This request from the Dhimyotis/Certigna is to include the SHA-256 ‘Certigna Root CA’ certificate and turn on the Websites and Email trust bits. This root certificate will eventually replace the SHA-1 ‘Certigna’ root certificate that was included via Bugzilla #393166.
Dhimyotis, t e name of the company, is a commercial CA and Certigna is the brand for their certificates. The new ‘Certigna Root CA’ has 7 internally operated subordinated CAs : - Identity CA : encipherment, authentication and/or digitally-signed email - Identity Plus CA : authentication and/or digitally-signed email - Entity CA : seal (EKU : emailProtection or timeStamping) - Entity Code signing CA : seal (EKU : codeSigning) - Services CA : SSL (EKU : authServer or authClient) - Wild CA : SSL (EKU : authServer and authClient) - FR03 : Seal The request is documented in the following bug: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1265683 BR Self Assessment is here: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/attachment.cgi?id=8861810 Summary of Information Gathered and Verified: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/attachment.cgi?id=8862251 * Root Certificate Download URL: http://autorite.dhimyotis.com/certignarootca.der * The CP documents are in French and translated into English. Document Repository: https://www.certigna.fr/autorites/index.xhtml CP - Root CA: http://politique.certigna.fr/en/PCcertignarootca.pdf CP - Services CA: http://politique.certigna.fr/en/PCcertignaservicesca.pdf CP - Wild CA: http://politique.certigna.fr/en/PCcertignawildca.pdf * CA Hierarchy Certificate Hierarchy Diagram : https://www.certigna.fr/autorites/index.xhtml * The request is to enable the Websites and Email trust bits ** Section 4.2.1 of CP - Services CA and CP - Wild CA : "The verification of the FQDN and the entity holding it is achieved using "WHOIS"websites and of the AFNIC website if applicable. A legal representative of the entity which hold the domain must formally designate the RC and its entity in a domain authorization document signed by that representative (request form or specific form provided by the CA)." *** This corresponds to BR section 3.2.2.4.5 Domain Authorization Document * EV Policy OID: Not Requesting EV treatment * Test Websites Valid certificate : https://valid.servicesca.dhimyotis.com Expired certificate: https://expired.servicesca.dhimyotis.com Revoked certificate: https://revoked.servicesca.dhimyotis.com * CRL URLs: Root CAs: http://crl.certigna.fr/certignarootca.crl Subordinated CAs : https://www.certigna.fr/autorites/index.xhtml Frequency of updating CRL is described in chapters 2.3 and 4.9.6 of the CP/CPS * OCSP URLs: URI for SSL certificates : http://servicesca.ocsp.certigna.fr/ Frequency of updating OCSP is described in chapter 4.9.6 of the CP/CPS. The maximum time elapsing from the revocation of an end entity or CA certificate until OCSP responders are updated to reflect that revocation : 1 hour * Audit: Annual audits are performed by LSTI according to the ETSI TS 102 042 / 101 456 criteria. https://bug1265683.bmoattachments.org/attachment.cgi?id=8856978 * Potentially Problematic Practices : None Noted (https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:Problematic_Practices) This begins the discussion of the request from Dhimyotis/Certigna to include the SHA-256 ‘Certigna Root CA’ certificate and turn on the Websites and Email trust bits. Aaron _______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list [email protected] https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy

