Hi Matt:
 
I read your posting (because you are always insightful), but I'm not sure that your message actually applies to what I had said (and to which Andrew had commented on) or if you may be answering to a different part of the conversation. Certainly nothing Utopian in what I wrote?
 
a) It is plain fact that the largest providers do check SPF, which in turn means that Joe-Jobs have a drastically lower impact on the spoofed domain's owner. 
b) It is also a fact, that spammers are very SPF aware (to the point that they create SPF records.) 
c) Based on my personal, admittedly anecdotal, experience (supported by common sense) it further appears to me that SPF protected domains would be less likely to get picked for Joe-Jobs than unprotected domains.
 
Here is what I had written:
How many times have we received angry emails or hundreds of
bounce messages from other ISPs because some Spammer was
sending mail with a fake email sender - using OUR domain names?

If you define SPF for your own (and client) domain names,
then the largest ISPs won't accept the spam that has your
email address faked, thus you and your clients will no longer
be bombarded with responses/complaints/bounces to messages
you never sent in the first place.

The effect of having SPF defined is, that FEWER spammers even
bother trying to abuse YOUR domain name, because they know
that a lot of their spam would never reach anyone.  Instead,
they now use their own domain names and even set up SPF for
those.  To me - that ripple effect alone justifies SPF!
Best Regards
Andy Schmidt

Phone:  +1 201 934-3414 x20 (Business)
Fax:    +1 201 934-9206
 


From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Matt
Sent: Thursday, September 08, 2005 01:55 PM
To: Declude.JunkMail@declude.com
Subject: Re: [Declude.JunkMail] SPF - Missing the Point

But isn't this utopian?  The majority of situations have exceptions as they apply to SPF, and in a world where there are open relays on every corner, many servers without proper reverse DNS records, etc., would you really want to trust others to maintain SPF records accurately?

I use a custom filter for tagging local domains in incoming E-mail.  Since all of my customers' servers are whitelisted, and hosted clients are also whitelisted through AUTH, I can add a couple of points for anything with a Mail From that matches something that I handle.  This does have false positives, many in fact due to mailers that forge such as greeting cards or feedback forms, devices that send out notifications with their own SMTP engine, people that are port 25 blocked or proxied, configured to use their own ISP's SMTP server, Web applications, etc.  SPF isn't required to do this.  I don't trust how well some random admin manages their own SPF records, and if I had my own SPF records, I wouldn't trust how some random admin treated a failure among my own customers.  At least they aren't going to be tagged for sending E-mail from someplace that they didn't know not to send from, and is otherwise perfectly acceptable.  I am obviously not going to give any credit to anyone for passing SPF either.  Passing SPF is a better indication of spam than of legitimate E-mail these days for incoming traffic.

I have never been a big fan of SPF because of what I saw as an impractical and unreliable implementation in the real world.  It really isn't any better than Habeas once you get down to it, but people ate that up for a while as well.  We have many tools available to us these days that are quite effective and much more accurate.  Forging spam almost never leaks through my system, and it's not something that I care to focus on at all these days.  It's things like Advance Fee Fraud, Phishing, Niche Spam, and First Run Static Spam that concern me.

Matt





Colbeck, Andrew wrote:
That's right on the money, Andy.

I agree 100%.


Andrew 8) 

  
-----Original Message-----
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] 
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] On Behalf Of Andy Schmidt
Sent: Thursday, September 08, 2005 8:48 AM
To: Declude.JunkMail@declude.com
Subject: RE: [Declude.JunkMail] SPF - Missing the Point

    
still unacceptable and reason enough for me to discard SPF 
completely. <<
        
I think the discusson is missing the key point of SPF.  Sure, 
this list is focused on INCOMING spam, and thus we 
restricting our discussions to SPFFAIL/SPFPASS and how to use 
it in Declude.

However, that ignores what SPF is designed to do:

How many times have we received angry emails or hundreds of 
bounce messages from other ISPs because some Spammer was 
sending mail with a fake email sender - using OUR domain names?

If you define SPF for your own (and client) domain names, 
then the largest ISPs won't accept the spam that has your 
email address faked, thus you and your clients will no longer 
be bombarded with responses/complaints/bounces to messages 
you never sent in the first place.

The effect of having SPF defined is, that FEWER spammers even 
bother trying to abuse YOUR domain name, because they know 
that a lot of their spam would never reach anyone.  Instead, 
they now use their own domain names and even set up SPF for 
those.  To me - that ripple effect alone justifies SPF!

Thus, without question, SPF should be in place for all 
domains you control.
Specially for alias/vanity/web-only domains that never send any email.
Ideally, in addition, set up SMTP AUTH for your clients so 
that you can use SPFFAIL for incoming mail and, if you 
choose, ignore SPFPASS for now.

Best Regards
Andy Schmidt

Phone:  +1 201 934-3414 x20 (Business)
Fax:    +1 201 934-9206 

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