Over the past many months, a few situations have arisen where SubCAs intended to be constrained were not constrained according to the rules, because they lacked "exclude all" name constraints for name types they were not supposed to issue at all.
Would it be beneficial to Mozilla in particular and the larger PKI community in general if the following was added to implementations: If an issuing CA cert specifies at least one name constraint, name types with no explicit name constraint (such as an allow-all constraint), are reinterpreted as "deny all" instead of "allow all" ? Note that CA certs with no name constraints at all remain unconstrained as intended. Obviously, such a change would need to be checked against the corpus of known public CAs, including past CAs that may still be trusted for things like e-mail signatures on old e-mails still in peoples mail boxes. Enjoy Jakob -- Jakob Bohm, CIO, Partner, WiseMo A/S. https://www.wisemo.com Transformervej 29, 2860 Søborg, Denmark. Direct +45 31 13 16 10 This public discussion message is non-binding and may contain errors. WiseMo - Remote Service Management for PCs, Phones and Embedded _______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy
