Attachment was stripped, here it the content: GlobalSign BR violation: EV Certificate with dNSName containing a space
On February 26, 2017, we received a report that there were multiple SANs in an EV SSL Certificate that contained a space within it. Spaces are not permitted characters, per RFC 5280. We notified the customer on March 1, 2017 and revoked the certificate the next day on March 2, 2017. How this happened: A customer ordered a certificate with CN of m.vietnamairlines.com and requested 3 additional SANs as listed below. The base domain, “vietnamairlines.com”, was vetted and the certificate was then approved and issued. When they ordered this 2 year certificate in August 2015 they entered a space (likely via copy/paste) in the SAN fields and this was not obvious the vetting team when they were reviewing the request. Our ordering application did not properly strip out the spaces and the vetting team did not notice the space in the middle of these SANs. The result was this set of invalid SAN values: * owa. m.vietnamairlines.com * mail. m.vietnamairlines.com * autodiscover. m.vietnamairlines.com Scope of the problem: As part of this problem investigation, we went back and searched for DNSNames with characters that don’t comply with RFC 5280 in active certificates. We found 11 orders (each with 1 active certificate) that contained values non-compliant with the RFC and we found one order with 34 active certificates (due to many certificate updates/reissuances for this order). All have been revoked. In February 2016, we put in more comprehensive data validation for SANs and CNs and have not issued any non-compliant dNSName values in SSL Certificates since that time, until last week on March 21, 2017. We issued a Wildcard OV SSL Certificate with a SAN of the format www.*.domain.com. It has been since revoked. The issue here is that the updated logic released in February 2016 was not applied to a certain case for a certain language specific validation routines (we have unique server side validation routines for different languages and one was missed). Plans for Remediation: GlobalSign is continuing to improve automated compliance checking services to catch issues prior to issuance in a centralized location as a standard compliance process that all certificates will need to pass. In addition to checking data when we receive new orders, we will be adding independent, redundant checks as follows: * By the end of May 2017, we’ll be adding an independent post issuance check for 100% of issued SSL Certificates. This centralized check can be more robust and will proactively detect errors so we can address them immediately. * By the end of July 2017, we’ll be adding the same independent pre-issuance check in-line with the issuance process at the very last step prior to issuance to check issues before issuance. We feel that adding these 2 additional levels of checking we will eliminate issuance of certificates with CommonName and SAN values that do not comply with RFC 5280. We plan to add redundant pre- and post-issuance validation for additional fields later this year. _______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list [email protected] https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy

