On Wednesday, August 31, 2016 at 12:43:50 PM UTC-7, Nick Lamb wrote: > I have spent some time thinking about this, but I am only one person, and one > with relatively little in-depth knowledge of the Mozilla project, so I think > I will lay out the options I've thought about and invite feedback though > particularly any alternative suggestions.
Returning to the topic of this thread, there were a number of alternatives put forward that didn't raise to the summary level captured here: https://groups.google.com/d/msg/mozilla.dev.security.policy/k9PBmyLCi8I/hj_KMPGUDAAJ To recap, and to combine your suggestions, we have: A) Distrust with option to manually add back B) Distrust with no option to manually add back (aka Blacklist) C) Distrust with Whitelist of Certs C.1) Whitelist based on all certs (several hundred thousand) C.2) Whitelist based Alexa Top 1M (~60 thousand) D) Trust w/ Heuristic D.1) Certs with notBefore < some date trusted implicitly, certs with notBefore > some date are CT logged D.2) Trust if C=CN is present in subject name (WoSign's proposal) E) Trust w/ PR E.1) Require some form of mandatory disclosure of misissuance F) Trust w/o any action Nick's proposal #1 is was already captured by D1 in the previous thread. Nick's proposal #2 is captured by E1 Nick's proposal #3 is captured by F (no concrete steps were proposed) I've not included the RP discussion in the above summary, because I don't believe it talks to actions short of distrust, but about alternative methods of determining trustworthiness. It doesn't provide an actionable framework, for, say dealing with issues that arise when a CA behaves against the public interest. To that end, I'm going to offer one more suggestion for consideration: G) Distrust with a Whitelist of Hosts The issue with C is that it becomes easily inflated by issuing certificates, even if they're not used; that is, a free certificate provider can easily exceed a reasonable size of a whitelist, by issuing many certificates for a given host, even if they're not used. Whitelisting by hostname may offer a reasonable solution that balances user need and performance. Consider if we start with the list of certificates issued by StartCom and WoSign, assuming the two are the same party (as all reasonable evidence suggests). Extract the subjectAltName from every one of these certificates, and then compare against the Alexa Top 1M. This yields more than 60K certificates, at 1920K in a 'naive' whitelist. However, if you compare based on base domain (as it appears in Alexa), you end up with 18,763 unique names, with a much better compressibility. For example, when compared with Chrome's Public Suffix List DAFSA implementation (as one such compressed data structure implementation), this ends up occupying 126K of storage. 126K may be within the range of acceptable to ship within a binary. Further, there are a number of things that can be done to reduce this overhead: 1) Large vendors (such as microsoft.com and amazonaws.com) appear within this list, but likely don't wish to; this gives a natural reduction function 2) This doesn't fully account for revocations 3) It could be combined with, say, requiring CT for new certs. While this is hardly a perfect function, given the backdating, it could effectively monitor the issuance of new certificates. 4) The Alexa list includes known third-party domain providers (e.x. myqnapcloud.com, myasustor.com) that could be factored out, as they're not centrally managed 5) Names naturally expire on this list, giving a reasonable stepping function This could be combined with a large scale distrust, and operates on the theory that the primary concerns with a distrust event are minimizing user impact, while allowing sites sufficient time to migrate, and this could offer a one-or-two-release-cycle "graceful turndown" of a CA. If other browsers were able to adopt such a solution, such that the industry could be in rough harmony, this could offer a graduated point to distrust. _______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list [email protected] https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy

