Hi Ben, While I wasn't trying to suggest the reasoning was the same, I was trying to highlight that for many implementations, the revocation of a single certificate (where there may exist multiple cross-signs) induces enough non-determinism to effectively constitute revoking all of them. That is, clients that encounter the revoked cert - which cannot reliably be predicted - may treat the entire chain as revoked even if alternative, unrevoked paths exist.
This should mean that CAs should be aware of, and cautious of, such revocations. The best mitigation to this is avoiding a large number of cross-signs and rotating keys or names often. On Tue, Sep 19, 2017 at 12:28 AM Ben Wilson <[email protected]> wrote: > Ryan, > Could you please explain what you mean by saying that if you revoke a > single > certificate that it is akin to revoking all variations of that certificate? > I don't think I agree. There are situations where the certificate is > revoked for reasons (e.g. issues of certificate format/content) that have > nothing to do with distrusting the underlying key pair. > Thanks, > Ben > > > -----Original Message----- > From: dev-security-policy > [mailto:[email protected]] On > Behalf Of Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy > Sent: Sunday, September 17, 2017 7:57 PM > To: userwithuid <[email protected]> > Cc: mozilla-dev-security-policy > <[email protected]> > Subject: Re: Old roots to new roots best practice? > > Hi there, > > I agree, Gerv's remarks are a bit confusing with respect to the concern. > You are correct that the process of establishing a new root generally > involves the creation of a self-signed certificate, and then any > cross-signing that happens conceptually creates an 'intermediate' - so you > have a key shared by a root and an intermediate. > > This is not forbidden; indeed, you can see in my recent suggestions to > Symantec/DigiCert, it can and often is the best way for both compatibility > and interoperability. Method #2 that you mentioned, while valid, can bring > much greater compatibility challenges, and thus requires far more careful > planning and execution (and collaboration both with servers and in > configuring AIA endpoints) > > However, there is a criticism to be landed here - and that's using the same > name/keypair for multiple intermediates and revoking one/some of them. This > creates all sorts of compatibility problems in the ecosystem, and is thus > unwise practice. > > As an example of a compatibility problem it creates, note that RFC5280 > states how to verify a constructed path, but doesn't necessarily specify > how > to discover that path (RFC 4158 covers many of the strategies that might be > used, but note, it's Informational). Some clients (such as macOS and iOS, > up > to I believe 10.11) construct a path first, and then perform revocation > checking. If any certificate in the path is rejected, the leaf is rejected > - > regardless of other paths existing. This is similar to the behaviour of a > number of OpenSSL and other (embedded) PKI stacks. > Similarly, applications which process their own revocation checks may only > be able to apply it to the constructed path (Chrome's CRLSets are somewhat > like this, particularly on macOS platforms). Add in caching of > intermediates > (like mentioned in 4158), and it quickly becomes complicated. > > For this reason - if you have a same name/key pair, it should generally be > expected that revoking a single one of those is akin to revoking all > variations of that certificate (including the root!) > > Note that all of this presumes the use of two organizations here, and > cross-signing. If there is a single organization present, or if the > 'intermediate' *isn't* intended to be a root, it's generally seen as an > unnecessary risk (for the reasons above). > > Does that help explain? > > > On Sun, Sep 17, 2017 at 11:37 AM, userwithuid via dev-security-policy < > [email protected]> wrote: > > > Forgot the links: > > > > [1] https://groups.google.com/forum/#!topic/mozilla.dev. > > security.policy/hNOJJrN6WfE > > [2] https://groups.google.com/forum/#!msg/mozilla.dev. > > security.policy/RJHPWUd93xE/RqnC3brRBQAJ > > [3] https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=fbe3018031f9586bcbf41727e417b7 > > d1c45c2f47f93be372a17b96b50757d5a2 > > [4] https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=82b5f84daf47a59c7ab521e4982aef > > a40a53406a3aec26039efa6b2e0e7244c1 > > [5] https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=706bb1017c855c59169bad5c1781cf > > 597f12d2cad2f63d1a4aa37493800ffb80 > > [6] https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=f7cd08a27aa9df0918b4df5265580c > > cee590cc9b5ad677f134fc137a6d57d2e7 > > [7] https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=60b87575447dcba2a36b7d11ac09fb > > 24a9db406fee12d2cc90180517616e8a18 > > [8] https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=d3b8136c20918725e848204735755a > > 4fcce203d4c2eddcaa4013763b5a23d81f > > [9] https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1311832 > > _______________________________________________ > > dev-security-policy mailing list > > [email protected] > > https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy > > > _______________________________________________ > dev-security-policy mailing list > [email protected] > https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy > _______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list [email protected] https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy

