[
https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/DERBY-2109?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:comment-tabpanel&focusedCommentId=12572991#action_12572991
]
djd edited comment on DERBY-2109 at 2/27/08 9:27 AM:
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
> Bottomline: When evaluating permissions, the (Sun) Java Security Runtime uses
> the principal names as found literally in the policy file and not as returned
> by SystemPrincipal.getName() (where we could return normalized names).
It's hard to see how that is the case, since the policy file is read in and
converted to a Policy object containing permissions and for Derby's
SystemPermission the class must be o.a.d.security.SystemPermission.
Could you confirm the format for names in the policy file in the patch? Does it
match the description here:
https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/DERBY-2109?focusedCommentId=12561537#action_12561537
- does it support delimited identifiers of the form "\"[EMAIL PROTECTED]""?
- is the only issue that non-delimited identifiers "fred" do not resolve
correctly?
was (Author: djd):
> Bottomline: When evaluating permissions, the (Sun) Java Security Runtime
uses the principal names as found literally in the policy file and not as
returned by SystemPrincipal.getName() (where we could return normalized names).
It's hard to see how that is the case, since the policy file is read in and
converted to a Policy object containing permissions and for Derby's
SystemPermission the class must be o.a.d.security.SystemPermission.
Could you confirm the format for names in the policy file in the patch? Does it
match
> System privileges
> -----------------
>
> Key: DERBY-2109
> URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/DERBY-2109
> Project: Derby
> Issue Type: New Feature
> Components: Security
> Affects Versions: 10.3.1.4
> Reporter: Rick Hillegas
> Assignee: Martin Zaun
> Attachments: DERBY-2109-02.diff, DERBY-2109-02.stat,
> derby-2109-03-javadoc-see-tags.diff, DERBY-2109-04.diff, DERBY-2109-04.stat,
> DERBY-2109-05and06.diff, DERBY-2109-05and06.stat, DERBY-2109-07.diff,
> DERBY-2109-07.stat, DERBY-2109-08.diff, DERBY-2109-08.stat,
> DERBY-2109-08_addendum.diff, DERBY-2109-08_addendum.stat, DERBY-2109-09.diff,
> DERBY-2109-09.stat, DERBY-2109-10.diff, DERBY-2109-10.stat,
> SystemPrivilegesBehaviour.html, systemPrivs.html, systemPrivs.html,
> systemPrivs.html, systemPrivs.html
>
>
> Add mechanisms for controlling system-level privileges in Derby. See the
> related email discussion at
> http://article.gmane.org/gmane.comp.apache.db.derby.devel/33151.
> The 10.2 GRANT/REVOKE work was a big step forward in making Derby more
> secure in a client/server configuration. I'd like to plug more client/server
> security holes in 10.3. In particular, I'd like to focus on authorization
> issues which the ANSI spec doesn't address.
> Here are the important issues which came out of the email discussion.
> Missing privileges that are above the level of a single database:
> - Create Database
> - Shutdown all databases
> - Shutdown System
> Missing privileges specific to a particular database:
> - Shutdown that Database
> - Encrypt that database
> - Upgrade database
> - Create (in that Database) Java Plugins (currently Functions/Procedures,
> but someday Aggregates and VTIs)
> Note that 10.2 gave us GRANT/REVOKE control over the following
> database-specific issues, via granting execute privilege to system
> procedures:
> Jar Handling
> Backup Routines
> Admin Routines
> Import/Export
> Property Handling
> Check Table
> In addition, since 10.0, the privilege of connecting to a database has been
> controlled by two properties (derby.database.fullAccessUsers and
> derby.database.defaultConnectionMode) as described in the security section of
> the Developer's Guide (see
> http://db.apache.org/derby/docs/10.2/devguide/cdevcsecure865818.html).
--
This message is automatically generated by JIRA.
-
You can reply to this email to add a comment to the issue online.
