On Wed, Oct 5, 2016 at 10:02 PM, Michael Ströder <mich...@stroeder.com> wrote:
> Dean Coclin wrote:
>> First Data's customers don't use browsers so Firefox can disable SHA-1 
>> tomorrow
>> and not affect them.
>
> So why to have your CA certificate trusted in Firefox's cert DB?
>
>> First Data has asked for a reasonable extension which doesn't affect 
>> browsers.
>
> If it does not "affect browsers" why do you need an extension?

The impact on browsers could be broken down into two parts:
1) An expectation they would work with the resulting certificate
2) The risk that someone uses this to create hash collision allowing
them to create a different certificate that is used with browsers.

I think Dean's point is that #1 is not true here.  Presumably these
certificates could even be blacklisted by browsers.  However #2 is
where the risk lies.

As we have seen with previous requests, the core challenge here is
that many device vendors have chosen to embed a CA trust list in their
devices that is based on the list used by web browsers.  From my own
experience, this is something that continues today with consumer
electronics.  They take a point in time snapshot of the Mozilla list,
embed it in the device, and expect anyone interacting with the device
to get a certificate from one of those CAs.  This inherently sets up a
conflict -- these same device vendors frequently don't release updates
for the devices, so the assumption is that the CAs they choose (which
is usually a unilateral decision) will continue to issue certs
compatible with the device for the lifetime of the device.  With the
transition to SHA-256 or better, this has become a challenge.

I think we can all look back with 20/20 hindsight and say that device
vendors should not use the same roots as browsers and that maybe CAs
should have created "SHA-1 forever" roots for devices that never plan
to update, but that is great hindsight. We have the problem now, so we
need an answer.

Thanks,
Peter
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