Hi Rick,

Please see item #3 of
https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:CertificatePolicyV2.1#Frequently_Asked_Questions
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3. How do I technically constrain a subordinate CA certificate that will only be used to issue end-user certificates intended for client authentication? For the subCA certificate to be considered technically constrained according to item #9 of Mozilla's CA Certificate Inclusion Policy, the subCA certificate must have the Extended Key Usage (EKU) extension with the id-kp-clientAuth KeyPurposeId (and whatever else they need), and the EKU extension must not include any of these KeyPurposeIds: anyExtendedKeyUsage, id-kp-serverAuth, id-kp-emailProtection, id-kp-codeSigning. - If the EKU extension includes id-kp-serverAuth, then (in order to be considered technically constrained) the subCA certificate must also include the Name Constraints extension as described in item #9 of Mozilla's CA Certificate Inclusion Policy. - If the EKU extension includes id-kp-emailProtection, then (in order to be considered technically constrained) technical and/or business controls need to be in place to ensure that the subCA only issues certs for email addresses that the CA has confirmed the subCA is authorized to use, as described in item #9 of Mozilla's CA Certificate Inclusion Policy. - If the EKU extension includes id-kp-codeSigning, then (in order to be considered technically constrained) the SubCA certificate must also contain a directoryName permittedSubtrees constraint as described item #9 of Mozilla's CA Certificate Inclusion Policy.
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As per section #9 of the policy, we prefer that all subordinate CA certificates are technically constrained. As per #10 of the policy, we recognize that technically constraining subordinate CA certificates as described in section #9 may not be practical in some cases, so in those cases the subCA certificate can be audited/disclosed instead.

Does that answer your questions?

Kathleen

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