Public bug reported:

See for reference:
https://www.krackattacks.com/#ap-mitigations

Yes this is not a bug. However, it has been noted on ubuntu-devel that adding 
some features even to stable releases could be justified in *some* cases.
First of paramount importance is that the fix introduces no regression.
In this case this code is *only* used if a new parameter is set:

wpa_disable_eapol_key_retries=1

if this parameter is missing, behaviour will not change.
So any regression introduced will be caused by a deliberate admin decision, 
from where all responsability could be denied (use at your own risk, yadda, 
yadda...)

Then is this parameter useful: it could be for the hundred of millions
of Android Phone that are not yet patched (6.0 et upper) and will never
be patched (about 50% of existing Android Phones).

Please note that at least one wifi provider has already decided to
provide this feature to help its users:

https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory
/cisco-sa-20171016-wpa

so this is something that leaders do :-)

I have already patched my AP that runs Ubuntu 16 LTS (see attached patch
against 2.4-0ubuntu6.2, I have used my AP for 3 days now with a Ubuntu
and an Android client without problem) and I could try to provide a
patch for Ubuntu 17. This kind of patch is really trivial anyway, since
it's just a port of the upstream patch in hostapd:

https://w1.fi/cgit/hostap/commit/?id=6f234c1e2ee1ede29f2412b7012b3345ed8e52d3


However I have a big problem. Any security patch (and this is a security 
enhancing patch at least) is only worth as much as it is *tested*. And I don't 
have the means to verify that mitigation is effective, as the vulnerability 
discoverer has not provided (for obvious reasons) public testing code for 
clients.
I think that Ubuntu should have this code (or did you just distribute security 
patches without testing that they are effective ? that would not be very 
serious IMO). 
There is no chance that M. Vanhoef sends his code to any old dog on the 
internet, so Canonical is my only chance for a real test of this feature on an 
Ubuntu AP (short of rewriting the attack code myself, not an attractive 
proposition). 
If in fact you don't have the testing (well, attack) code feel free to dismiss 
my bug report as irrelevant. But if you have please consider the opportunity to 
add some goodwill to Ubuntu. Thanks.

** Affects: wpa (Ubuntu)
     Importance: Undecided
         Status: New

** Patch added: "Krackattacks mitigation for Ubuntu 16LTS test patch"
   
https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1730399/+attachment/5004651/+files/hostapd-krk-mitigation-u16LTS.patch

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https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1730399

Title:
  Add krackattacks mitigation

Status in wpa package in Ubuntu:
  New

Bug description:
  See for reference:
  https://www.krackattacks.com/#ap-mitigations

  Yes this is not a bug. However, it has been noted on ubuntu-devel that adding 
some features even to stable releases could be justified in *some* cases.
  First of paramount importance is that the fix introduces no regression.
  In this case this code is *only* used if a new parameter is set:

  wpa_disable_eapol_key_retries=1

  if this parameter is missing, behaviour will not change.
  So any regression introduced will be caused by a deliberate admin decision, 
from where all responsability could be denied (use at your own risk, yadda, 
yadda...)

  Then is this parameter useful: it could be for the hundred of millions
  of Android Phone that are not yet patched (6.0 et upper) and will
  never be patched (about 50% of existing Android Phones).

  Please note that at least one wifi provider has already decided to
  provide this feature to help its users:

  https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory
  /cisco-sa-20171016-wpa

  so this is something that leaders do :-)

  I have already patched my AP that runs Ubuntu 16 LTS (see attached
  patch against 2.4-0ubuntu6.2, I have used my AP for 3 days now with a
  Ubuntu and an Android client without problem) and I could try to
  provide a patch for Ubuntu 17. This kind of patch is really trivial
  anyway, since it's just a port of the upstream patch in hostapd:

  https://w1.fi/cgit/hostap/commit/?id=6f234c1e2ee1ede29f2412b7012b3345ed8e52d3

  
  However I have a big problem. Any security patch (and this is a security 
enhancing patch at least) is only worth as much as it is *tested*. And I don't 
have the means to verify that mitigation is effective, as the vulnerability 
discoverer has not provided (for obvious reasons) public testing code for 
clients.
  I think that Ubuntu should have this code (or did you just distribute 
security patches without testing that they are effective ? that would not be 
very serious IMO). 
  There is no chance that M. Vanhoef sends his code to any old dog on the 
internet, so Canonical is my only chance for a real test of this feature on an 
Ubuntu AP (short of rewriting the attack code myself, not an attractive 
proposition). 
  If in fact you don't have the testing (well, attack) code feel free to 
dismiss my bug report as irrelevant. But if you have please consider the 
opportunity to add some goodwill to Ubuntu. Thanks.

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