I think that instead Ryan H is suggesting that (some) CAs are taking advantage of multiple geographically distinct nodes to run the tests from one of the Blessed Methods against an applicant's systems from several places on the Internet at once. This mitigates against attacks that are able to disturb routing only for the CA or some small corner of the Internet containing the CA. For example my hypothetical 17 year-old at the ISP earlier in the thread can't plausibly also be working at four other ISPs around the globe.
This is a mitigation not a fix because a truly sophisticated attacker can obtain other certificates legitimately to build up intelligence about the CA's other perspective points on the Internet and then attack all of them simultaneously. It doesn't involve knowing much about Internet routing, beyond the highest level knowledge that connections from very distant locations will travel by different routes to reach the "same" destination. _______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list [email protected] https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy

