Gerv has already responded and while his response is correct I have a little more detail I can share, see bellow.
> Peter Kurrash: I'm trying to keep score here but am having difficulties. Can > someone confirm if > the following statements are correct: > - Google has acquired 2 root certificates from GMO GlobalSign but not the > company itself. Correct, two root certificates and their keys were acquired. > Peter Kurrash: GMO GlobalSign will continue to own other roots and will use > only those other roots for > the various products and services they choose to offer going forward. There > is no affiliation or business > relationship between GMO GlobalSign and Google after the completion of the > acquisition. Mostly correct, we do have a contractual obligation to GMO GlobalSign relative to the subordinate that exists under GlobalSign R2, that subordinate is owned and operated by GMO GlobalSign. The terms of this agreement require us to provide revocation services while they migrate their customers off. It also requires them to maintain their WebTrust accreditation. I must also add that Google is large organization and may now, or in the future, have other agreements with GMO GlobalSign but I can say those agreements would likely be orthogonal to this transaction. > Peter Kurrash:No public announcement of the acquisition was made prior to > January 26, 2017 > via the Google security blog. No, this is not correct, the first public announcement was at the CAB/Forum in mid October 2016 and the second was the Mozilla bug database on December 22nd, 2016. > Peter Kurrash: No disclosure has been made regarding what specific items were > acquired, > including such things as: "private key material" (HSM's and whatnot); > computer equipment used > as web servers, OCSP responders, etc.; domain names, IP addresses, and > other infrastructure > used in the operations and maintenance of the acquired roots; data such as > subscriber lists, > databases, server logs, payment details and histories, certificate issuance > activities and histories, > etc.; any access rights to physical space such as offices, data centers, > development and test > facilities, and so forth; and last, but not least, any personnel, > documentation, training materials, > or other knowledge products. That is correct, we did not enumerate the items > involved in the exchange. The auditor's opinion letter covering the transfer is the most explicit public document covering the transfer. I can say that the acquisition included the acquisition of the root key material and corresponding certificates. Additionally the transfer included tooling, documentation and training related to the aforementioned assets. The elements included were within the scope necessary to enable us to satisfy auditors of proper historical and future management of the associated keys. For those who are interested I can also add we did not purchase the GMO GlobalSign HSMs, instead we purchased our own HSMs directly from the manufacturer. These HSMs were compatible with what were in use by GMO GlobalSign and we utilized the key migration capabilities of those devices to migrate those keys to our HSMs. > Peter Kurrash: The scope of impact to existing GlobalSign customers is not > known. Neither > GMO GlobalSign nor Google have notified any existing clients of the > acquisition. I can not speak for GMO GlobalSign or what GMO GlobalSign has or has not told affected customers, that said I do know that they have updated their CP/CPS. I can say that our key migration plan was chosen, in part, to provide GMO GlobalSign enough time to migrate affected customers to CAs operated under their other roots. > Peter Kurrash: The GlobalSign web site has no mention of this acquisition > for reasons which are > unknown. Further, the web site does not make their CP/CPS documents readily > available limiting the > ability for current subscribers and relying parties to decide if continued > use of a cert chaining up to > these roots is acceptable to them. I can not speak for GMO GlobalSign or what GMO GlobalSign has or has not done, however a Google search of “GlobalSign CPS” has the first match of https://www.globalsign.com/en/repository/ which has their CP/CPS. Additionally I am not aware of a requirement to do notification, I would only expect notification if it materially impacted them and I personally would argue that since GMO GlobalSign continues to operate many other roots as well as the related sub CA there is not a material impact. > Peter Kurrash: A relying party who takes the initiative to review a > certificate chain that goes up to either > of the acquired roots will see that it is anchored (or "verified by") > GlobalSign. No mention of Google will > be made anywhere in the user > interface. GMO GlobalSign continues to maintain an active WebTrust audit for the CA under R2. As the operator of the issuing CA, they are responsible for the verification of of the identity of the associated certificates. This includes those certificates they have historically issued as well as those they may issue in the future, given this, the above this statement is accurate. Additionally it is also common for the name of the root not to match who is the current operator, for example in the 90s I created several roots for a company called ValiCert. Those roots have changed hands several times. I can also say that the intent is for GMO GlobalSign to migrate existing customers off of this subordinate CA to one issued under one of their roots as soon as practical. > Peter Kurrash: Google has acquired these roots in order to better serve > their subscribers, which are > organizations (not people) throughout the many Google companies. Relying > parties (i.e. end users of > the various Google products) are not affected positively or negatively by > this acquisition. Mostly true, though we have no product plans to disclose at this time we may, in the future issue certificates to people as well as to organizations outside of Google. > Peter Kurrash: Mozilla granted Google's request to keep the acquisition > confidential based on > statements made by Google and Google's auditor E&Y. Neither GlobalSign nor > their auditors offered > any opinion on this matter. Mostly true, both GMO GlobalSign and Google independently and together reached out to the respective root programs both before, during and after the transfer. I can say the negotiation and execution of commercial contracts are commonly covered under nondisclosure agreements as are engagements with consultants and auditors. As such I would not expect in this, or in any other commercial negotiation for the parties involved to make public opinion statements about confidentiality. _______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list [email protected] https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy

