On Thu, Apr 20, 2017 at 4:02 PM, Gervase Markham via
dev-security-policy <[email protected]> wrote:
> I don't believe the issuance of wildcard DV certs is problematic in
> practice. Mozilla is of the view that ubiquitous SSL is the highest
> priority for the Web PKI, and wildcard certs are a part of that. Mozilla
> also doesn't believe that it's the job of CAs to police phishing, which
> is the concern raised.
>
> I propose this section be removed from the document.

I support this proposal.

To get code isolation in a browser, you have to have different origins
for the things you are isolating from each other. A security system
(like Sandstorm.io) can mint new origins by minting hostnames. Even
with ACME, getting a non-wildcard cert for each throw-away
on-demand-minted hostname doesn't make sense in terms of CA latency
and CA rate limits.

A wildcard cert solves this, and the solution should be broadly
available (not just to those who pay for OV).

-- 
Henri Sivonen
[email protected]
https://hsivonen.fi/
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