Repost to the same subject. Regards,
Richard > On 30 Aug 2016, at 15:11, Richard Wang <[email protected]> wrote: > > Dear all, > > This email is the formal reply from WoSign for this 3 incidents. > > First, thank you all very much to help WoSign to improve our system security > that helped the global Internet security. And I am very sorry deeply for the > related 33 misissuance certificates subscribers that we like to offer a free > EV SSL certificates upgrade as compensation after finishing the EV validation. > > Second, we are very sorry to all browsers that we don't notify you after the > incident, this is a mis-understanding problem of the bug report policy. And > we never do this way again in the future. Now we are very clear that all > misissuance case and other security incident must revoke the certificate > instantly and report to all browsers and related parties. We guarantee we > will do this well in the future. > > Third, due to the English language limit, we know we can't understand all > related international standard that it may have some bugs in the system in > the past and maybe in the future, so we have logged all issued SSL > certificates to CT Log servers since July 5th, this is for full transparency, > and for easy and quickly find out any problems. All browsers can distrust the > SSL certificate issued by WoSign after July 5th that no SCT data embedded in > the certificate. And we even plan to log all code signing certificate and all > client certificate to CT log server for full transparency completely in the > future. For current case, as promised in this email thread, we will post all > issued SSL certificate in 2015 to CT log server soon. > > For incident 0: > We start to use the higher port website control validation from Jan. 8th, > 2015 since some customer can't use the 80 and 443 port. And we have closed > this function after getting report from Google at April 24, 2015. > We checked our system, the certificates issued related using higher level > port website control validation is totally 72 certificates. To be clear, > those certificates are validated by website control validation method that > using other port except 80 and 443. So we think no need to revoke those > certificates. We posted all those certificates to CT log server for > transparency and provided the crt.sh link in this email thread. > > For incident 1: > We checked our system that the mis-issued certificate with un-validated > subdomain, total 33 certificates. We have posted to CT log server and > provided the crt.sh link in this email thread. All certificates are revoked > today after noticing each subscriber. > This is a system bug for the rule of adding additional domains to SAN for > free, the rule is if you validated the domain: wosign.com, and you apply > certificate for wosogn.com, then system will add a domain www.wosign.com in > SAN for free, this is for the subscriber convenience that no any problem if > the site visitor visit https://wosign.com and https://www.wosign.com. This is > no any problem in domain control validation, but for website control > validation method, it will have problem, the code engineer mis-understand > this free add-domain policy, this is a code bug that we don't find even we > revoked some misissuance certificate, this bug is fixed completely at Aug. > 9th, 2015 system update. > We classified this 33 misissuance certificate into two types: one type is we > think this misissuance certificate is obviously not from the domain owner, we > revoked this type certificates instantly after we know the misissuance; > another type is, this certificate is a normal order that the subscriber own > this domain, it is our system bug fault to add a wrong sub-domain to the > certificate, in order to not interrupt those subscriber's website normal > operation, we must notice those subscriber first, reissue a correct one for > this subscriber, then revoke this certificate. > Considering the website control validation method has potential risk, we have > closed this method at Aug. 27 even the BR allow this method. There are many > famous Internet service providers provide subdomain to its customer, we can't > add all of their domains to our Flag-Block system. So we decided to close > this validation method, only support domain control validation. > > For incident 2: > We declared this big in Bugzilla [4], this is not the case that we want to > issue backdated SAH1 certificate, this is a bug that used by the test company > to issued two certificates only. StartCom and WoSign used the same > auto-generation script, set different parameter to go to different CA API > URL. Now StartCom and WoSign all decided to use Let Encrypted ACME protocol > that it will support this case -- one same client software can be used to get > certificate from different CA, just define the CA parameter. > We revoked this two wrong SHA1 certificate instantly after getting report. > And we disabled this bug in API, and StartCom stopped StartEncrypt service. > > I wish I say this 3 case clearly, if not, please forgive my bad English, and > please contact me if you still have any question, thanks a million. > > > Best Regards, > > Richard Wang > CEO > WoSign CA Limited > > -----Original Message----- > From: Gervase Markham [mailto:[email protected]] > Sent: Wednesday, August 24, 2016 9:08 PM > To: [email protected] > Cc: Richard Wang <[email protected]> > Subject: Incidents involving the CA WoSign > > Dear m.d.s.policy, > > Several incidents have come to our attention involving the CA "WoSign". > Mozilla is considering what action it should take in response to these > incidents. This email sets out our understanding of the situation. > > Before we begin, we note that Section 1 of the Mozilla CA Certificate > Enforcement Policy[0] says: "When a serious security concern is noticed, such > as a major root compromise, it should be treated as a security-sensitive bug, > and the Mozilla Policy for Handling Security Bugs should be followed." It is > clear to us, and appears to be clear to other CAs based on their actions, > that misissuances where domain control checks have failed fall into the > category of "serious security concern". > > Incident 0 > ---------- > > On or around April 23rd, 2015, WoSign's certificate issuance system for their > free certificates allowed the applicant to choose any port for validation. > Once validation had been completed, WoSign would issue certificates for that > domain. A researcher was able to obtain a certificate for a university by > opening a high-numbered port (>50,000) and getting WoSign to use that port > for validation of control. > > This problem was reported to Google, and thence to WoSign and resolved. > Mozilla only became aware of it recently. > > * Before the recent passage of Ballot 169 in the CAB Forum, which limits the > ports and paths which can be used, the Baseline Requirements said that one > acceptable method of domain validation was "Having the Applicant demonstrate > practical control over the FQDN by making an agreed‐upon change to > information found on an online Web page identified by a uniform resource > identifier containing the FQDN". This method therefore did not violate the > letter of the BRs. However, Mozilla considers the basic security knowledge > that ports over 1024 are unprivileged should have led all CAs not to accept > validations of domain control on such ports, even when not documented in the > BRs. > > * The misissuance incident was not reported to Mozilla by WoSign as it should > have been (see above). > > * This misissuance incident did not turn up on WoSign's subsequent BR > audit[1]. > > Incident 1 > ---------- > > In June 2015, an applicant found a problem with WoSign's free certificate > service, which allowed them to get a certificate for the base domain if they > were able to prove control of a subdomain. > > The reporter proved the problem in two ways. They accidentally discovered it > when trying to get a certificate for med.ucf.edu and mistakenly also applied > for www.ucf.edu, which was approved. They then confirmed the problem by using > their control of theiraccount.github.com/theiraccount.github.io to get a cert > for github.com, github.io, and www.github.io. > > They reported this to WoSign, giving only the Github certificate as an > example. That cert was revoked and the vulnerability was fixed. However > recently, they got in touch with Google to note that the ucf.edu cert still > had not been revoked almost a year later. > > * The lack of revocation of the ucf.edu certificate (still unrevoked at time > of writing, although it may have been by time of posting) strongly suggests > that WoSign either did not or could not search their issuance databases for > other occurrences of the same problem. Mozilla considers such a search a > basic part of the response to disclosure of a vulnerability which causes > misissuance, and expects CAs to keep records detailed enough to make it > possible. > > * This misissuance incident was not reported to Mozilla by WoSign as it > should have been (see above). > > * This misissuance incident did not turn up on WoSign's subsequent BR > audit[1]. > > Incident 2 > ---------- > > In July 2016, it became clear that there was some problems with the > StartEncrypt automatic issuance service recently deployed by the CA StartCom. > As well as other problems it had, which are outside the scope of this > discussion, changing a simple API parameter in the POST request on the > submission page changed the root certificate to which the resulting > certificate chained up. The value "2" made a certificate signed by "StartCom > Class 1 DV Server CA", "1" selected "WoSign CA Free SSL Certificate G2" and > "0" selected "CA 沃通根证书", another root certificate owned by WoSign and trusted > by Firefox. > > Using the value "1" led to a certificate which had a notBefore date (usage > start date) of 20th December 2015, and which was signed using the > SHA-1 checksum algorithm. > > * The issuance of certificates using SHA-1 has been banned by the Baseline > Requirements since January 1st, 2016. Browsers, including Firefox, planned to > enforce this[2] by not trusting certs with a notBefore date after that date, > but in the case of Firefox the fix had to be backed out due to web > compatibility issues. However, we are considering how/when to reintroduce it, > and CAs presumably know this. > > * The issuance of backdated certificates is not forbidden, but is listed in > Mozilla's list of Problematic Practices[3]. It says "Minor tweaking for > technical compatibility reasons is accepted, but backdating certificates in > order to avoid some deadline or code-enforced restriction is not." > > * WoSign deny that their code backdated the certificates in order to avoid > browser-based restrictions - they say "this date is the day we stop to use > this code"[4]. If that is true, it is not clear to us how StartCom came to > deploy WoSign code that WoSign itself had abandoned. > > * It seems clear from publicly available information that StartCom's issuance > systems are linked to WoSign's issuance systems in some way. > Nevertheless, it should not have been possible for an application for a cert > from StartCom to produce a cert signed by WoSign. > > * This misissuance incident was not reported to Mozilla by WoSign as it > should have been. > > > Taking into account all these incidents and the actions of this CA, Mozilla > is considering what action to take. Your input is welcomed. > > Gerv, Kathleen and Richard > > > [0] > https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/about/governance/policies/security-group/certs/policy/enforcement/ > [1] https://cert.webtrust.org/SealFile?seal=2019&file=pdf > [2] https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=942515 > [3] > https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:Problematic_Practices#Backdating_the_notBefore_date > [4] https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1293366 > _______________________________________________ > dev-security-policy mailing list > [email protected] > https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy
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