On Thu, Apr 20, 2017 at 4:02 PM, Gervase Markham via dev-security-policy <[email protected]> wrote: > I don't believe the issuance of wildcard DV certs is problematic in > practice. Mozilla is of the view that ubiquitous SSL is the highest > priority for the Web PKI, and wildcard certs are a part of that. Mozilla > also doesn't believe that it's the job of CAs to police phishing, which > is the concern raised. > > I propose this section be removed from the document.
I support this proposal. To get code isolation in a browser, you have to have different origins for the things you are isolating from each other. A security system (like Sandstorm.io) can mint new origins by minting hostnames. Even with ACME, getting a non-wildcard cert for each throw-away on-demand-minted hostname doesn't make sense in terms of CA latency and CA rate limits. A wildcard cert solves this, and the solution should be broadly available (not just to those who pay for OV). -- Henri Sivonen [email protected] https://hsivonen.fi/ _______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list [email protected] https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy

