Hi David,
This is a possibility. It seems to me that "." is a bad choice for
customers whose usernames take the form "firstName.lastName". And "@" is
bad for customers whose usernames are email addresses. And "-", "_", " "
can all turn up in usernames too. And "~", "?", "=", ":", "/", "\" are
all awkward if the databasename is an url or a path. Would "!", "#",
"*", "+", "|", ";" be better?
Thanks,
-Rick
David Van Couvering wrote:
Why not use "." rather than "@"? Seems more natural to me...
David
Rick Hillegas (JIRA) wrote:
[
https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/DERBY-2109?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:comment-tabpanel#action_12465306
]
Rick Hillegas commented on DERBY-2109:
--------------------------------------
I agree that a DatabasePrincipal should encode both the database name
and the authorization id inside that database. It is interesting that
the same authorization id can have different credentials depending on
the connected database.
I don't know what the terms-of-art here are, but for the rest of this
discussion, I'm going to use the following nomenclature:
systemWideID - This is a user name that is authenticated with
databaseName = null.
databaseScopedID - This is a user name that is authenticated with a
non-null databaseName.
It is interesting that we authenticate the user twice when creating a
database. First we authenticate with a systemWideID. If that
succeeds, we create the database and mark that authorization id as
the database owner. Then we re-authenticate the user as a
databaseScopedID, using the same credentials. Clearly this assumes
that at bootstrap time, the same credentials will work for the
systemWideID and the databaseScopedID.
The policy file syntax for Principals is a little limited. That is,
you're only allowed to declare one argument to your Principal's
constructor. This means that we have to glue together the
authorization id and database name. Maybe we can model this on the
names used for KerberosPrincipal. Those names are of the form
[EMAIL PROTECTED] I don't know if the @ is going to be a nuisance. Any
separator we choose will have escaping problems and @ may be
particularly annoying to customers who want their authorization ids
to be email addresses. But here's what it would look like:
# this is a systemWideID
grant principal org.apache.derby.authentication.DatabasePrincipal
"fred" ...
# this is a databaseScopedID
grant principal org.apache.derby.authentication.DatabasePrincipal
"[EMAIL PROTECTED]" ...
# this systemWideID is an email address
grant principal org.apache.derby.authentication.DatabasePrincipal
"fred@@comcast.net" ...
# this databaseScopedID is an email address
grant principal org.apache.derby.authentication.DatabasePrincipal
"fred@@[EMAIL PROTECTED]" ...
I think that the create-database privilege should be granted to
systemWideIDs for the following reasons:
1) The actual database creation today depends on whether we can
authenticate the systemWideID, not the databaseScopedID.
2) This is a generic privilege which is not bound to a particular
database name.
I think that the engine-shutdown privilege is also a systemWideID. So
for this first release, I think we only need systemWideIDs--although
the user guides should explain the implications of escaping @.
System privileges
-----------------
Key: DERBY-2109
URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/DERBY-2109
Project: Derby
Issue Type: New Feature
Components: Security
Affects Versions: 10.3.0.0
Reporter: Rick Hillegas
Fix For: 10.3.0.0
Attachments: systemPrivs.html, systemPrivs.html
Add mechanisms for controlling system-level privileges in Derby. See
the related email discussion at
http://article.gmane.org/gmane.comp.apache.db.derby.devel/33151.
The 10.2 GRANT/REVOKE work was a big step forward in making Derby
more secure in a client/server configuration. I'd like to plug more
client/server security holes in 10.3. In particular, I'd like to
focus on authorization issues which the ANSI spec doesn't address.
Here are the important issues which came out of the email discussion.
Missing privileges that are above the level of a single database:
- Create Database
- Shutdown all databases
- Shutdown System
Missing privileges specific to a particular database:
- Shutdown that Database
- Encrypt that database
- Upgrade database
- Create (in that Database) Java Plugins (currently
Functions/Procedures, but someday Aggregates and VTIs)
Note that 10.2 gave us GRANT/REVOKE control over the following
database-specific issues, via granting execute privilege to system
procedures:
Jar Handling
Backup Routines
Admin Routines
Import/Export
Property Handling
Check Table
In addition, since 10.0, the privilege of connecting to a database
has been controlled by two properties
(derby.database.fullAccessUsers and
derby.database.defaultConnectionMode) as described in the security
section of the Developer's Guide (see
http://db.apache.org/derby/docs/10.2/devguide/cdevcsecure865818.html).
