On Fri, Mar 31, 2017 at 2:39 PM, Gervase Markham via dev-security-policy < [email protected]> wrote:
> As we continue to consider how best to react to the most recent incident > involving Symantec, and given that there is a question of whether it is > part of a pattern of behaviour, it seemed best to produce an issues list > as we did with WoSign. This means Symantec has proper opportunity to > respond to issues raised and those responses can be documented in one > place and the clearest overayll picture can be seen by the community. > > So I have prepared: > https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:Symantec_Issues > > I will now be dropping Symantec an email asking them to begin the > process of providing whatever comment, factual correction or input they > feel appropriate. > > If anyone in this group feels they have an issue which it is appropriate > to add to the list, please send me email with the details. > (Wearing a Google hat) Gerv, Thanks for organizing this information, as much of it was related to and relevant to Google's recent announcement. I want to take this opportunity to share additional details regarding the interactions for UniCredit, which I believe may be useful and relevant both for understanding that issue and the GeoTrust audits. As the Chrome team announced at https://security.googleblog.com/2015/10/sustaining-digital-certificate-security.html , we made steps to require that all Symantec-issued certificates be disclosed via Certificate Transparency. In March of last year, Symantec provided us a list of five sub-CAs which they termed GeoRoots: Apple, Google, Unicredit, Aetna, NTT Docomo - and requested they be excluded from this requirement. We asked Symantec to provide current audit statements for each of these CAs. Symantec indicated that the audit information for these sub-CAs would be added to the CCADB. This was on 3/29. We then followed-up with Symantec, again, because as of 6/28, there were several outstanding issues with Symantec's disclosures: - Apple IST CA 3 was not covered by the general set of Apple audits - No audit information for Aetna was provided, and its CPS was dated in 2011 - No audit information for Unicredit was provided - NTT Docomo (DKHS and DKHS CA2) were disclosed as being part of Symantec's audit Upon follow-up, Symantec provided Aetna's WebTrust for BRs audit. On it, there were 15 qualifications, some of which would have spanned the totality of operation. If Symantec is not willing or able to provide this audit, we would be happy to, in the interest of public transparency. This audit was dated May 11, 2016, but covered the period January 1, 2015 through December 31, 2015. I highlight this, because this means it was provided 132 days after the close of the period, or 42 days after provided for by the Baseline Requirements. This audit was performed by Symantec's auditors, KPMG, and thus demonstrates the pattern of delayed audits that KPMG has shown a tendency for, and extends beyond just Symantec. I want to highlight some of the qualifications on this audit: "It was noted that: physical access to the cage housing the CA system was not logged; event logs for the CA prior to July 2015 were not available; and logs are not reviewed periodically." "It was noted that no training programs were in place for Trusted Role personnel." "It was noted that a security risk assessment of the Aetna CA operations was not performed during the examination period." "It was noted that a security risk assessment of the Aetna CA operations was not performed during the examination period." "It was noted that penetration testing was not performed on the PKI environment during the examination period." Symantec's proposed remediation for this was to allow their contract to expire, and proposed revoking this certificate in October. Note that this was still nearly 3 months later. Regarding NTT Docomo, Symantec repeatedly asserted they controlled issuance for these CAs. However, I highlight this, because the Geotrust audits note 5 sub-CAs, so the fifth sub-CA, if not NTT Docomo, remains unknown and unidentified by Symantec during the same time as their audit. If NTT Docomo was issued and managed by Symantec, then their auditor (KPMG) did not examine this. Regarding Apple's IST CA 3 (and subsequently issued by Symantec, IST CA 8 - G1), Apple requested and Google accepted a discussion with their CA operations team. After discussions with the team, we received suitable assurances from Apple that these two CAs were operated in accordance with their CP/CPS and would be part of the next audit. As has been discussed in other threads, there is a natural period of time where the scope of the audit does not cover any newly issued intermediates, but we ensured that these were listed within Apple's next CP/CPS, and thus scoped for the next audit. Because of this reason alone, we excluded these sub-CAs from our CT requirement. Regarding Unicredit, Google requested that Symantec place us in direct contact with Unicredit. We had several calls with Unicredit's management team regarding the issues, attempting to find a path to see if they would be able to complete a Baseline Requirements audit. Despite this gap, at no point did Symantec propose revoking it. Both Unicredit and Symantec assured us that there would be no new issuance. Despite this, https://crt.sh/?id=40445775 was issued. On October 13, 2016, Google informed Symantec we would be revoking this intermediate. Symantec requested, on behalf of Unicredit, that we reconsider and not revoke this intermediate until 2016/11/30. We declined, and Symantec then revoked this intermediate. I want to share these details so that a fuller picture of the GeoRoot issues can be noted. Particularly concerning is the seriousness of the Aetna issues and the failure to remedy them, and the failure to identify the NTT Docomo (DKHS) roots as part of Symantec's infrastructure. https://crt.sh/?id=33549 is the Aetna intermediate. This is, presumably, the intermediate that for at least two years (if not longer) caused Symantec's Geotrust audit to be qualified. The seriousness of the issues underscores the significant danger presented by the lack of appropriate oversight. Symantec revoked this intermediate on 2016/11/30, despite being aware of the then-unremediated critical security failures as early as 2016/06/29. Further, we have no reason to believe that Symantec's proposed disabling of Aetna issuance was any different from that of the proposed disabling of Unicredit's issuance - that is, a letter. When Unicredit's misissuance event occurred, based on the available public evidence, Aetna's issuance was not rescinded. Further, despite Symantec's awareness of these issues, they were not part of Symantec's Point in Time Readiness Assessment for GeoTrust ( https://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/about/media/repository/6_symantec_geotrust_wtbr_6-15-2016.pdf ). I mention this to highlight that the demonstration of the lack of qualifications on the PITRA audits, for June 15, 2016, should not be seen as sufficient demonstration of Symantec's remediation of the lack of oversight that existed for at least two years. _______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list [email protected] https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy

