It may be necessary to expand that definition to intermediates that were 
capable of issuing certificates within the past year (or longer).

On Monday, May 8, 2017 at 9:31:21 AM UTC-4, Alex Gaynor wrote:
> I'm not the best way to phrase this, so please forgive the bluntness, but I
> think it'd be appropriate to ask at this point if Symantec has disclosed
> all necessary intermediates (I believe this would be defined as: chain to
> their roots in our trust store, are not expired, are not revoked, and are
> not technically constrained), and would they be willing to state that if
> new intermediate CAs are discovered beyond that point, it would reflect
> either dishonesty or serious mismanagement of their PKI.
> 
> Alex
> 
> 
> On Mon, May 8, 2017 at 9:20 AM, Kurt Roeckx via dev-security-policy <
> [email protected]> wrote:
> 
> > On 2017-05-08 14:24, Gervase Markham wrote:
> >
> >>
> >> 1) Did any of the RAs in your program (CrossCert and co.) have the
> >> technical ability to independently issue EV certificates? If they did
> >> not not, given that they had issuance capability from intermediates
> >> which chained up to EV-enabled roots, what technical controls prevented
> >> them from having this capability?
> >>
> >
> > It has a duplicate "not" there.
> >
> > Issue Y
> >> -------
> >>
> >> 3) Does Symantec agree that "VeriSign Class 3 SSP Intermediate CA - G2"
> >> and "Symantec Class 3 SSP Intermediate CA - G3", can issue certs which
> >> are trusted for SSL/TLS in Mozilla products (by chaining up to "VeriSign
> >> Universal Root Certification Authority") and yet do not have BR audits?
> >>
> >
> > I'm wondering if the intermediate CA certificates recently published in CT
> > should have it's own issue. As far as I know they should have been
> > disclosed much earlier. It seems that (at least now) they're all either
> > revoked by CRL on the 5th of May (but not disclosed as revoked) or expired
> > except for one (https://crt.sh/?id=132854209).
> >
> > I think they're all from "VeriSign Class 3 SSP Intermediate CA", not G2 or
> > G3, except that one that's not revoked.
> >
> > 4) These two intermediates have a number of sub-intermediates. Does
> >> Symantec agree that not all of these sub-intermediates are within the
> >> scope of even Symantec's NFSSP Webtrust for CAs audit?[1] If so, how
> >> many are in scope and how many are out of scope? If they are all in
> >> scope, why are they not listed in the audit document?
> >>
> >
> > The audit document says: "and the Symantec Non-Federal SSP – customer
> > specific CAs (collectively referred to as the “Non-Federal SSP CAs”)."
> >
> > For which it then says that "our examination did not extend to the
> > controls of external registration authorities."
> >
> > The management assertion also says:
> > "Controls have inherent limitations, including the possibility of  human
> > error and the circumvention or overriding of controls. Accordingly, even
> > effective controls can provide only reasonable  assurance with respect to
> > Symantec’s Non-Federal SSP CA operations. Furthermore, because of changes
> > in conditions, the effectiveness of controls may vary over time."
> >
> >
> > Kurt
> >
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > dev-security-policy mailing list
> > [email protected]
> > https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy
> >

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