On Friday, November 4, 2016 at 5:32:23 AM UTC-7, Hanno Böck wrote: > Hi, > > Great to see Mozilla committing to CT. > > On Fri, 4 Nov 2016 12:19:32 +0000 > Gervase Markham <[email protected]> wrote: > > > So, please add comments with additional _questions_ you think the > > policy will need to address. What the answers should be is (for now) > > off-topic. > > Some meta-thought: > In practice pretty much every webpage wants to be compliant with all > major browsers. It's hard to imagine anyone saying "I'll comply with > Chrome's CT requirements, but not with Mozilla's" (or vice versa). > > Therefore practically the "real" CT requirements will be all > requirements combined. It also probably means that diverity in CT > requirements between different browsers doesn't make a whole lot of > sense. > > So one could ask: Should mozilla just say "we agree with everything > Chrome does" ?
This is a very useful point to consider. As has been repeatedly stated in Chrome's discussion of CT, the requirement for one Google/one non-Google is due to the absence of SCT->STH verification, and the absence of Gossip, in current versions of Chrome (it's being worked on). In the absence of this, if you trust an SCT from a log, you're effectively trusting that log to be honest - there's no validation occurring that the log isn't providing a split view (perhaps to users inside a particular network block/country and those outside) My understanding was that Mozilla's implementation status was similar to Chrome's a year ago - that is, that it doesn't implement inclusion proof fetching (in the background) and that work hadn't been scheduled/slated yet. In that case, it's a question for Mozilla about whether to trust that logs won't lie, or whether to verify. In Google's case, the one-Google/one-non-Google was merely an interim stopgap towards that solution - because it resolves the "I don't trust other logs" aspect by trusting Google logs (which, at least for Chrome's threat model, is no different than trusting Google not to deliver hostile updates to Chrome users), while giving others the relief that they don't have to solely/entirely trust Google (by having a third-party expression). So I think the question about 'CT Qualification' (to steal Chrome's term) is at least useful to consider that point, about threat models - which, admittedly, I haven't been very good at articulating on Chrome's ct-policy@ all the ways in which we expect/planned for things to go wrong, and attempted to design against that, as well as all the things we knew we didn't know solutions for, in which case, we tried to leave things open. I'll hopefully have more news in the following weeks, on Chrome's ct-policy list, but I think we're interested in hosting another "CT days" event, this time in the US, similar to the events we held in conjunction with the ETSI CA days in Europe. This would hopefully provide for an opportunity of a real time roundtable and discussion of these sorts of issues, across browsers, log operators, and relying parties, to better explore how we can develop both an immediate and long-term healthy ecosystem. Think of it as the "CT/Log Roundtable", and we'll try to figure out solutions for remote participation as well. _______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list [email protected] https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy

