On Thu, 8 Feb 2018 15:50:08 +0000 Gervase Markham via dev-security-policy <dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote:
> In this case, the certificates are revoked in Firefox via OneCRL and > Chrome via CRLSets (AIUI) and so the revocations are guaranteed to be > noticed. Hi Gerv, Independent of this specific case, which I guess is mostly harmless, I find this worrying. Let's assume something like this happens: * CA xyz, which is trusted by Mozilla and other root stores, issues a sub-certificate for company SuperShady Inc. Immediately after that CA xyz asks Mozilla to include it into OneCRL and Google to include it in CRLsets. * SuperShady Inc. starts selling certificates. Their offer is that you can get a certificate for every domain you want, the price depends on how popular the domain is. If you pay enough you can get a certificate that's valid for google.com or facebook.com. * SuperShady Inc. advertises their certificates with the fact that while they won't be valid in mainstream browsers due to revocation lists they still work in many situations, i.e. they will be considered valid by commandline tools or API calls from many programming languages as they don't include a mechanism like OneCRL. I'm aware that this goes into the tricky topic of people consuming the Mozilla CA root store without implementing the full certificate validation logic, which is already a problem with deprecated CAs like the old Symantec roots that are phased out. But this is much more sever. While we don't expect that the Symantec roots have been operated with the care we expect from a CA we also don't have any indication that they're used for outright malicious purposes. Yet I feel what you and others here are implying is that once a subca is part of OneCRL and revoked they're no longer bound to any standards at all. -- Hanno Böck https://hboeck.de/ mail/jabber: ha...@hboeck.de GPG: FE73757FA60E4E21B937579FA5880072BBB51E42 _______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy
