Well, they found a way to do it with somewhat "ordinary" computers
running for an actually doable period of time.
And they chose a prefix for its real world usefulness, not for matching
any specific property of the SHA-1 algorithm or its weakness. Their
paper explains (with some wisely omitted details) how to repeat the
attack for any other chosen prefix, such as might be involved in an
attack on CA issuance.
That said, their attack requires the ability of the attacker to choose
a meaningless 128 byte block in the data being passed to SHA-1, which
may be quite difficult in requests submitted to most CA services.
For example, in a certificate request, while the attacker can "choose"
such a bunch of bits in the public key, the value also has to be a valid
public key for which the attacker can generate at least one digital
signature (the one on the CSR). For RSA certificates, this might be
done by requesting a longer that 2048 bit public key found by searching
for primes whose most significant 1024 bits multiply to form the attack
value (such prime searching is a standard part of legitimate key
generation). The length of the request DN would then need to be
adjusted to align the public key just right for the public key to start
at a 64 byte boundary after adding the stuff the victim CA adds. And
after that, the actual 128 byte block would need the very costly
calculation for a prefix corresponding to the combination of the chosen
request parameters and whatever the CA is predicted to add, including
any random serial number bits and whatever "predictable" serial number
and timestamp will be used after the multi-month calculation period.
As a further countermeasure, I would suggest that CAs operating
continued SHA-1 services (such as Windows XP compatible code signing
certificate issuance and signature timestamping) should run a
variation of the "sha1collisiondetection" check released Tuesday by the
CWI/Google team, and simply refuse requests that this check flags as
suspicious. For internally generated signing requests (such as CRL
signing), instances rejected by this check might be retried with fresh
timestamps and random values.
On 23/02/2017 20:23, Yuhong Bao wrote:
identical prefix, not chosen prefix. I was more interested in an SHA-1
collision ASIC.
________________________________________
From: dev-security-policy
<dev-security-policy-bounces+yuhongbao_386=hotmail....@lists.mozilla.org> on behalf
of Adrian R. via dev-security-policy <[email protected]>
Sent: Thursday, February 23, 2017 8:26:10 AM
To: [email protected]
Subject: SHA-1 collision
Hello
i just saw this in the news... a SHA-1 collision has been achieved.
https://arstechnica.com/security/2017/02/at-deaths-door-for-years-widely-used-sha1-function-is-now-dead/
proof site: https://shattered.io/
authors:
Marc Stevens (1), Elie Bursztein (2), Pierre Karpman (1), Ange Albertini (2),
Yarik Markov (2)
1 = CWI Amsterdam
2 = Google Research
File: shattered-1.pdf
CRC-32: 348150fb
MD5: ee4aa52b139d925f8d8884402b0a750c
SHA-1: 38762cf7f55934b34d179ae6a4c80cadccbb7f0a
SHA-256: 2bb787a73e37352f92383abe7e2902936d1059ad9f1ba6daaa9c1e58ee6970d0
SHA-512:
3c19b2cbcf72f7f5b252ea31677b8f2323d6119e49bcc0fb55931d00132385f1e749bb24cbd68c04ac826ae8421802825d3587fe185abf709669bb9693f6b416
File: shattered-2.pdf
CRC-32: b3fbab1c
MD5: 5bd9d8cabc46041579a311230539b8d1
SHA-1: 38762cf7f55934b34d179ae6a4c80cadccbb7f0a
SHA-256: d4488775d29bdef7993367d541064dbdda50d383f89f0aa13a6ff2e0894ba5ff
SHA-512:
f39a04842e4b28e04558496beb7cb84654ded9c00b2f873c3ef64f9dfdbc760cd0273b816858ba5b203c0dd71af8b65d6a0c1032e00e48ace0b4705eedcc1bab
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Enjoy
Jakob
--
Jakob Bohm, CIO, Partner, WiseMo A/S. https://www.wisemo.com
Transformervej 29, 2860 Søborg, Denmark. Direct +45 31 13 16 10
This public discussion message is non-binding and may contain errors.
WiseMo - Remote Service Management for PCs, Phones and Embedded
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