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GlobalSign BR violation: EV Certificate with dNSName containing a space

On February 26, 2017, we received a report that there were multiple SANs in an 
EV SSL Certificate that contained a space within it.  Spaces are not permitted 
characters, per RFC 5280.  We notified the customer on March 1, 2017 and 
revoked the certificate the next day on March 2, 2017.

How this happened:

A customer ordered a certificate with CN of m.vietnamairlines.com and requested 
3 additional SANs as listed below. The base domain, “vietnamairlines.com”, was 
vetted and the certificate was then approved and issued.  When they ordered 
this 2 year certificate in August 2015 they entered a space (likely via 
copy/paste) in the SAN fields and this was not obvious the vetting team when 
they were reviewing the request.  Our ordering application did not properly 
strip out the spaces and the vetting team did not notice the space in the 
middle of these SANs.  The result was this set of invalid SAN values:
* owa. m.vietnamairlines.com
* mail. m.vietnamairlines.com
* autodiscover. m.vietnamairlines.com

Scope of the problem:

As part of this problem investigation, we went back and searched for DNSNames 
with characters that don’t comply with RFC 5280 in active certificates.  We 
found 11 orders (each with 1 active certificate) that contained values 
non-compliant with the RFC and we found one order with 34 active certificates 
(due to many certificate updates/reissuances for this order).  All have been 
revoked. 

In February 2016, we put in more comprehensive data validation for SANs and CNs 
and have not issued any non-compliant dNSName values in SSL Certificates since 
that time, until last week on March 21, 2017.  We issued a Wildcard OV SSL 
Certificate with a SAN of the format www.*.domain.com.  It has been since 
revoked.  The issue here is that the updated logic released in February 2016 
was not applied to a certain case for a certain language specific validation 
routines (we have unique server side validation routines for different 
languages and one was missed).

Plans for Remediation:

GlobalSign is continuing to improve automated compliance checking services to 
catch issues prior to issuance in a centralized location as a standard 
compliance process that all certificates will need to pass.  In addition to 
checking data when we receive new orders, we will be adding independent, 
redundant checks as follows:

* By the end of May 2017, we’ll be adding an independent post issuance check 
for 100% of issued SSL Certificates.  This centralized check can be more robust 
and will proactively detect errors so we can address them immediately.
* By the end of July 2017, we’ll be adding the same independent pre-issuance 
check in-line with the issuance process at the very last step prior to issuance 
to check issues before issuance. 

We feel that adding these 2 additional levels of checking we will eliminate 
issuance of certificates with CommonName and SAN values that do not comply with 
RFC 5280.  We plan to add redundant pre- and post-issuance validation for 
additional fields later this year.
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