On 11/11/16 19:51, Peter Bowen wrote: >> The following issues with our current policy may be relevant: >> https://github.com/mozilla/pkipolicy/issues/27 >> https://github.com/mozilla/pkipolicy/issues/5 > > I think any increase in requirements needs to be carefully considered > given that many Root CAs are included in multiple browser trust > stores. For example, forbidding DSA would impact all browsers.
Please note that in the appropriate bug :-) >>> Certification Authority (CA) - a logical entity which uses its private >>> key to sign certificates. >> >> Is this too broad? An intermediate certificate might meet this >> definition. Why do we need this definition if we have CAO and CAKP? > > A CA is not a certificate. It is the tuple (CAKP, CADN). Ah. That would be a useful explanatory extra sentence. > This comes directly from RFC 5280, section 3.2: > > "This specification covers two classes of certificates: CA > certificates and end entity certificates. CA certificates may be > further divided into three classes: cross-certificates, self-issued > certificates, and self-signed certificates. That's as may be, but I suggest that normal usage has moved on. I certainly don't see that usage of cross-certificate. >>> a) Ensure the End-Entity certificates follows the S/MIME Certificate >>> Profile: Minimum >> >> What is that? > > The Google draft Andrew Whalley published. I'm not sure I'm familiar with that; URL? Gerv _______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list [email protected] https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy

