Repost to the same subject.

Regards,

Richard

> On 30 Aug 2016, at 15:11, Richard Wang <[email protected]> wrote:
> 
> Dear all,
> 
> This email is the formal reply from WoSign for this 3 incidents.
> 
> First, thank you all very much to help WoSign to improve our system security 
> that helped the global Internet security.  And I am very sorry deeply for the 
> related 33 misissuance certificates subscribers that we like to offer a free 
> EV SSL certificates upgrade as compensation after finishing the EV validation.
> 
> Second, we are very sorry to all browsers that we don't notify you after the 
> incident, this is a mis-understanding problem of the bug report policy. And 
> we never do this way again in the future. Now we are very clear that all 
> misissuance case and other security incident must revoke the certificate 
> instantly and report to all browsers and related parties. We guarantee we 
> will do this well in the future.
> 
> Third, due to the English language limit, we know we can't understand all 
> related international standard that it may have some bugs in the system in 
> the past and maybe in the future, so we have logged all issued SSL 
> certificates to CT Log servers since July 5th, this is for full transparency, 
> and for easy and quickly find out any problems. All browsers can distrust the 
> SSL certificate issued by WoSign after July 5th that no SCT data embedded in 
> the certificate. And we even plan to log all code signing certificate and all 
> client certificate to CT log server for full transparency completely in the 
> future. For current case, as promised in this email thread, we will post all 
> issued SSL certificate in 2015 to CT log server soon.
> 
> For incident 0:
> We start to use the higher port website control validation from Jan. 8th, 
> 2015 since some customer can't use the 80 and 443 port. And we have closed 
> this function after getting report from Google at April 24, 2015. 
> We checked our system, the certificates issued related using higher level 
> port website control validation is totally 72 certificates. To be clear, 
> those certificates are validated by website control validation method that 
> using other port except 80 and 443. So we think no need to revoke those 
> certificates. We posted all those certificates to CT log server for 
> transparency and provided the crt.sh link in this email thread.
> 
> For incident 1:
> We checked our system that the mis-issued certificate with un-validated 
> subdomain, total 33 certificates. We have posted to CT log server and 
> provided the crt.sh link in this email thread. All certificates are revoked 
> today after noticing each subscriber. 
> This is a system bug for the rule of adding additional domains to SAN for 
> free, the rule is if you validated the domain: wosign.com, and you apply 
> certificate for wosogn.com, then system will add a domain www.wosign.com in 
> SAN for free, this is for the subscriber convenience that no any problem if 
> the site visitor visit https://wosign.com and https://www.wosign.com. This is 
> no any problem in domain control validation, but for website control 
> validation method, it will have problem, the code engineer mis-understand 
> this free add-domain policy, this is a code bug that we don't find even we 
> revoked some misissuance certificate, this bug is fixed completely at Aug. 
> 9th, 2015 system update. 
> We classified this 33 misissuance certificate into two types: one type is we 
> think this misissuance certificate is obviously not from the domain owner, we 
> revoked this type certificates instantly after we know the misissuance; 
> another type is, this certificate is a normal order that the subscriber own 
> this domain, it is our system bug fault to add a wrong sub-domain to the 
> certificate, in order to not interrupt those subscriber's website normal 
> operation, we must notice those subscriber first, reissue a correct one for 
> this subscriber, then revoke this certificate.     
> Considering the website control validation method has potential risk, we have 
> closed this method at Aug. 27 even the BR allow this method. There are many 
> famous Internet service providers provide subdomain to its customer, we can't 
> add all of their domains to our Flag-Block system. So we decided to close 
> this validation method, only support domain control validation.
> 
> For incident 2:
> We declared this big in Bugzilla [4], this is not the case that we want to 
> issue backdated SAH1 certificate, this is a bug that used by the test company 
> to issued two certificates only. StartCom and WoSign used the same 
> auto-generation script, set different parameter to go to different CA API 
> URL. Now StartCom and WoSign all decided to use Let Encrypted ACME protocol 
> that it will support this case -- one same client software can be used to get 
> certificate from different CA, just define the CA parameter.
> We revoked this two wrong SHA1 certificate instantly after getting report. 
> And we disabled this bug in API, and StartCom stopped StartEncrypt service. 
> 
> I wish I say this 3 case clearly, if not, please forgive my bad English, and 
> please contact me if you still have any question, thanks a million.
> 
> 
> Best Regards,
> 
> Richard Wang
> CEO
> WoSign CA Limited
> 
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Gervase Markham [mailto:[email protected]] 
> Sent: Wednesday, August 24, 2016 9:08 PM
> To: [email protected]
> Cc: Richard Wang <[email protected]>
> Subject: Incidents involving the CA WoSign
> 
> Dear m.d.s.policy,
> 
> Several incidents have come to our attention involving the CA "WoSign".
> Mozilla is considering what action it should take in response to these 
> incidents. This email sets out our understanding of the situation.
> 
> Before we begin, we note that Section 1 of the Mozilla CA Certificate 
> Enforcement Policy[0] says: "When a serious security concern is noticed, such 
> as a major root compromise, it should be treated as a security-sensitive bug, 
> and the Mozilla Policy for Handling Security Bugs should be followed." It is 
> clear to us, and appears to be clear to other CAs based on their actions, 
> that misissuances where domain control checks have failed fall into the 
> category of "serious security concern".
> 
> Incident 0
> ----------
> 
> On or around April 23rd, 2015, WoSign's certificate issuance system for their 
> free certificates allowed the applicant to choose any port for validation. 
> Once validation had been completed, WoSign would issue certificates for that 
> domain. A researcher was able to obtain a certificate for a university by 
> opening a high-numbered port (>50,000) and getting WoSign to use that port 
> for validation of control.
> 
> This problem was reported to Google, and thence to WoSign and resolved.
> Mozilla only became aware of it recently.
> 
> * Before the recent passage of Ballot 169 in the CAB Forum, which limits the 
> ports and paths which can be used, the Baseline Requirements said that one 
> acceptable method of domain validation was "Having the Applicant demonstrate 
> practical control over the FQDN by making an agreed‐upon change to 
> information found on an online Web page identified by a uniform resource 
> identifier containing the FQDN". This method therefore did not violate the 
> letter of the BRs. However, Mozilla considers the basic security knowledge 
> that ports over 1024 are unprivileged should have led all CAs not to accept 
> validations of domain control on such ports, even when not documented in the 
> BRs.
> 
> * The misissuance incident was not reported to Mozilla by WoSign as it should 
> have been (see above).
> 
> * This misissuance incident did not turn up on WoSign's subsequent BR 
> audit[1].
> 
> Incident 1
> ----------
> 
> In June 2015, an applicant found a problem with WoSign's free certificate 
> service, which allowed them to get a certificate for the base domain if they 
> were able to prove control of a subdomain.
> 
> The reporter proved the problem in two ways. They accidentally discovered it 
> when trying to get a certificate for med.ucf.edu and mistakenly also applied 
> for www.ucf.edu, which was approved. They then confirmed the problem by using 
> their control of theiraccount.github.com/theiraccount.github.io to get a cert 
> for github.com, github.io, and www.github.io.
> 
> They reported this to WoSign, giving only the Github certificate as an 
> example. That cert was revoked and the vulnerability was fixed. However 
> recently, they got in touch with Google to note that the ucf.edu cert still 
> had not been revoked almost a year later.
> 
> * The lack of revocation of the ucf.edu certificate (still unrevoked at time 
> of writing, although it may have been by time of posting) strongly suggests 
> that WoSign either did not or could not search their issuance databases for 
> other occurrences of the same problem. Mozilla considers such a search a 
> basic part of the response to disclosure of a vulnerability which causes 
> misissuance, and expects CAs to keep records detailed enough to make it 
> possible.
> 
> * This misissuance incident was not reported to Mozilla by WoSign as it 
> should have been (see above).
> 
> * This misissuance incident did not turn up on WoSign's subsequent BR 
> audit[1].
> 
> Incident 2
> ----------
> 
> In July 2016, it became clear that there was some problems with the 
> StartEncrypt automatic issuance service recently deployed by the CA StartCom. 
> As well as other problems it had, which are outside the scope of this 
> discussion, changing a simple API parameter in the POST request on the 
> submission page changed the root certificate to which the resulting 
> certificate chained up. The value "2" made a certificate signed by "StartCom 
> Class 1 DV Server CA", "1" selected "WoSign CA Free SSL Certificate G2" and 
> "0" selected "CA 沃通根证书", another root certificate owned by WoSign and trusted 
> by Firefox.
> 
> Using the value "1" led to a certificate which had a notBefore date (usage 
> start date) of 20th December 2015, and which was signed using the
> SHA-1 checksum algorithm.
> 
> * The issuance of certificates using SHA-1 has been banned by the Baseline 
> Requirements since January 1st, 2016. Browsers, including Firefox, planned to 
> enforce this[2] by not trusting certs with a notBefore date after that date, 
> but in the case of Firefox the fix had to be backed out due to web 
> compatibility issues. However, we are considering how/when to reintroduce it, 
> and CAs presumably know this.
> 
> * The issuance of backdated certificates is not forbidden, but is listed in 
> Mozilla's list of Problematic Practices[3]. It says "Minor tweaking for 
> technical compatibility reasons is accepted, but backdating certificates in 
> order to avoid some deadline or code-enforced restriction is not."
> 
> * WoSign deny that their code backdated the certificates in order to avoid 
> browser-based restrictions - they say "this date is the day we stop to use 
> this code"[4]. If that is true, it is not clear to us how StartCom came to 
> deploy WoSign code that WoSign itself had abandoned.
> 
> * It seems clear from publicly available information that StartCom's issuance 
> systems are linked to WoSign's issuance systems in some way.
> Nevertheless, it should not have been possible for an application for a cert 
> from StartCom to produce a cert signed by WoSign.
> 
> * This misissuance incident was not reported to Mozilla by WoSign as it 
> should have been.
> 
> 
> Taking into account all these incidents and the actions of this CA, Mozilla 
> is considering what action to take. Your input is welcomed.
> 
> Gerv, Kathleen and Richard
> 
> 
> [0]
> https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/about/governance/policies/security-group/certs/policy/enforcement/
> [1] https://cert.webtrust.org/SealFile?seal=2019&file=pdf
> [2] https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=942515
> [3]
> https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:Problematic_Practices#Backdating_the_notBefore_date
> [4] https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1293366
> _______________________________________________
> dev-security-policy mailing list
> [email protected]
> https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy

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