On 11/11/16 19:51, Peter Bowen wrote:
>> The following issues with our current policy may be relevant:
>> https://github.com/mozilla/pkipolicy/issues/27
>> https://github.com/mozilla/pkipolicy/issues/5
> 
> I think any increase in requirements needs to be carefully considered
> given that many Root CAs are included in multiple browser trust
> stores.  For example, forbidding DSA would impact all browsers.

Please note that in the appropriate bug :-)

>>> Certification Authority (CA) - a logical entity which uses its private
>>> key to sign certificates.
>>
>> Is this too broad? An intermediate certificate might meet this
>> definition. Why do we need this definition if we have CAO and CAKP?
> 
> A CA is not a certificate.  It is the tuple (CAKP, CADN).

Ah. That would be a useful explanatory extra sentence.

> This comes directly from RFC 5280, section 3.2:
> 
>   "This specification covers two classes of certificates: CA
>    certificates and end entity certificates.  CA certificates may be
>    further divided into three classes: cross-certificates, self-issued
>    certificates, and self-signed certificates. 

That's as may be, but I suggest that normal usage has moved on. I
certainly don't see that usage of cross-certificate.

>>> a) Ensure the End-Entity certificates follows the S/MIME Certificate
>>> Profile: Minimum
>>
>> What is that?
> 
> The Google draft Andrew Whalley published.

I'm not sure I'm familiar with that; URL?

Gerv

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