On Wed, Mar 8, 2017 at 9:56 AM, tugba onder via dev-security-policy <
[email protected]> wrote:

> 3.2.2.4.6: Applicant representative is requested to change a web page
> hosted in certificate requested domain. That change is done by serving the
> file which we sent for this purpose. This method means Request-upon-change
> for us but until the next audit, we plan to use the request token method
> which is indicated in CAB BR section 3.2.2.4.6.
>

Right, but the reason I highlighted this is that the audit noted
conformance to v1.4.1, but the process you described wasn't consistent with
v1.4.1. It's understandable that the auditable controls for 1.4.1 have not
been developed, so I'm not particularly surprised that this wouldn't have
been called out in the audit, but it did highlight a divergence between the
statement as to how you validate domains and the stated compliance.

To me, it signaled that there may be other places where the asserted
compliance is to v1.4.1, but the absence of audited criteria relative to
the changes in v.1.4.1 may not have actually been implemented. The serial
number is another example of that - where the practice and statement
diverged.

Here's another example: Section 2.2 of the Baseline Requirements requires
that the CA SHALL publicly give effect to these Requirements and represent
that it will adhere to the latest published version. (and then describes an
illustrative examples of fulfilling that obligation)

Rather than including that clause, Section 1 of your CPS states "Kamu SM
conforms to the updated versions of the standard ... and CA/Browser Forum
Baseline Requirements (BR) for the Issuance and Management of Publicly
Trusted Certificates". This is all perfectly fine and compliant with
Section 2.2 - you've made the statement and represented adherence.

However, the matters of both serial numbers and domain validation (as
described) are examples of non-adherence to that Section 1 of your CPS,
because the procedures used weren't consistent with Kamu SM conforming to
the updated version of the standard.

So that's why I suggested that you carefully examine the updated version
for any other divergences. For example, the Mozilla community would not
have been aware of the non-compliance to 3.2.2.4.6 had you not shared
details, which is why Andrew originally requested them. There's the
possibility of other areas of non-compliance, hence the similar request to
fully examine the Baseline Requirements and double check to make sure all
policies/processes are consistent - since Section 1 of your CPS says they
will be, but it was determined they weren't.

Once you've done that examination and identified any other issues, I was
suggesting sharing those. That way, the community can know that we're
"starting" from a good and compliant state, and then moving forward. It
also avoids any issues where, if three years down the road we find
something was overlooked, there's no way to excuse that - as there was the
opportunity now to examine and comply.

As it stands right now, Section 3.2.2 is in conflict with Section 1. I
think that needs to be fixed.



> Prior to CA/B BR v1.3.7, the certificate serial numbers are required to
> contain at least 20 bits of entropy. We were satisfying this condition by
> adding 32 bits entropy to the serial number. We had implemented the 64-bit
> entropy restriction beginning with v1.3.7 which went into effect on
> September 30th, but the system is left to add 32-bit entropy. As a result
> of Andrew's warnings, we have quickly deployed 64-bit random generator
> implementation and updated the test web page certificate to ensure this.
> There is no active certificate that we have issued since the process of our
> new root application has not been completed. Certificates that will issue
> after our application process is completed will provide this feature.
>

Similarly, at the time audit report was produced, Section 10.3 ("End Entity
SSL Certificate Template") was not consistent with Section 1 (current BRs).

With your current update, this is resolved, although the matter still
remains for Section 3.2.2 above.

Further, given these, I'm suggesting it would be good to review your
policies and practices for consistency with/adherence to Section 1 (or,
more aptly, to the Baseline Requirements), share if there are any further
inconsistencies identified, and then continue with the discussions :)
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