Issue J: SHA-1 Issuance After Deadline, Again (February 2016)

On February 29, 2016, a CT pre-certificate was generated using a SHA-1 hash. 
The system checks we had in place at the time prevented new enrollments with 
SHA-1; however, the enrollment associated with this particular pre-cert 
specified SHA-256 when it originated in our systems.

As part of our assessment of the situation, we discovered that an enterprise 
customer used a deprecated, enterprise-only interface that historically allowed 
them to change the algorithm requested from SHA-256 to SHA-1 after the initial 
enrollment. While this use case with the deprecated interface was missed during 
testing, it was promptly patched.

Specifically, we quickly removed the historic interface that allowed algorithm 
changes after enrollment, and conducted a review to identify any other 
deprecated interfaces that could cause the same or related issues.

We acknowledge that this CT pre-certificate was a BR violation. The final 
certificate was not generated, as it was rejected during administrator review 
prior to issuance.

Our prior public updates about this matter can be found here: 
https://groups.google.com/forum/#!searchin/mozilla.dev.security.policy/symantec$20sha1%7Csort:relevance/mozilla.dev.security.policy/siHOXppxE9k/NNwjrMJ6BAAJ
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