social contract in that "bug" of not knowing how to measure rightness, is being concealed. I even have software only that is too hard to use that simply allows a measurement of the nonmonotonicity of the methods. A competent designer might be able to get other problems removed. * there are NO good principles to Condorcet. NO PRINCIPLES that man likes as far as I can tell. The like Condorcet but were not led away from it by a liking of principle. A respect for principle offers the reward of beating the others in argument, but Condorcet likers hop away (frogs off to the ancient regime) * there is no regard for the affect parties and there are hundreds of individuals who are affected * covertness and concealment of bugs has been maximised. That is potentially able to cover a fairly evil intent. In the case of reforming US cities. it can mean that the wrong method appears and it takes maybe 15 years to get it removed again. The Debian Social Contract is adverse to the concealment of bugs. * The is NO obvious indication that well meaning members of Debian should prefer the first of these two options: (a) assist Mr Manoj Srivastava (b) block Mr Manoj Srivastava, e.g. since absolutely no good reasoning that pays close attention to every single symbol in the old and new algorithm, is occurring. * There is NO basis for suspecting that Mr Srivastava is involved in a highly technical consideration in which top leaders and others are out of their depth. All I can think of in the way of social implications is: * maths student Mr Voss created a website packed with errors. Hey, I don't do that. However I never once held a purpose of harming G. Branden Robinson or held Mr Voss' which is a purpose of helping Mr Manoj Srivastava with his incorrect wrong changes. >Perhaps I lost the election because too many people could not find the >name "Brandon" on the ballot. After all, no such person was a >candidate. > >Translation: PLEASE SPELL MY NAME CORRECTLY. Thank you. There is only one winner in the game and that is the method designer. The more precise the method then the smaller the opposition from the super-intelligent and then usage of it can increase. No other part of the world in the next 20 years would it. IRV/Condorcet is a very bad single method for Debian internally when it under an external infiltration attack on its identity from IRV wheelbarrow pushers. Of course there are no counter arguments to what I write at this mailing list. That is because the others are stupid and I am not. The top leader should e-mail whomever and find out Debian is really using the anti-incumbent IRV method. I guess the current leader can't think about anti-incumbent type unfairness at such a great distance from the next election, though it must be a terrible strain overseeing so many difficult aspects in Debian running as intelligently as it is. If there are inflitrators (evil IRV lobbyists [these ones are too dumb to know that Condorcet is IRV hah ha ha]) then there should be a rounding up of the leaders. No need to question them. >-- >G. Branden Robinson | Imagination was given man to >Debian GNU/Linux | compensate for what he is not, and >[EMAIL PROTECTED] | a sense of humor to console him for >http://people.debian.org/~branden/ | what he is. Persons suspecting that I have quit could e-mail me at my single-transferable-vote amailing list and maybe engage in an argument there. In truth there is no room for dissent on what the best 3 winner method is (with STV style papers). I wonder if Manoj would actually provide an argument showing that his inconsistent view of improving the system is true). Craig Carey <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Ada 95 mailing lists: http://www.ijs.co.nz/ada_95.htm