It may be necessary to expand that definition to intermediates that were capable of issuing certificates within the past year (or longer).
On Monday, May 8, 2017 at 9:31:21 AM UTC-4, Alex Gaynor wrote: > I'm not the best way to phrase this, so please forgive the bluntness, but I > think it'd be appropriate to ask at this point if Symantec has disclosed > all necessary intermediates (I believe this would be defined as: chain to > their roots in our trust store, are not expired, are not revoked, and are > not technically constrained), and would they be willing to state that if > new intermediate CAs are discovered beyond that point, it would reflect > either dishonesty or serious mismanagement of their PKI. > > Alex > > > On Mon, May 8, 2017 at 9:20 AM, Kurt Roeckx via dev-security-policy < > [email protected]> wrote: > > > On 2017-05-08 14:24, Gervase Markham wrote: > > > >> > >> 1) Did any of the RAs in your program (CrossCert and co.) have the > >> technical ability to independently issue EV certificates? If they did > >> not not, given that they had issuance capability from intermediates > >> which chained up to EV-enabled roots, what technical controls prevented > >> them from having this capability? > >> > > > > It has a duplicate "not" there. > > > > Issue Y > >> ------- > >> > >> 3) Does Symantec agree that "VeriSign Class 3 SSP Intermediate CA - G2" > >> and "Symantec Class 3 SSP Intermediate CA - G3", can issue certs which > >> are trusted for SSL/TLS in Mozilla products (by chaining up to "VeriSign > >> Universal Root Certification Authority") and yet do not have BR audits? > >> > > > > I'm wondering if the intermediate CA certificates recently published in CT > > should have it's own issue. As far as I know they should have been > > disclosed much earlier. It seems that (at least now) they're all either > > revoked by CRL on the 5th of May (but not disclosed as revoked) or expired > > except for one (https://crt.sh/?id=132854209). > > > > I think they're all from "VeriSign Class 3 SSP Intermediate CA", not G2 or > > G3, except that one that's not revoked. > > > > 4) These two intermediates have a number of sub-intermediates. Does > >> Symantec agree that not all of these sub-intermediates are within the > >> scope of even Symantec's NFSSP Webtrust for CAs audit?[1] If so, how > >> many are in scope and how many are out of scope? If they are all in > >> scope, why are they not listed in the audit document? > >> > > > > The audit document says: "and the Symantec Non-Federal SSP – customer > > specific CAs (collectively referred to as the “Non-Federal SSP CAs”)." > > > > For which it then says that "our examination did not extend to the > > controls of external registration authorities." > > > > The management assertion also says: > > "Controls have inherent limitations, including the possibility of human > > error and the circumvention or overriding of controls. Accordingly, even > > effective controls can provide only reasonable assurance with respect to > > Symantec’s Non-Federal SSP CA operations. Furthermore, because of changes > > in conditions, the effectiveness of controls may vary over time." > > > > > > Kurt > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > dev-security-policy mailing list > > [email protected] > > https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy > > _______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list [email protected] https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy

