On Friday, November 4, 2016 at 5:32:23 AM UTC-7, Hanno Böck wrote:
> Hi,
> 
> Great to see Mozilla committing to CT.
> 
> On Fri, 4 Nov 2016 12:19:32 +0000
> Gervase Markham <[email protected]> wrote:
> 
> > So, please add comments with additional _questions_ you think the
> > policy will need to address. What the answers should be is (for now)
> > off-topic.
> 
> Some meta-thought:
> In practice pretty much every webpage wants to be compliant with all
> major browsers. It's hard to imagine anyone saying "I'll comply with
> Chrome's CT requirements, but not with Mozilla's" (or vice versa).
> 
> Therefore practically the "real" CT requirements will be all
> requirements combined. It also probably means that diverity in CT
> requirements between different browsers doesn't make a whole lot of
> sense.
> 
> So one could ask: Should mozilla just say "we agree with everything
> Chrome does" ?

This is a very useful point to consider. As has been repeatedly stated in 
Chrome's discussion of CT, the requirement for one Google/one non-Google is due 
to the absence of SCT->STH verification, and the absence of Gossip, in current 
versions of Chrome (it's being worked on). In the absence of this, if you trust 
an SCT from a log, you're effectively trusting that log to be honest - there's 
no validation occurring that the log isn't providing a split view (perhaps to 
users inside a particular network block/country and those outside)

My understanding was that Mozilla's implementation status was similar to 
Chrome's a year ago - that is, that it doesn't implement inclusion proof 
fetching (in the background) and that work hadn't been scheduled/slated yet. In 
that case, it's a question for Mozilla about whether to trust that logs won't 
lie, or whether to verify.

In Google's case, the one-Google/one-non-Google was merely an interim stopgap 
towards that solution - because it resolves the "I don't trust other logs" 
aspect by trusting Google logs (which, at least for Chrome's threat model, is 
no different than trusting Google not to deliver hostile updates to Chrome 
users), while giving others the relief that they don't have to solely/entirely 
trust Google (by having a third-party expression).

So I think the question about 'CT Qualification' (to steal Chrome's term) is at 
least useful to consider that point, about threat models - which, admittedly, I 
haven't been very good at articulating on Chrome's ct-policy@ all the ways in 
which we expect/planned for things to go wrong, and attempted to design against 
that, as well as all the things we knew we didn't know solutions for, in which 
case, we tried to leave things open.

I'll hopefully have more news in the following weeks, on Chrome's ct-policy 
list, but I think we're interested in hosting another "CT days" event, this 
time in the US, similar to the events we held in conjunction with the ETSI CA 
days in Europe. This would hopefully provide for an opportunity of a real time 
roundtable and discussion of these sorts of issues, across browsers, log 
operators, and relying parties, to better explore how we can develop both an 
immediate and long-term healthy ecosystem. Think of it as the "CT/Log 
Roundtable", and we'll try to figure out solutions for remote participation as 
well.
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