I disagree. If the CA has requested removal of the root and added it to
OneCRL, then I don't see how there is an obligation to continue operating
the root under the Mozilla policy.  If the browser doesn't update the root
store/revocation list to remove the root, then the browser is accepting the
CA as non-compliant.  If Mozilla wanted to have the root remain compliant
after the attempted removal, there'd have to be some sort of agreement with
the CA for a transition period. Afterall, a root store operator can always
add/remove a root to its program unilaterally, regardless of the root
certificate status.

Jeremy

-----Original Message-----
From: dev-security-policy
[mailto:dev-security-policy-bounces+jeremy.rowley=digicert.com@lists.mozilla
.org] On Behalf Of Richard Barnes
Sent: Tuesday, January 24, 2017 9:11 AM
To: Peter Bowen <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]; Rob Stradling
<[email protected]>; Gervase Markham <[email protected]>;
[email protected]
Subject: Re: I found some SHA-1 certificates issued by Symantec

On Tue, Jan 24, 2017 at 11:08 AM, Peter Bowen <[email protected]> wrote:

> On Tue, Jan 24, 2017 at 8:00 AM, Richard Barnes <[email protected]>
> wrote:
> > On Tue, Jan 24, 2017 at 10:48 AM, Gervase Markham <[email protected]>
> wrote:
> >>
> >> This helpful spreadsheet shows that they were removed in Firefox 47 
> >> and
> >> 51 respectively:
> >> https://mozillacaprogram.secure.force.com/CA/RemovedCACertificateRe
> >> port Although Firefox 51 was only released yesterday, so that's a 
> >> bit concerning.
> >>
> >
> > Indeed, if they issued these before yesterday, this seems like a
problem.
>
> I'm a little surprised to read this.  This SHA-1 "private" hierarchy 
> is not new news and has been discussed in various forums over the year 
> or 18 months. At least one other CA operator has a similar hierarchy 
> that is chained back to a root formerly in the Mozilla trust store.
>
> I was under the impression Mozilla knew about this from the SHA-1 
> exceptions discussions, as one of the topics there has been "why can't 
> they use the SHA-1 certs from the pulled roots?"
>

If the root was removed in Firefox 51, and they were issuing SHA-1 off of it
before 51 shipped, then they were issuing SHA-1 certificates under a root
trusted by Firefox.

You can use SHA-1 under a pulled root, but it has to actually be pulled
first.

--Richard


>
> Thanks,
> Peter
>
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