Hi Gerv, Based on the number of reports reviewed recently, I suspect we've got opportunities for improvement, but I'm not quite sure yet what the concrete suggestions on that should look like. A few thoughts below:
- The current report format biases itself towards "misissuance", when we know there's a spectrum of BR compliance issues that can arise (for example, the OCSP responders) that don't necessarily involve the certificates and crt.sh IDs, but on other factors - I would say that the majority of CAs had difficulty understanding what a "timeline" was, often providing statements of steps they took, without any context as to when - either date or time. They also tended to focus on when the incident was reported to them, without taking into the full consideration of when the situation causing the incident began. - For example, if the BRs changed at Date X, and required the CA do something by Date Y, and they didn't, then it would seem that at least Date X and Y are relevant to the discussion (and potentially when the change was first discussed in the CA/B Forum, which often far pre-dates Date X). Further, if CAs' do audits or annual CPS reviews, understanding those in the timeline are equally valuable, even when they predate the incident itself. - It's unclear the value of the confirmation of non-issuance or resolution. If the intent is for the CA to make a binding pledge to the community with respect to their corrective actions, perhaps it should be expanded (and the consequences of misrepresenting that pledge captured) - It's unclear what the reasonable expected update period should be when CAs are taking corrective steps. Weekly updates? If it helps, Microsoft requires the following of CAs that participate in its program - https://social.technet.microsoft.com/wiki/contents/articles/31633.microsoft-trusted-root-program-requirements.aspx#D_CA_Responsibilities_in_the_Event_of_an_Incident - so one might expect that every CA participating in both programs has such information available to them, when it's a BR violation. On Thu, Sep 21, 2017 at 10:34 PM, Gervase Markham via dev-security-policy < [email protected]> wrote: > It seems like the list of topics to cover on the Responding to a > Misissuance page: > https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA/Responding_To_A_Misissuance#Incident_Report > has become a de facto template for incident reports. > > We've now had quite a few CAs use this outline to respond to issues. If > people (CAs or others) have feedback on how this template could be > improved, that would be a fine thing. > > Gerv > _______________________________________________ > dev-security-policy mailing list > [email protected] > https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy > _______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list [email protected] https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy

