I agree with Jakob. This is similar to case laws vs statutory law. Even though we can get the same understandings from various cases, I believe in this situation, it will be clearer to codify such requirements clearly.
On Monday, September 12, 2016 at 10:38:48 AM UTC-7, Jakob Bohm wrote: > On 10/09/2016 14:39, Gervase Markham wrote: > > On 09/09/16 11:59, Jakob Bohm wrote: > >> Since a major root compromise is generally considered the worst > >> possible security event for a trusted CA, this wording could easily be > >> (mis?)understood not to require reporting of lesser security failures, > >> such as issuing millions (or just hundreds) of certificates without > >> proper validation etc. > > > > Our position on the meaning of this clause, which (by their behaviour) > > can be said to be shared by many CAs, was set out at the very beginning > > of the original mail about WoSign. > > > > Yes, I am aware of this position and suggesting the Mozilla policy be > changed to reflect its intended meaning. > > This is particularly relevant as one of the CAs currently under > discussion claimed difficulty understanding that this particular rule > required them to report lesser incidents. > > > Enjoy > > Jakob > -- > Jakob Bohm, CIO, Partner, WiseMo A/S. https://www.wisemo.com > Transformervej 29, 2860 Søborg, Denmark. Direct +45 31 13 16 10 > This public discussion message is non-binding and may contain errors. > WiseMo - Remote Service Management for PCs, Phones and Embedded _______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list [email protected] https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy

