Hi everyone, I'd like to take some action about persistent failures to properly disclose intermediates. The deadline for this was June, and CAs have had a number of reminders, so there's no excuse.
Of course, if intermediates aren't disclosed, we can't be certain what they are, but crt.sh has a good idea of many of them: https://crt.sh/mozilla-disclosures#undisclosed There is also a list on that page of certs which CAs have disclosed but not provided audit info, but given that you can get off that list by putting _anything_ in the relevant box in Salesforce, I'm worried about perverse incentives if we go after people on that list at the moment: https://crt.sh/mozilla-disclosures#disclosureincomplete Anyway, considering the first list: what do we do? I'm not particularly in favour of sending another nagging email. We could just un-trust the lot, but that might be quite impactful. So here's my proposal: we play Russian Roulette. We choose 3 certs from the list each week and add them to OneCRL, and email the CAs concerned to tell them we've done it. Hopefully after a few weeks, they'll get the message. RFC 3797 has a handy mechanism called "verifiable random selection", which allows you to make a random selection from a list that can be publicly verified as random. And, even more handily, I've written an implementation of it in JavaScript: http://www.gerv.net/hacking/vrs/ We would choose 3 certs from the list as it exists every Monday at 2pm UK time, using the following sources of randomness for the algorithm: 1) UK National Lottery "Lotto" numbers, not including bonus ball 2) UK National Lottery "Thunderball" numbers, not including Thunderball 3) UK National Lottery "Lotto Hotpicks" numbers All would be from the draws which take place on the Saturday preceding the Monday in question. https://www.national-lottery.co.uk/results Comments? Gerv _______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list [email protected] https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy

