Andrew,

Thank you for your review of our CP and CPS.  Please see our responses inline.

Thanks,
Peter

> On Aug 10, 2016, at 3:12 PM, Andrew R. Whalley <[email protected]> wrote:
> 
> Here are the notes from my read-through. I commend Amazon for the clarity
> of their CP and CPS.
> 
> Reviewed Amazon Trust Services Certificate Policy
> 
> Version 1.0.3
> 
> "This [CP] is intended to communicate the minimum operating requirements
> for CAs in the Amazon PKI. By design, it closely follows the CA/Brower
> [sic] Forum Guidelines and Requirements and only deviates when an
> Application Software Supplier has requirements that are stricter…"
> 
> Good.
> 
> "Creative Commons Attribution-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License"
> 
> Good.
> 
> 1.1.2 Types of Certificate
> 
> "A certificate is a Root CA-certificate if it a Policy CA-certificate and
> the subject is designated by the CA as a Root CA in the CA’s CPS."
> 
> The Root CA-Certificates designated by the CPS are self signed, and match
> the definition of "self issued" from section 1.1.2.1.  However 1.1.2.1.7
> says Root CA-Certificates are Policy CA-certificates and 1.1.2.1.4 says
> Policy CA Certificates are cross-certificates, and 1.1.2.1 says that
> cross-certificates are not self-issued certificates.

You are correct that this definition is missing the self-issued case.  We will 
update our CP to reflect this by changing the definition to:

A certificate is a Root CA-certificate if the subject is designated by the CA 
as a Root CA in the CA’s CPS and it is either a self-issued certificate or 
Policy CA-certificate.

> 1.1.2.2 End-Entity Certificates
> 
> "CAs must not issue EndEntity Certificates that simultaneously meet the
> criteria of multiple of the following categories."
> 
> Good.
> 
> 3.2.1 Method to prove possession of private key
> 
> Section is blank.  Assuming "No stipulation" rather than missing text?

Yes, we will update our CP to state "No stipulation" for this section.

> 6.5.1.4 Authentication: Passwords and Accounts
> 
> "For accounts that are accessible from outside a Secure Zone or High
> Security Zone, require that passwords have at least eight (8) characters…"
> 
> Eight characters seems a bit short.

This is taken directly from the Network and Certificate System Security 
Requirements (NCSSR), section 2(g)(i).

> 6.6.3 Life cycle security controls
> 
> "apply recommended security patches to Certificate Systems within six
> months of the security patch’s availability"
> 
> Six months seems a bit long.

As with the prior item, this is directly from NCSSR, section 1(l).

> 7.1.4.4 Subject Information for Extended Validation Server Authentication
> certificates
> 
> Formatting bug - not rendered as a table.

We will fix this markdown error in the next revision of our CP.

> (suggests that this came from a plaintext original - is that available
> anywhere?)

The Amazon CP is derived from the Public CP published on GitHub at 
https://github.com/pzb/PublicCP.

> Amazon Trust Service Certificate Practice Statement v1.0.4
> 
> 3.2.2 Authentication of organization identity
> 
> "Amazon does not use methods 9, 10, or 11 for validating wildcard names"
> 
> There is no method 11

With the recent passage of Ballot 169 in the CA/Browser Forum, we will be 
updating 3.2.2 to comply with the new validation requirements and will fix this 
as part of the update.

> 4.2.1 Performing identification and authentication functions
> 
> "Amazon Root CAs do not check CAA records prior to issuing certificates."
> 
> Pity.
> 
> 4.4.3 Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities
> 
> Amazon may notify the public of the issuance of a certificate by adding it
> to one or more publicly accessible  … CT Logs
> 
> Good
> 
> Appendix B: Certificate Profiles
> 
> "If the signatureAlgorithm uses SHA-1, the serial number must contain at
> least 64 bits of randomly generated entropy"
> 
> What about non SHA-1?

We have included at least 64 bits of entropy in all certificates issued since 
mid-2015.  In compliance with Baseline Requirements version 1.3.7, we will 
update our CPS to reflect such by September 30, 2016.

> Andrew
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