This request from the Dhimyotis/Certigna is to include the SHA-256 ‘Certigna 
Root CA’ certificate and turn on the Websites and Email trust bits. This root 
certificate will eventually replace the SHA-1 ‘Certigna’ root certificate that 
was included via Bugzilla #393166. 

Dhimyotis, t e name of the company,  is a commercial CA and Certigna is the 
brand for their certificates.

The new ‘Certigna Root CA’ has 7 internally operated subordinated CAs : 
- Identity CA : encipherment, authentication and/or digitally-signed email 
- Identity Plus CA : authentication and/or digitally-signed email 
- Entity CA : seal (EKU : emailProtection or timeStamping) 
- Entity Code signing CA : seal (EKU : codeSigning) 
- Services CA : SSL (EKU : authServer or authClient) 
- Wild CA : SSL (EKU : authServer and authClient) 
- FR03 : Seal

The request is documented in the following bug: 
https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1265683

BR Self Assessment is here:
https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/attachment.cgi?id=8861810

Summary of Information Gathered and Verified: 
https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/attachment.cgi?id=8862251

* Root Certificate Download URL: 
http://autorite.dhimyotis.com/certignarootca.der

* The CP documents are in French and translated into English.

Document Repository: https://www.certigna.fr/autorites/index.xhtml
CP - Root CA: http://politique.certigna.fr/en/PCcertignarootca.pdf
CP - Services CA: http://politique.certigna.fr/en/PCcertignaservicesca.pdf
CP - Wild CA:  http://politique.certigna.fr/en/PCcertignawildca.pdf

* CA Hierarchy
Certificate Hierarchy Diagram  : https://www.certigna.fr/autorites/index.xhtml

* The request is to enable the Websites and Email trust bits

** Section 4.2.1 of CP - Services CA and CP - Wild CA : "The verification of 
the FQDN and the entity holding it is achieved using "WHOIS"websites and of the 
AFNIC website if applicable. A legal representative of the entity which hold 
the domain must formally designate the RC and its entity in a domain 
authorization document signed by that representative (request form or specific 
form provided by the CA)."
*** This corresponds to BR section 3.2.2.4.5 Domain Authorization Document

* EV Policy OID: Not Requesting EV treatment 

* Test Websites
Valid certificate : https://valid.servicesca.dhimyotis.com 
Expired certificate: https://expired.servicesca.dhimyotis.com 
Revoked certificate: https://revoked.servicesca.dhimyotis.com 

* CRL URLs: 
Root CAs: http://crl.certigna.fr/certignarootca.crl
Subordinated CAs : https://www.certigna.fr/autorites/index.xhtml 
Frequency of updating CRL is described in chapters 2.3 and 4.9.6 of the CP/CPS

* OCSP URLs:
URI for SSL certificates : http://servicesca.ocsp.certigna.fr/
Frequency of updating OCSP is described in chapter 4.9.6 of the CP/CPS. 
The maximum time elapsing from the revocation of an end entity or CA 
certificate until OCSP responders are updated to reflect that revocation : 1 
hour

* Audit: Annual audits are performed by LSTI according to the ETSI TS 102 042 / 
101 456 criteria. 
https://bug1265683.bmoattachments.org/attachment.cgi?id=8856978

* Potentially Problematic Practices : None Noted
(https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:Problematic_Practices)

This begins the discussion of the request from Dhimyotis/Certigna to include 
the SHA-256 ‘Certigna Root CA’ certificate and turn on the Websites and Email 
trust bits. 

Aaron
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