On 17/03/17 15:30, Gervase Markham wrote:
> The URL for the draft of the next CA Communication is here:
> https://mozilla-mozillacaprogram.cs54.force.com/Communications/CACommunicationSurveySample?CACommunicationId=a050S000000G3K2
> 
> Note that this is a _draft_ - the form parts will not work, and no CA
> should attempt to use this URL or the form to send in any responses.

Here is another proposed question:

Certificate Validity Periods

Your attention is drawn to CAB Forum ballot 193, which recently passed.
This reduces the maximum permissible lifetime of certificates from 39 to
27 months, as of 1st March 2018. In addition, it reduces the amount of
time validation information can be reused, from 39 to 27 months, as of
31st March 2017. Please be aware of these deadlines so you can adjust
your practices accordingly.

Mozilla is interested in, and the CAB Forum continues to discuss, the
possibility of further reductions in certificate lifetime. We see a
benefit here in reducing the overall turnover time it takes for an
improvement in practices or algorithms to make its way through the
entire WebPKI. Shorter times, carefully managed, also encourage the
ecosystem towards automation, which is beneficial when quick changes
need to be made in response to security incidents. Specifically, Mozilla
is currently considering a reduction to 13 months, effective as of 1st
March 2019 (2 years from now). Alternatively, several CAs have said that
the need for contract renegotiation is a significant issue when reducing
lifetimes, so in order that CAs will only have to do this once rather
than twice, another option would be to require the reduction from 1st
March 2018 (1 year from now), the current reduction date.

Please explain whether you would support such a further reduction dated
to one or both of those dates and, if not, what specifically prevents
you from lending your support to such a move. You may wish to reference
the discussion on the CAB Forum public mailing list to familiarise
yourself with the detailed arguments in favour of certificate lifetime
reduction.


Comments, as always, are welcome.

Gerv
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