On 23/03/17 16:09, Ryan Sleevi wrote: > You can participate in this discussion at > https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/forum/#!topic/blink-dev/eUAKwjihhBs
Participants who want to discuss Google's action should, of course, visit the Blink forum above as Ryan has requested. However, the discussion about what action Mozilla should take regarding Symantec remains open. (My apologies for not driving it forward; it was CAB Forum this week.) Here are some additional thoughts I have on this topic, but I have not yet reached a conclusion to recommend to Kathleen. The root stores tend to actively avoid coordinating enforcement actions ahead of any public announcement, to avoid accusations of impropriety. But now that Google have announced their action, it is unavoidable to note that it can be preferable for two root stores considering action against a CA to take broadly parallel approaches, so that the CA is not doubly penalised for the same actions. Google's communication has two parts (which are intermingled in the message as written) - a summary of Symantec's issues as they see them, and then a plan of action for changes they want to make in response to those issues. As far as the summary of issues goes, my understanding of the situation is broadly the same - that is, Google has correctly identified the things that have gone wrong, and appropriately assessed the severity of the problems. It is particularly concerning to me that Symantec discovered that one of their RAs was doing a terrible job and, while they demanded remediation, did nothing about existing certificates issued by that RA. An additional consideration in deciding on what action to take is whether a particular incident fits into a pattern for a particular CA. In the case of WoSign, while there were one or two unusually bad things about what they did, once we started investigating it became clear that these fit into a persistent pattern of ongoing problems. In the case of Symantec, it is borderline whether that test has been met. It is true that this incident and the previous "test cert" one are both serious, and both involved test certs - although this most recent one then turned up other problems. And they also have, like several CAs, managed to issue some unpermitted SHA-1 in 2016 despite attempting to update their systems to stop it. But we have not seen the sheer number of different problems that we saw with WoSign. Considering all that, calibrating a level of response is a difficult question. It is important to be consistent with previous precedent (with some consideration given to the fact that a second or third CA to take some bad action should have taken warning from the fate of the first) but there are few enough precedents in this area that any choice of level of action will always be open to both "you should do more" and "you should do less" criticism. Google's plan is, in my personal opinion, at the "strong" end of the options I was considering. Google's gradated distrust plan aims to minimise or spread the compatibility risk. Emulating it exactly would be difficult in any case, due to the fact that our releases do not line up with theirs. However, a simpler version may have the same effect in practice, given Chrome's ability to drive the market alone. Further comments and thoughts on the above are welcome. Gerv _______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list [email protected] https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy

