On Fri, Sep 02, 2016 at 03:48:13PM -0700, John Nagle wrote: > On 09/02/2016 01:04 PM, Patrick Figel wrote: > >On 02/09/16 21:14, John Nagle wrote: > >>2. For certs under this root cert, always check CA's certificate > >>transparency server. Fail if not found. > > > >To my knowledge, CT does not have any kind of online check > >mechanism. SCTs can be embedded in the certificate (at the time of > >issuance), delivered as part of the TLS handshake or via OCSP > >stapling. > > You're supposed to be able to check if a cert is known by > querying an OCSP responder. OCSP stapling is just a faster way > to do that.
OCSP stapling is also a *privacy preserving* way to do that (also more reliable, in addition to faster). I'm not sure that essentially snooping (or at least having the ability to snoop) on the browsing habits of users who happen to connect to a website that uses the certificate of a poorly-trusted CA better serves the user community than just pulling the root. I guess at least we're not training users to ignore security warnings this way, and since if Mozilla is running the OCSP responder (or similar) you're already trusting Mozilla not to snoop on your browsing... - Matt _______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy
