El jueves, 17 de agosto de 2017, 12:26:05 (UTC+2), ramiro...@gmail.com escribió: > El martes, 15 de agosto de 2017, 15:13:04 (UTC+2), Gervase Markham escribió: > > On 08/08/17 14:33, Alex Gaynor wrote: > > > Following up on this thread, 8 days ago I emailed Camerfirma, I have not > > > heard back from them, nor have they taken any action. What is the > > > appropriate next step here? > > > > I have emailed the primary Point of Contact at Camerfirma to enquire as > > to what is going on. > > > > Gerv > Hi Gev and Alex > > We have been trying to contact with our customer to replace the wrong > certificate otherwise we could block our customers services. We found > difficulties to reach the right person due to the holidays period. > > We have already revoke > - https://crt.sh/?id=5129200&opt=cablint > - https://crt.sh/?id=42531587&opt=cablint > and we are working on > - https://crt.sh/?id=112929021&opt=cablint > We expect to be revoked along this day > > All of then are mistakes from the request form that are not been detected by > the AR operator. > > placing "http://"; or "https://"; in the domain name. > > We are going to improve control over the domain name entry form and report to > the AR operators. > > Best regards
https://crt.sh/?id=112929021&opt=cablint is a precertificate. You can see the CT Precertificate Poison critical extention. _______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy
