On 22/06/2017 15:02, Ryan Sleevi wrote:
On Thu, Jun 22, 2017 at 1:59 PM Jakob Bohm via dev-security-policy < [email protected]> wrote:
> (Snip long repeat of the same opinion) You seem to argue: - Because the recent research on efficient central CRL distribution was based on a novel optimization of a previously inefficient algorithm, then it is nothing new and should be ignored. - Operating a central CRL distribution service is a suspect commercial enterprise with a suspect business model, not a service to the community. - OCSP stapling of intermediary certificates is inefficient because we should all just use central CRL distribution in a form where not all revocations are included. - Because most/all browsers contain security holes in their revocation checking, making those holes bigger is not a problem. - Revocation by the issuing CA is not trustworthy, thus nothing is, therefore everybody should just trust compromised keys as if they were not compromised. - An attacker with a stolen/compromised key not doing OCSP stapling is the fault of the legitimate key holder. - Forcing people to use OCSP stapling will magically cause software that allows this to spring into existence overnight. If this doesn't happen it is the fault of the server operator, not because the demand was premature. Enjoy Jakob -- Jakob Bohm, CIO, Partner, WiseMo A/S. https://www.wisemo.com Transformervej 29, 2860 Søborg, Denmark. Direct +45 31 13 16 10 This public discussion message is non-binding and may contain errors. WiseMo - Remote Service Management for PCs, Phones and Embedded _______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list [email protected] https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy

