I agree with Jakob. This is similar to case laws vs statutory law. Even though 
we can get the same understandings from various cases, I believe in this 
situation, it will be clearer to codify such requirements clearly. 


On Monday, September 12, 2016 at 10:38:48 AM UTC-7, Jakob Bohm wrote:
> On 10/09/2016 14:39, Gervase Markham wrote:
> > On 09/09/16 11:59, Jakob Bohm wrote:
> >> Since a major root compromise is generally considered the worst
> >> possible security event for a trusted CA, this wording could easily be
> >> (mis?)understood not to require reporting of lesser security failures,
> >> such as issuing millions (or just hundreds) of certificates without
> >> proper validation etc.
> >
> > Our position on the meaning of this clause, which (by their behaviour)
> > can be said to be shared by many CAs, was set out at the very beginning
> > of the original mail about WoSign.
> >
> 
> Yes, I am aware of this position and suggesting the Mozilla policy be
> changed to reflect its intended meaning.
> 
> This is particularly relevant as one of the CAs currently under
> discussion claimed difficulty understanding that this particular rule
> required them to report lesser incidents.
> 
> 
> Enjoy
> 
> Jakob
> -- 
> Jakob Bohm, CIO, Partner, WiseMo A/S.  https://www.wisemo.com
> Transformervej 29, 2860 Søborg, Denmark.  Direct +45 31 13 16 10
> This public discussion message is non-binding and may contain errors.
> WiseMo - Remote Service Management for PCs, Phones and Embedded

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