I would like to open a discussion about the criteria by which Mozilla
decides which CAs we should allow to apply for inclusion in our root store.

Section 2.1 of Mozilla’s current Root Store Policy states:

CAs whose certificates are included in Mozilla's root program MUST:
>     1.    provide some service relevant to typical users of our software
> products;
>

Further non-normative guidance for which organizations may apply to the CA
program is documented in the ‘Who May Apply’ section of the application
process at https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA/Application_Process . The original
intent of this provision in the policy and the guidance was to discourage a
large number of organizations from applying to the program solely for the
purpose of avoiding the difficulties of distributing private roots for
their own internal use.

Recently, we’ve encountered a number of examples that cause us to question
the usefulness of the currently-vague statement(s) we have that define
which CAs to accept, along a number of different axes:

* Visa is a current program member that has an open request to add another
root. They only issue a relatively small number of certificates per year to
partners and for internal use. They do not offer certificates to the
general public or to anyone with whom they do not have an existing business
relationship.

* Google is also a current program member, admitted via the acquisition of
an existing root, but does not currently, to the best of our knowledge,
meet the existing inclusion criteria, even though it is conceivable that
they would issue certificates to the public in the future.

* There are potential applicants for CA status who deploy a large number of
certificates, but only on their own infrastructure and for their own
domains, albeit that this infrastructure is public-facing rather than
company-internal.

* We have numerous government CAs in the program or in the inclusion
process that only intend to issue certificates to their own institutions.

* We have at least one CA applying for the program that (at least, it has
been reported in the press) is controlled by an entity which may wish to
use it for MITM.

There are many potential options for resolving this issue. Ideally, we
would like to establish some objective criteria that can be measured and
applied fairly. It’s possible that this could require us to define
different categories of CAs, each with different inclusion criteria. Or it
could be that we should remove the existing ‘relevance’ requirement and
inclusion guidelines and accept any applicant who can meet all of our other
requirements.

With this background, I would like to encourage everyone to provide
constructive input on this topic.

Thanks,

Wayne
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