I disagree. If the CA has requested removal of the root and added it to OneCRL, then I don't see how there is an obligation to continue operating the root under the Mozilla policy. If the browser doesn't update the root store/revocation list to remove the root, then the browser is accepting the CA as non-compliant. If Mozilla wanted to have the root remain compliant after the attempted removal, there'd have to be some sort of agreement with the CA for a transition period. Afterall, a root store operator can always add/remove a root to its program unilaterally, regardless of the root certificate status.
Jeremy -----Original Message----- From: dev-security-policy [mailto:dev-security-policy-bounces+jeremy.rowley=digicert.com@lists.mozilla .org] On Behalf Of Richard Barnes Sent: Tuesday, January 24, 2017 9:11 AM To: Peter Bowen <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected]; Rob Stradling <[email protected]>; Gervase Markham <[email protected]>; [email protected] Subject: Re: I found some SHA-1 certificates issued by Symantec On Tue, Jan 24, 2017 at 11:08 AM, Peter Bowen <[email protected]> wrote: > On Tue, Jan 24, 2017 at 8:00 AM, Richard Barnes <[email protected]> > wrote: > > On Tue, Jan 24, 2017 at 10:48 AM, Gervase Markham <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> > >> This helpful spreadsheet shows that they were removed in Firefox 47 > >> and > >> 51 respectively: > >> https://mozillacaprogram.secure.force.com/CA/RemovedCACertificateRe > >> port Although Firefox 51 was only released yesterday, so that's a > >> bit concerning. > >> > > > > Indeed, if they issued these before yesterday, this seems like a problem. > > I'm a little surprised to read this. This SHA-1 "private" hierarchy > is not new news and has been discussed in various forums over the year > or 18 months. At least one other CA operator has a similar hierarchy > that is chained back to a root formerly in the Mozilla trust store. > > I was under the impression Mozilla knew about this from the SHA-1 > exceptions discussions, as one of the topics there has been "why can't > they use the SHA-1 certs from the pulled roots?" > If the root was removed in Firefox 51, and they were issuing SHA-1 off of it before 51 shipped, then they were issuing SHA-1 certificates under a root trusted by Firefox. You can use SHA-1 under a pulled root, but it has to actually be pulled first. --Richard > > Thanks, > Peter > _______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list [email protected] https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy
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